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2 
Introduction 
 
„Portfolios are usually marked to market at the middle of the bid-offer spread, 
and many hedge funds used models that incorporated this assumption. In late 
August, there was only one realistic value for portfolio: the bid price. 
Amid such massive sell-offs, only the first seller obtains a reasonable price for 
its security; the rest lose a fortune by having to pay a liquidity premium 
if they want to sell. …Models should be revised to include bid-offer 
behaviour.” 
 
Nicholas Dunbar („Meriwether’s Meltdown,” Risk, October 1998, 32-36) 
 
Liquidity is the essential condition of the normal functioning of financial 
markets and financial system. Only the appropriately liquid financial markets are able 
to function effectively, i.e. to transmit the savings to the users, and to aggregate 
market actors’ expectations and available information. The liquidity of markets, more 
precisely the lack of it affects the whole financial system, and indirectly through it the 
whole economy, thus inhibiting their normal, operational way of functioning. The 
financial crisis of 2008 has pointed to the outstanding importance of the liquidity of 
the financial system, and at the same time it pushed this question to the limelight. The 
revision and/or supplementation of the standard equilibrium and no-arbitrage models 
which assume the existence of  infinite market liquidity has become a necessity , as 
there is an evident need to develop new pricing models and risk management 
techniques.  
Although the scientific analysis of market liquidity has a history of a decade, 
only a relatively few generally accepted and widely spread results can be connected 
to this field because of the elusive nature of this concept. Another reason is the fact 
that the concept of liquidity and liquidity risk is used in various senses both in 
practice and in theoretical studies. Although these various interpretations are 
connected to each other by a multitude of ways, it is nonetheless important to single 
out at least the most important ones: 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
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1. in connection with  the liquidity of a portfolio and, in a broader sense, that 
of a company’s what we examine is whether it is able to fulfill its cash-
flow obligation as they become due;  
2. concerning the liquidity of a market, i.e. the market liquidity of a 
particular financial instrument what we  examine is whether we can trade 
with the given financial instrument at the spot market price in a reasonably 
big amount quickly with low transaction costs (spread); 
3. by the liquidity of the financial system we mean the free, available cash 
and cash equivalents volume present in the financial system. 
The above interpretations are evidently correlated, since for instance the 
liquidity of a portfolio/company is highly determined by the liquidity of the assets it 
consists of/has at its disposal, which is closely related to the liquidity of the financial 
system. In the same way, it is worth to make the following distinctions concerning 
liquidity risk as well: 
1. cash flow risk; 
2. risk of trading on an illiquid market, i.e. the price impact risk; 
3. risk of the liquidity circulating in the financial system to dry up, i.e. the 
system risk.  
The first interpretation is important to the portfolio managers and for 
corporate chief financial officers, the second is to the traders active on financial 
markets (indirectly issuers and investors), and the third is important to central banks 
and other supervisory institutions safeguarding the stability of the financial system. 
This also shows the diversity of the involved market participants and of the degree of 
involvement itself. 
In my dissertation I am especially concerned with market liquidity and 
trading risk from different aspects: both from theoretical and also empirical points of 
view. Parallel with my research we have made a series of interviews supported by the 
Budapest Stock Exchange, during which stock-traders and portfolio managers were 
asked about the practical ways they manage liquidity risk (see Szűcs and Váradi, 
2012). The responses I got from the interviews contributed to a large extent to the 
formation of and refining my research questions and hypotheses. During the 
interviews a view gradually emerged that dynamic portfolio optimization on illiquid 
markets is a remarkably complex problem, which cannot be regarded as solved either 
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from the practical or from the theoretical aspect for the time being. Market 
participants (in the absence of anything else) attempt to simplify the question, e.g. 
some are only willing to trade on liquid markets exclusively, while others decide on 
the portfolio they intend to create, then they give orders to traders who are specialized 
in carrying out the transaction of the requested size within a given time frame in a 
way that they are able to minimize the price impact of the transaction. Many others 
yet attempt to decrease liquidity risk during the build-up and/or the liquidation of a 
portfolio by setting up simple rules of thumb. In my dissertation I do not undertake 
the task of precisely describing and solving the optimization task, either, instead I 
attempt to take the first steps towards it by presenting the nature of liquidity risk and 
the options to manage it. 
On illiquid markets trading costs are significantly higher than on liquid 
markets, i.e. transactions can only be executed with a notably higher cost and time. 
Therefore it is not surprising that market participants’ basic requirement is that each 
stock’s liquidity should be comparable and the transaction costs quantifiable. 
Measuring liquidity is a complex problem in itself, it is difficult to express all of its 
aspects with one single indicator, and it is also hard to estimate how much cost 
illiquidity generates during the trade, since liquidity can be interpreted along different 
dimensions and thus at any given time one or another of its different attributes can 
come to the forefront. 
During my research I put strong emphasis on a liquidity indicator which 
quantifies the transaction costs of trading in the hypothetic and considerably extreme 
case when the buyer/seller is not willing to wait at all i.e. they intend to realize the 
transaction immediately, without any delay. This index is the so called Budapest 
Liquidity Measure (BLM), which has been created according to the pattern of the 
liquidity indicator firstly introduced and constantly published by Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, the Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM). The database has been provided to 
me by the Budapest Stock Exchange. 
My main goal was to help liquidity as a concept to be incorporated into the 
daily practice of risk management, i.e. to elaborate solutions which can be easily 
intruded into the daily practice, but also properly developed from a theoretical point 
of view. From the series of interviews it evidently turned out that a prerequisite for 
dynamic portfolio optimization would be to get a clear view on how the return, the 
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volatility and market liquidity of risky assets are correlated, i.e. what are the main 
attributes of this aggregated stochastic process. Accordingly during my research I 
have focused on three main issues: (1) I have examined the cross- and horizontal 
sectional statistical attributes of the BLM time series; (2) I have shown how the 
indicator can be integrated into a VaR-based risk management system; (3) I have 
deducted the correlation between the BLM and the so called price impact function, 
which is one of the essential concept of liquidity and is often analyzed in literature. 
With the help of this latter I have also empirically analyzed how price impact evolved 
on the Hungarian stock markets between 2007 and 2011. This period is especially 
interesting because it includes the escalation and the run-down of a major liquidity 
crisis. 
The three research issues also differ in the respect of the applied 
methodology: (1) I make a traditional descriptive statistical analysis on BLM 
database; (2) I build up a theoretical model which can be used in the field of risk 
management; (3) I make a time series analysis on the time series of the estimated 
price impact function. 
My dissertation consists of four chapters. In the first chapter I shortly sum up 
the basic concepts and main contexts, the ensuing three chapters center around the 
three research questions and my own results concerning them. 
In the first chapter I outline the operation of the stock markets and the main 
attributes of quote driven and order driven markets. In addition, I also give a detailed 
description about the statistical characteristics of the order book which is used on 
order driven markets based on the results of the earlier empirical research. This is 
significant because the BLM database is based on the order book, namely it actually 
condenses the pieces of information in the order book by way of a special 
transformation. 
In the second chapter I present the basic concepts concerning market 
liquidity, the dimensions along which it can be measured and the main indicators 
which can quantify certain aspects of market liquidity. I give a detailed description 
about the build-up of the BLM indicator and the process of its calculation. I review 
the Hungarian research literature made concerning market liquidity on the Budapest 
Stock Exchange. Subsequently I present my own research results, i.e. the traditional 
statistical analysis of BLM, the analysis of the relation between BLM and other 
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liquidity indicators (e.g. bid-ask spread and turnover) and the co-movement of BLM 
and volatility before and after the crisis. The daily BLM time series create an 
opportunity to have a thorough knowledge on its temporal and cross-sectional 
behaviour. 
In the third chapter I introduce a possible model with which the BLM 
indicator can easily be integrated into VaR (value at risk) based systems which 
support market risk management. Here the underlying idea is that on illiquid markets 
a value of an asset is not equal to its last market price. Namely, the buy/sell 
transaction reacts to the price and shifts it into the opposite direction. In this situation 
it is reasonable to determine the return in a way that we take the expected opposite 
price impact into consideration. In the second part of the chapter I give a detailed 
description of liquidity adjusted VaR models (LAVaR) which can be found in the 
literature, and then about my own theoretical model. I regard this latter as one of my 
most important innovative achievements. 
In the fourth chapter I describe one of the central concepts of the topic of 
market liquidity, the so-called price impact function, which shows the relative price-
shift caused by a particular order. The knowledge of the behavioural attributes of the 
price impact function has particularly great significance for market participants, since 
with its help they can predict the price impact concerning their orders to be given in 
the future, i.e. the expected surplus cost caused by a price-shift. In this chapter I 
describe the difference between the virtual and the empirical price impact functions, 
and I also present a method of estimation of a price impact function with the help of 
the Budapest Liquidity Measure. Based on the method I elaborated market 
participants can simply and quickly estimate a virtual price impact function without 
knowing the whole order book in detail. Finally, I also conclude the examination of 
the time variation and the basic statistical attributes of the virtual price impact 
function estimated from the BLM database. Based on this function I examine whether 
the time variation of liquidity is predictable, i.e. whether the process has a memory, 
and if yes, then for how long the impact of shocks prevail. Furthermore, I also 
examine the nature of the trend and the height of the volatility which characterize the 
price impact and whether the process of price impact is a mean-reverting process. I 
summarize these results in the last part of the chapter. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
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Some studies have been published in the Hungarian literature in which market 
liquidity was analyzed on different markets. However, only a few of these were 
concerned specifically with the liquidity of Budapest Stock Exchange. I base my 
dissertation on the findings of these studies, but in many respect I extend and exceed 
them inasmuch the circle of research questions, their depths and also the size of the 
examined database are concerned.  
The main achievements of my dissertation, which can be regarded as my own 
contribution to the examined field of finance on Hungarian and on international 
levels, are the following: 
1. Simple liquidity indicators (bid-ask spread, turnover) do not measure the 
transaction cost-type aspects of illiquidity appropriately; therefore it can be 
misleading to rank different markets according to them, or to base dynamic 
portfolio optimization on these indicators. This is especially true in case of a crisis 
or on illiquid markets. 
2. Based on the examination of the relationship between liquidity and volatility, it 
can be stated that the 2007/2008 crisis can also be regarded as a liquidity crisis, 
i.e. the increased indirect trading costs cannot exclusively be attributed to 
increased volatility. 
3. I have split the return (net return) into two major parts, namely I quantified the 
proportion of the transaction costs due to illiquidity (liquidity risk) inside the 
return, and the proportion of the shift of the mid price (price risk). I incorporated 
this net return into a VaR-based risk management system (LAVaR). 
4. In the LAVaR model I have shown that in the case of stock portfolios liquidity 
costs can be diversified. 
5. I have elaborated a way to estimate the virtual price impact function from the 
BLM database. 
6. I accomplished the time series analysis of the estimated virtual price impact 
function. 
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I. The order book 
 
1. Trading on stock exchange 
 
Financial markets can be classified and distinguished based on different 
attributes. There are a number of market characteristics which influence market 
microstructure and thus have an effect on market price formation and transaction 
costs. A vast number of studies prove that different market microstructures have an 
effect on features like price-formation, liquidity, the returns realized by investors and 
finally the way these affect the general market efficiency (e.g.: O’Hara, 1995). Before 
the detailed description of the concept of liquidity I intend to enumerate the types of 
stock trade and the trading methods that market participants are provided with. The 
following enumeration gives a broad picture of how the stock market functions, as 
well as of the features of market microstructure and of the differences between 
markets. 
 
Characteristics of market microstructure: 
1. Participants: Various participants can be present on the markets e.g.: institutional 
investors (hedge funds, banks, enterprises, etc.), agents with intermediary role 
(brokers), traders, dealers, private individuals, etc. The number of participants and 
their market share, namely the market concentration are also important from the 
point of view of market microstructure. 
2. Primary and secondary markets: Security issuance happens on primary markets 
where it basically takes place via investment banks. However, trading with the 
issued securities takes place on secondary markets: the stock exchange. 
Furthermore, there also exist a tertiary and a quarternary market. On the tertiary 
markets participants trade with listed stocks outside the stock exchange (OTC – 
over the counter), which is less regulated than the trading on stock exchange. But 
these OTC markets have a more regulated form: the multilateral trading facility 
(MTF) which is a new legal category created by the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID). The crucial difference between the stock 
exchange and MTF is that while regulated markets can only be operated by 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
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organizations having an exclusive operating license, namely they are market 
operators, MTF can also be run by authorized investment enterprises, credit 
institutions or even by regulated markets (Gellén, 2009, p. 214). Apart from 
MTFs there exists another tertiary market category, which is regulated by MiFID: 
the „dark pools”, whose aim is to enable the big institutional investors to make 
large ticket transactions via organized trading systems without significant 
transaction costs (Réz, 2011). On the quarternary markets investors directly trade 
with listed securities outside the stock exchange without brokers/dealers. This 
trading method started to improve by leaps and bounds in the last years as a result 
of the spread of the common electronic platform, called Electronic 
Communication Network (ECN) (Bodie et al. 2005, p. 91).  
3. Characteristics of the product: The attributes of the product have an effect on 
price-formation, namely there are some products whose prices evolve 
independently, but there are markets where prices are determined by prices of 
other markets. An example is the market of derivative products, whose prices are 
determined by the underlying product. When considering the relationship between 
a derivative and the underlying product it is important to pay attention to the 
following attributes: 
a) whether the two products complement or substitute each another. 
b) whether the underlying product is traded or not. For instance in the case of a 
weather derivative the underlying product is not traded. 
c) whether the underlying product can be delivered at the expiry of the derivative 
product. Also in the case of a weather derivative the underlying product is not 
traded and it also cannot be delivered, whilst for instance in the case of buying 
a stock futures/forward the underlying product is traded and it is also 
deliverable at the expiry. 
d) whether there is a cost of carry during the holding period of the underlying 
product, as for example a storing cost of commodities. It is also crucial in this 
case whether the underlying product is stored at all. For instance, electricity as 
an underlying product that can be delivered, but it cannot be stored. 
4. Order types: Markets can also be characterized by different types of orders, e.g. 
stop, limit, market, hidden, etc. These orders will be more exhaustively described 
in Subchapter 1.3. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
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5. Mechanism of price-determination: There are three significant markets from this 
respect. The first one is the direct market, where market participants trade directly 
with each other. The second one is the broker/dealer market where trading is 
realized through intermediaries. Finally, the third one is the auction market where 
actors participate in the trade with or without dealers and brokers. 
6. Presence of market makers: On quote driven markets a market maker is present 
on one side of each transaction. The market makers can be divided into two big 
groups: the Designated Market Makers (DMM-s) who are always obligated to 
quote a bid and an ask price, and the Supplemental Liquidity Providers (SLP-s) 
who are obligated to quote only a bid or an ask price in order to provide market 
liquidity. Another big group of markets are the order driven markets where 
participants directly trade with each other without the market makers’ presence. 
The operation of quote and order driven markets will be more exhaustively 
presented in Subchapters 1.2 and 1.3. 
7. Information, transparency: Markets also highly differ to the extent they provide 
information for e.g. brokers, clients or any other market participants. 
Transparency means the quantity and quality of information available for the 
participants. Such information can be for example the publication of the different 
price levels in the pre-trade phase, the order prices or market depth (Madhavan, 
2002). Moreover, there are differences in the speed of information dissemination 
e.g. whether real-time or delayed data are provided for the market participants. As 
far as information is concerned another crucial question is anonymity, since if the 
market participant is aware of the broker’s or dealer's identity then they are able 
to get extra information, which helps them to more easily filter out the trading 
strategies based on order splitting (Margitai, 2009, p. 6). 
8. Transaction costs: Markets may vary in respect of transaction costs e.g.: 
brokerage fees, commissions, etc. 
9. Level of automatization: markets also differ in this respect. The two great 
extremes are floor trading and electronic trading. An instance for electronic trade 
is the SuperDot system, which typically supports programmed trading, block 
transactions and orders that consists of more than one transaction. It helps orders 
to be executed quickly, 95% of the transactions are realized within 1 minute. 
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10. Other regulations, protocols: 
a) Level of standardization: The main difference between stock exchanges and 
OTC markets lies in their degree of standardization. While during a futures 
contract on the stock exchange trade can only be realized with pre-determined 
amounts, expiration, etc., on OTC markets transactions are increasedly 
personalized. 
b) Centralization: Markets can be divided into two main groups: they can 
provide trading with financial instruments in a centralized or decentralized 
way. An example of the decentralized market is the foreign exchange markets, 
where traders are physically dispersed and they are also market makers at the 
same time. Centralized trade is the stock exchanges, for example the Budapest 
Stock Exchange (BSE). 
c) Physical delivery: from the aspect of trade it is important whether the products 
featuring in the transaction have to be delivered, or is it sufficient to make a 
financial settlement. For example in case of an index forward contract at 
expiry there is no delivery obligation, as the underlying product, the index is 
not traded on the spot market. 
d) Continuity: A vast number of trading systems operate only periodically i.e. a 
trade can only be executed during definite periods of time, while there are 
systems in which trades are continuous, i.e. the market is always open 
(Madhavan, 2002). However, in the case of continuous trading markets are 
also closed from Friday midnight until Sunday night, because this is the time 
interval when there is weekend in all time zones of the world. Such 
continuous trading is typical for foreign exchange markets. An example for 
periodic system is the Budapest Stock Exchange where orders are collected in 
the order book until the so called „market clearing” time. According to this, 
the trading at BSE can be divided into a continuous and an auction phase. 
Continuous trading lasts from 9:02 A.M. until 5:00 P.M. preceeded by an 
opening and closed by a closing order collecting phase. 
e) Protocols: Protocols serve as a regulated framework for the trading. They 
regulate e.g. the minimum amount of trading, the suspension and the pause of 
the trade, the special rules of opening, closing and reopening, etc. (Madhavan, 
2002). 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
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f) Settlement rules: there are different settlement systems, in some of them 
settlements are T+3- or T+5-day and they can also be different if they have a 
central settlement house, the so called clearing house, which holds the 
counterparty risk during the transaction. On OTC markets transactions are 
directly realized between the seller and the buyer, there is no clearing house, 
thus the partner risk is more significant than it is during trading on the stock 
exchange. 
g) Permission of short selling: Markets highly differ in respect of short selling 
i.e. whether there is a possibility to sell a security which is not physically 
owned at the time of the sale. 
 
Table 1 shows how trading systems differ in some attributes in different 
markets of the world.  
 
Table 1: Trading systems 
Attributes Typical ECN 
NYSE1 
Open 
Market 
NYSE 
Intraday 
trading 
Paris 
Stock 
Exchange 
Chicago 
Board 
of Trade 
FX2 
Markets BSE 
Continuity X  X X X X  
Presence of 
market maker  X X  X   
Level of  
automatization X   X   X 
Anonymity X X  X    
Pre-trade 
order  
collection 
X  X X X  X 
Post-trade 
reports X X X X X X X 
Source: Madhavan (2002), p. 34, and my own additions 
 
The literature of market microstructure is more thoroughly concerned with the 
question of how these different market structures affect prices and the market 
operation. The main market processes which can be affected by market 
microstructure: 
- Predictability of returns (efficiency, memory); 
- Distribution of the returns (expected return, volatility, normal or extreme 
distributions); 
                                                 
1
 New York Stock Exchange 
2
 Foreign Exchange markets 
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- Correlation between markets; 
- The possibility to manipulate returns, emergence of bubbles, shock 
deceleration, stability/instability, systemic risk; 
- Liquidity, trading volumes. 
 
A vast number of studies attempt to find the relation between market 
microstructure attributes and market processes e.g. how trading volumes and returns 
were affected by the ban or the reporting obligation of short positions (Boehmer et al., 
2010), etc. In this dissertation I examine market liquidity which correlates with the 
above characteristics. From this point of view the mechanism of price-determination 
(point 5) is especially significant, and that is why I intend to give a detailed 
explanation about it in the following point. 
 
1.1. The mechanism of price-determination 
 
As far as market price-determination is concerned the simplest is the direct 
market (prices are random, transparency and liquidity are low). Dealer/broker 
markets, where one can trade through dealers and brokers, are slightly more 
sophisticated. Dealers and brokers realize their profit from the difference of bid and 
ask price and they provide liquidity in return.  Auction markets are the most complex. 
Auction markets can either be unilateral, e.g. when the issuer invites all the potential 
buyers interested in the product, gathers their orders and quotes prices accordingly 
(its mechanism can be manifold). It can also be bilateral, when sellers and buyers are 
both present and they hand in their orders simultaneously, which are to be matched 
according to some algorithm.3 Therefore, on an auction market liquidity is provided 
not primarily by dealers and brokers, instead the actors directly find each other hence 
a significant part of the broker fees can be saved. From the point of view of price-
determination the sophistication is shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
3
 On the operation of auctions see a detailed description from Szatmári, 1996.  
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Figure 1: Market types from the aspect of price-determination 
 
Source: proprietary 
 
Intermediaries can be brokers, dealers, specialists and market makers. The 
difference between them is that as opposed to dealers brokers are not allowed to trade 
for their own account. Moreover dealers generally have a significant amount of 
stock/open positions in the given security or product. Furthermore, the specialist is a 
market leader of whom there is only one in each market, therefore only one specialist 
sets the price for all stocks, while market makers are those market leaders, of whom 
there can be several in the same market. 
Broker/dealer markets can either be negotiated or posted. On negotiated 
markets orders are not visible, but dealers/brokers find each other according to 
different heuristics (e.g. walking on the floor or phoning, etc.), collect some orders 
and taking the prices and the partner risk into consideration they pick the most 
attractive one and then they conclude the transaction. Posted markets can either 
function in a way that the market maker constantly publishes the order prices in its 
own order book. They are obligated to trade with a minimum amount at this order 
price. The other option, which is the way order driven markets work, is that they 
aggregate the constantly incoming buy/sell limit price orders and make this 
information available in the so called order book. Figure 2 shows the different 
variations of broker/dealer markets and their relationship with auction markets.  
 
Direct search 
market Auction market 
Broker/dealer 
market 
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Figure 2: The relationship of auction and broker/dealer markets 
 
 
Source: proprietary 
 
The above listed different price-determination mechanisms are not separate, 
they can also operate simultaneously, e.g. besides a posted option there can be a 
possibility of a negotiated deal (e.g. NASDAQ4); or on order driven markets market 
makers can work in addition to the order book e.g. by constantly filling up the order 
book with their own bid and ask prices. For example on the market of Hungarian 
government bonds the issuance is realized on a unilateral auction market, then the 
bonds are traded in a broker/dealer system (secondary market) parallel with the 
primary dealers’ continuous price-quotations (Balogh and Kóczán, 2008).  
This dichotomy can also be observed at the Budapest Stock Exchange, i.e. it 
has two different auction systems at the opening/closing phase and during the 
daytime trading. At the opening and closing phase trading is realized in an auction 
system in which the market-clearing price (the price at which the most transactions 
are realized) is the opening and closing price, while during the day the auction system 
functions continuously in an order-driven way based on the order book. Therefore the 
order driven mechanism can be equivalent to a constant, bilateral auction (DCA – 
double continuous auction) (Farmer et al., 2002). In the following part I intend to list 
the characteristics of the auction-, order driven and quote driven markets.   
 
                                                 
4
 The NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) is an electronic 
stock exchange which has the greates turnover in the world. 
 
Negotiated market 
 
Posted market 
Quote driven 
markets 
Order driven 
markets 
Bilateral 
auction 
 
Broker/dealer 
market 
Unilateral 
auction 
 
 
Auction market 
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1.2. Quote driven markets 
 
The main attribute of the quote driven markets is that the so called market 
makers have an intermediary function between buyers and sellers. Their primary duty 
is to give a bilateral quotation, thus providing market liquidity. The market makers 
are always obligated to set a price both on the bid (buy) and ask (sell) sides. This 
means that there is a market maker on one side of every transaction. They have to 
execute the transaction either from their own stock of securities or by matching it 
with another transaction. The market makers’ goal is to gain the spread (the 
difference between the bid and ask prices), independently of the movement of current 
market prices. Thus for them it is important to have a high turnover and a lot of 
incoming orders so that they can turn over their stock, thus profiting from the spread. 
However, market makers have to quote a price which do not significantly 
influence market price, i.e. they have to give a price on both bid and ask sides which 
encompasses the real market price of the given product. It is important to have about 
the same volume of buy and sell orders therefore market makers should only have 
their income from spreads, and they should not have an interest in influencing market 
price. Otherwise market makers would accumulate a short or a long position of a 
certain financial product and then they would have an interest in shifting prices in 
their own favor. Inspite of this the hold of a neutral position, i.e. zero stock very 
rarely occurs (Parlour and Seppi, 2008).  
Quote driven markets are widely spread among financial markets. For instance 
NASDAQ or even LSE (London Stock Exchange) function this way. 
  
1.3. Order driven markets 
 
Many stock exchanges around the world function as order driven markets. For 
example the Paris Bourse (Paris Stock Exchange) and even Budapest Stock Exchange 
belong to this category. My dissertation centers around order driven markets, as my 
empirical analysis is based on the database provided by BSE. 
Markets where there is no assigned market maker but there is a constant flow 
of bilateral trading and the recording and matching of orders are executed with the 
help of an electronic trading system are called order driven markets (Bouchaud et al. 
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2008). As there are no market makers on this market, it can sometimes be extremely 
illiquid, where transactions cannot be realized, because on one side – e.g. on the 
buyer side – there are no participants. This generally happens in extreme economic 
situations, for example during a crisis. In such cases the maintenance of the proper 
functioning of the market is secured by rules and protocols of the stock exchanges 
(Madhavan, 2002). 
In order driven markets orders are collected in the so called order book, which 
thus contains all buy and sell orders. The book always contains the price and the 
volume for each price level for any given moment and it can be seen by market 
participants (typically the first five or ten rows). Table 2 shows a fictive order book.  
 
Table 2: The order book 
Bidsize Bidprice Askprice Asksize 
300 8,270 8,275 200 
622 8,262 8,276 400 
400 8,251 8,280 320 
721 8,241 8,290 22 
1,200 8,237 8,291 66 
Source: proprietary  
 
In the first row sets out the best buy price (bidprice) and volume (bidsize), and 
the best sell price (askprice) and volume (asksize). The second best prices and 
volumes are in the next row, etc. The prompt bid-ask spread is the difference of the 
bid and ask price of the best order level. 
When a new order arrives to the market, e.g. a bid order, it gets into the book 
in case it is lower than the best ask order, then it is considered to be a limit order. In 
case the bid order is equal to or has a higher value than the best ask order in the book, 
the transaction is immediately realized. Such type of order is called market order (Iori 
et al. 2003). 
On the whole the order book contains only the limit orders. These orders, 
according to the above, only stay in the order book until they are matched with a 
market order or another limit order,5 or until they are withdrawn.  
The main difference between the two order types is that market participants 
who give a limit order are willing to wait in order to have their orders realized at the 
                                                 
5
 In case it is matched with a limit price order, the given order can be regarded as a market order since 
the transaction is immediately realized and the order did not get into the book.  
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preferred price; whilst those who give a market order are impatient, and find it 
important to realize their orders immediately. Thus, participants who give a limit 
order provide the supply of market liquidity (liquidity providers), whilst those giving 
a market order are the demand for liquidity (liquidity takers). For liquidity providers 
the most interesting thing are the time and the number of transactions their offers take 
to realize, while for liquidity takers the most important is to know how much their 
transactions are likely to shift the market price (Bookstaber, 1999). 
Therefore, on the whole on order driven markets liquidity is provided by limit 
orders, whilst those who give a market order are the users of this liquidity. Therefore 
market liquidity depends exclusively on the supply and demand for such liquidity. 
In addition to limit orders and market orders there are numerous order types at 
the market participants’ disposal, which can be regarded as variations of these two 
order types. They typically differ from the above described two orders in their 
validity period (e.g. day order, good till cancel, etc.), or market participants may 
incidentally subject the order execution to some other conditions (e.g. stop-loss order, 
„iceberg order”, etc.).6 
The sequence of different orders is called the orderflow on which the order 
book is based. Figure 3 demonstrates the way an order book builds up from different 
order types. It shows that as soon as a market order arrives, it is fulfilled on the best 
bid or ask level. The priority of the fulfillment of the incoming orders is first based on 
the price, and then on the time. If the volume of the market order is bigger than the 
available amount at the best price level then the orders at the following order levels 
are realized until the total volume of the market order is executed. Nevertheless, in 
reality this means that the total volume of the market order submitted by the given 
trader will be realized at a worse average price than the price available at the best 
price level, because not only the first, but several price levels could be eventually 
deleted from the book. On the whole it can be regarded as a cost of an immediate 
purchase due to its higher volume that is currently available at the best price level. 
However, such market order leads to a modification in the bid-ask spread and it also 
changes the mid price, which is exactly halfway between the best bid and ask orders. 
                                                 
6
  About order types see: Budapest Stock Exchange’s homepage: 
http://bet.hu/topmenu/befektetok/tozsde_lepesrol_lepesre/azonnali_piacismeretek/hogyan_kereskedjun
k_a_tozsden/tozsdei_megbizasok or New York Stock Exchange’s homepage: 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/fact_sheet_nyse_orders.pdf 
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Figure 3: The order book and the orderflow 
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Source: Farmer et al., 2004, p. 3. 
 
Orderflow is actually the resultant of three stochastic factors7 such as:  
- Price  
- Signed volume  
- Time 
The limit order price, the intended bid and ask volume and the time of order 
arrivals are stochastic. The current order book evolves according to the constantly 
incoming orders. Therefore, the distribution of order prices and volumes in the order 
book reflects the process of all three stochastic factors. To know the nature of this 
distribution is crucial for market participants. 
One of the most important questions from the aspect of risk management is 
the occurrence probability of extreme values. If for example the particular stochastic 
variables (order book price or volume) follow normal distribution, then events beyond 
three sigmas (three times bigger than the standard deviation) practically never occur, 
therefore it is not necessary to be particularly prepared for such events in the frame of 
                                                 
7
 More detailed on the stochastic processes see Medvegyev and Száz (2010), where one can read about 
the relevance and applications of the stochastic processes on the field of finance (e.g. Homolya and 
Benedek, 2007). 
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risk management. Figure 4 shows the probability density function of the normal 
distribution and the probability of event occurrence beyond three sigmas.  
 
Figure 4: Probability density function of the normal distribution 
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Source: proprietary 
 
As opposed to the above situation if fat-tailed distributions characterize these 
values, the probability of extreme values is remarkably higher, thus we should pay 
special attention to such occurrences in the frame of risk management.8 Thus it is not 
surprising that the analysis of distribution characteristics is the central theme of a 
multitude of studies. Empirical examinations mostly show that in the order book 
prices and volumes – independently from the examined period and market – follow 
an exponential distribution, their density function is shown in Figure 5. 
Compared to normal distribution, the exponential distribution assigns a 
remarkably higher probability to extreme events; therefore there is no practical barrier 
for the occurrence of the most extreme cases. It follows from the above that the 
importance of risk management moves into the forefront and it is not sufficient to 
prepare for the normal business, but it is also important to have a disaster or 
contingency-plan. 
                                                 
8
 Probability is an important notion of risk management. The connections, differences of the notions of 
risk-uncertainty-probablility can be found in detailed at Hitelintézeti Szemle’s special edition in 2011. 
The title is: „Vélekedés a kockázatról és bizonytalanságról”. The authors of the articles are: Bélyácz, 
2011; Badics, 2011; Dömötör, 2011; Krekó, 2011; Kovács, 2011; Medvegyev, 2011; Száz 2011. 
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Figure 5: Probability density function of the exponential distribution 
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Source: proprietary 
 
For instance extreme returns are usually characterized by exponential-like 
distributions. In a basic case returns are regarded to be normally distributed, but it is a 
stylized fact that the density function of the empirical distribution of returns are more 
fat-tailed than it could be justified by the normal distribution, i.e. its drop is less steep 
at the tails. Empirical research shows that on the sides the drop of the function is 
exponential-like, i.e. on the sides return (r) can be modeled according to the following 
formula: ( ) α≈〉 x/1xrp , where α  ≈ 3 which is called tailindex (Tulassay, 2009). The 
lower the tailindex value is, the more fat-tailed the distribution is, but its typical value 
is cca. between 2 and 3 (Clauset et al., 2009). In the following Subchapter 2, I 
examine the different distributions characterizing the orderflow and the statistical 
attributes of the order book. 
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2. The statistical attributes of the order book 
 
A vast number of studies have been published about the statistical attributes of 
the financial markets in the recent few decades, and researchers found very similar 
results whether they examined commodities markets (Mandelbrot, 1963), the foreign 
exchange or the stock exchange markets (Fama, 1965, Cont, 2001, etc.) in different 
parts of the world. Researchers have found similar phenomena in every market, which 
they have summed up under the name of stylized facts. These stylized facts are for 
instance: 
- volatility clustering,  
- the fat-tailed, exponential-like drop of returns,  
- the low effect fundamental news have on prices,  
- leverage effect (The correlation is negative between the price change and 
volatility. When prices fall, the leverage increases as well, and generally 
volatility is increasing also.), 
- autocorrelation of returns, 
- stock prices fluctuate more than it could be justified by the fundamentals, 9 
- benefit/loss asymmetry (i.e. their fluctuations are not symmetric). 
 
The main goal of these studies was to test the efficiency of markets. Their 
intention was to build models, or find market phenomena which would enable them 
to forecast returns. The efficient market hypothesis says that market prices „fully 
reflect” all the available information market participants have (Fama, 1970, p. 383). 
This means, that all information concerning the appropriate values of securities are 
reflected in the prices, so no one can earn unusual ex ante profits on a consistent basis 
using known information set (Pilbeam, 2010). According to the efficient market 
hypothesis, only new information will change the prices, so at the end the daily 
returns will be normally distributed and independent, because the arrival of new 
information at the market is random (Száz, 2009). 
                                                 
9
  For instance Joulin et al. (2008) showed that the volatility after price jumps is too high to be justified 
by the change in fundamentals.   
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Since the returns are in the focus of the efficient market hypothesis, the 
research have focused on them. These studies haven’t provided any breakthrough 
results, they couldn’t verify nor deny the efficient market hypothesis.  
Research have recently begun to focus much more on analyzing the statistical 
attributes of the order book, because the change in the order book leads to the price 
changing on the markets, thus the given orders can be regarded as the most basic part 
of price-formation. Hence the examination of the order book is important both for 
market participants and academic professionals, because it provides information 
about trade and price-formation processes.  
One part of scientific articles concerned with the order book attributes, tend to 
approach their subject mostly from a theoretical point of view. These studies are, 
among others, the following articles: Bouchaud et al. (2002), Bak et al. (1997), Chan 
et al. (2001), Luckock (2001), Slanina (2001), Daniels et al. (2002), Challet and 
Stinchcombe (2001), Willmann et al. (2003), Maslov (2000) and the works of Maslov 
and Mills (2001). 
The other part of the academic articles have statistically analyzed the order 
book from various perspectives, of which the most important ones are the following:  
- the distribution of the distance of limit order prices from the actual market 
price (Bouchaud and Potters, 2002; Zovko and Farmer, 2002; Bouchaud et 
al., 2008),  
- the examination of the order book shape: the location of its maximum, the 
distribution of the volumes on the bid and ask sides (Bouchaud and Potters, 
2002; Maslov and Mills, 2001; Zovko and Farmer, 2002; Bouchaud et al., 
2008; Lillo and Farmer, 2004; Mike and Farmer, 2008), 
- attributes of the order volume (Gopikrishnan et al., 2000; Gabaix et al., 2003; 
Maslov and Mills, 2001; Margitai, 2009; Bouchaud et al., 2008; Lillo and 
Farmer, 2004), 
- the distribution of different order types (Lillo and Farmer, 2004),  
- persistence of transaction signs (Lillo and Farmer, 2004; Margitai, 2009; 
Lillo et al., 2005), and 
- the effect of the supply and demand on stock returns (Plerou et al., 2002; 
Bouchaud et al., 2004; Maslov and Mills, 2001; Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 
2002). 
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2.1. Attributes of order prices 
 
Bouchaud and Potters (2002) have analyzed the statistical attributes of the 
order book via the database of NASDAQ and Paris Bourse. Among others, they have 
analyzed the distribution of the prices of the limit orders. They examined the distance 
between the current price and the incoming limit order. They called this distance delta 
(∆). Concerning Paris Bourse they came to the conclusion that delta (∆) follows a 
power-law distribution, regardless whether it was a bid or an ask order. They have 
given the following estimation to the distribution function:  
 
( ) µ+
µ
∆+
∆
∝∆ 1
0
1
)(P ,     (1) 
 
where the exponent was estimated to be µ ≈ 0.6. This result is similar to Zovko and 
Farmer’s (2002), with the difference that the value of their exponent (µ) was 1.5. 
According to the authors the reason of this difference can be the fact that Zovko and 
Farmer examined the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) database, where the examined 
database they were provided with did not contain all of the orders, because only a 
particular selection of orders get to the electronic system used by LSE; whilst in the 
case of Paris Bourse the electronic system contains all of the orders. 
Bouchaud and Potters (2002) have also examined the distribution of the 
distance of the prices of the limit orders from the mid price in the case of securities 
traded on NASDAQ, and they found that the security itself under examination had a 
high impact on the results.10 However, the character of the distribution i.e. how 
slowly the density function of the distribution decreases on the sides, was very similar 
to that of the French stocks. This phenomenon – market participants give numerous 
orders far from the mid price – was explained by Zovko and Farmer (2002), 
Bouchaud and Potters, (2002), and Bouchaud et al. (2008) with the fact that market 
participants think that a big jump in prices is always possible, and this is why they 
give orders which are further from the mid price. They do this in order to take 
advantage of the eventual big price-shifts. 
                                                 
10
 They have examined two investment funds: QQQ and SPY, two indexes: Nasdaq and S&P 500 and 
one stock: Microsoft.  
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2.2. Shape of the order book 
 
The studies on the statistical attributes of the order book focused on the shape 
of the order book. Researchers have counted the number of orders on each price level. 
Beforehand we could have expected that the orderflow is the biggest around the 
current market price, and the further we go the orders are fewer. However, we have to 
take into consideration that an order close to the market price is more likely to get out 
of the book either because it is matched with a market order or because it is cancelled. 
This is why the shape of the order book is not evident. 
In the case of Paris Bourse Bouchaud and Potters (2002) found that the 
function was symmetric,11 therefore its shape was identical on ask and bid side. 
Taking an average order book into consideration we can observe that the function 
does not reach its maximum at the current best bid or ask order, but slightly further 
away from it. The researchers have pointed out, that the further we are from the mid 
price, the fewer order is in the book. In the case of NASDAQ database it could only 
be observed with one traded fund (the QQQ) that the function does not reach its 
maximum at the best order level. In the case of the other examined fund, indexes and 
Microsoft’s shares the function reached its maximum at the best bid and ask order, 
and then it gradually decreased. This result is identical to Maslov and Mills’ results 
(2001), who in connection with the data of NASDAQ Level II also found that the 
majority of the orders could be found at the best order level in the book. According to 
researchers the difference between the two function forms is again due to the fact that 
not all of the traded volumes appear in the database. 
Zovko and Farmer (2002) and Bouchaud and Potters (2002) have both 
explained the order book shape with the fact that on the best price levels orders did 
not stay in the book long enough, because they can either be executed or cancelled. 
Zovko and Farmer (2002), and Bouchaud et al. (2008) have also shown that the 
further the order was from the best price, the more time it stayed in the book. Namely, 
the market participants who make this sort of order in the book are willing to wait and 
they do not cancel the order, because they would like to gain from the price shift. In 
contrast, those who give their orders around the best order level are active market 
participants, who regularly hand in orders to the book (Bouchaud és Potters, 2002). 
                                                 
11
 They examined the time-averaged size in the function of the distance of the mid price. 
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The orders of these  participants’ are either quickly matched with a market order or in 
case it does not take place and market participants observe that the market price 
changes in an unfavorable way, they prefer to cancel the order and hand in another 
one, because they are less willing to wait. 
Examining LSE data Lillo and Farmer (2004) have found that 32% of the 
cancellations were from the best price level, while the other 68% were cancelled 
inside the book. Mike and Farmer (2008) have also examined the distribution of the 
lifetime of cancelled orders. They have found that it can also be approached with a 
power-law distribution. 
According to the authors, the cancellation rate, which was measured by the 
reciprocal value of the lifetime, can depend on more factors, of which I intend to 
emphasize two significant ones: 
1. the further an order is from the best price level, the higher the conditional 
probability of the cancellation is, 
2. if the number of orders on bid and ask sides are highly unbalanced, it also 
raises the probability of cancellation.  
Referring to the order book shape, Maslov and Mills (2001) provide another 
interesting result. They have found that the bid-ask spread was smaller by 10-20% 
than the average distance between levels in the order book. Moreover, jumps on the 
ask side are by 5-10% bigger than the ones on the bid side. However, they could not 
verify whether it was generally true for the order book, or only a particular attribute 
of the examined day. 
 
2.3. Attributes of order volumes 
 
Numerous researchers have examined the orders according to the submitted 
volumes. Some of them have found that the distribution of the volumes of the 
submitted orders could be described with a power-law distribution, while others have 
found a gamma distribution12 for both the bid and the ask sides. 
                                                 
12
 Gamma distribution is a two-parametered (p and λ) continuous distribution whose density function 
is ( ) ( )p
ex
xf
x1pp
Γ
λ
=
λ−−
, where Γ(p) is the gamma function ( ( ) ∫
∞
−−
=Γ
0
t1p dtetp ) (Spiegel et al. 2000).  
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Power-law distribution was found by, among others, Gopikrishnan et al. 
(2000), where the authors got the following result for distribution of the submitted 
volume (Q) within a certain time interval (∆t): 
 
( ) λ+
∆
∆ ≈ 1
t
t Q
1QP
     (2) 
 
Concerning one thousand American stocks, the authors have given the 
following estimation for the exponent: λ=1.7 +/- 0.1. Gabaix et al. (2003) have found 
the same result when examining the 30 biggest Parisian stocks with the difference 
that they have given a 1.5 estimation for the exponent (λ). Maslov and Mills (2001) 
having examined the data of NASDAQ Level II got the result 1.4 +/- 0.1 for the 
exponent concerning all of the orders, whilst concerning the limit orders only they 
estimated the exponent to be 1+/- 0.3. 
Margitai (2009) has also examined the distribution of the order volume on the 
Hungarian database: in the case of MOL stocks. His aim was to find out whether the 
Pareto,13 or the gamma distributions suits the empirical database better. As a result he 
found that the distribution of the order volume can be properly approached by Pareto 
distribution, where he estimated the value for the exponent to be 1.25. The gamma 
distribution did not fit the empirical data distribution appropriately, which in the 
author’s opinion is the consequence of the fact that the tail of the density function of 
the empirical distribution is power-law-like, while the tail of the density function of 
the gamma distribution is exponential-like. 
Another part of researchers have estimated a gamma distribution for the 
distribution of the order volume. Bouchaud et al. (2008) belong to these researchers, 
who have examined the data of Paris Bourse, and also Lillo and Farmer (2004), who 
studied the London Stock Exchange data. 
A number of researchers have also examined whether there is persistence in 
the database in the case of the submitted volume. Gopikrishnan et al. (2000), Lillo 
                                                 
13
 Pareto distribution is a special continuous type power-law distribution. This distribution is often 
referred to as  „80/20” rule, because its characteristics is that the 20% of possible events occur with an 
80% probability, while 80% of events occur with a probability of 20%. This distribution suits a 
numerous natural and economical phenomena. I.e. 80% of world wealth accumulates in the hands of 
the 20% of the population, while the remaining 80% possesses only the 20% of this wealth (Spiegel et 
al. 2000).  
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
28 
and Farmer (2004), and Margitai (2009) have also found that there was a significant 
persistence in the time-series, i.e. the autocorrelation function of the volumes have 
shown that there was a positive autocorrelation between the volumes given in each 
particular occasion. According to this, the sequence of the given volumes can be 
considered as a long memory process. 
 
2.4. The distribution of different orders 
 
Lillo and Farmer (2004) have examined order composition in the case of the 
London Stock Exchange. The authors have sorted the orders into the three categories 
created by Hopman (2007) which are as follows: 
- Market orders: all the orders that are executed immediately. 
- Spread orders: orders which are placed between the best bid and ask prices. In 
these cases transactions are not realized, but the spread is getting narrower. 
- Limit orders: orders given inside the book.  
Lillo and Farmer (2004) have found that 33% of orders were market orders, 
32% were spread orders and 35% were limit orders. According to researchers, limit 
orders have the smallest price impact, i.e. they do not shift the market price, the 
spread orders have a more significant impact, whilst the givers of market order are the 
most impatient. Therefore, market orders have the most significant price impact, 
because if an order is not realized at the best price level, but it also affects the other 
rows of the order book, market price will move from its former level. 
The result achieved by the authors is interesting because the order, in which 
different order types arrive, i.e. the orderflow, has a significant effect on the price 
formation process. 
 
2.5. Persistence of the transaction signs 
 
Lillo and Farmer (2004) and Margitai (2009) have investigated whether there 
is a persistence in order signs, namely if we know whether it is a buy (positive sign) 
or a sell (negative sign) order, can we predict the sign of the next order. Both 
researchers have found the same results, i.e. there is a persistence considering any 
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stock database. It means that similarly to the order volume, the direction of 
transactions is also a long memory process. 
Lillo et al. (2005) justified the long memory with two reasons. One is that 
investors can be characterized with a herd effect – although it cannot entirely be 
empirically tested – the other is that there are many institutional investors on the 
market who trade in a way that they split a big order, and they execute the transaction 
one by one in order not to have a big influence on the market price. These order types 
are called hidden orders, as the investors’ aim with the order splitting is not to reveal 
the real size of the transaction they intend to execute. This strategy results in the 
“sliding” of prices, thus there is no definite trend (Margitai, 2009). 
 
2.6. Effect of the supply and demand on the returns 
 
The basic idea of efficient market hypothesis is that only the newly arrived 
pieces of information will shift the prices, and thus the price formation process will 
be unpredictable. However, Bouchaud et al. (2004) state that even though information 
has a crucial role, it is nonetheless secondary. According to them the really important 
factor is how the supply and the demand influence price-formation. Bouchaud et al. 
(2004) think that the price-shift affected by the supply-demand can be caused by the 
response to new information and also by the change in the demand for liquidity. 
According to their statement, in both cases there could be a situation when the 
orderflow becomes predictable. The traders with their buy and sell decisions put a 
demand or supply pressure on the market, and via this they influence the price-
formation process. These supply- or demand-side pressures can easily be identified by 
the order book, although it is questionable whether it is actually possible to predict 
the price-shift from this, because it would contradict the efficient market hypothesis. 
In this subchapter I describe the research which are concerned with the analysis of 
this phenomenon.  
First of all I would like to highlight Plerou et al.’s (2002) work. The authors 
have examined how a change in demand affects stock prices within a given ∆t time 
interval. The demand change was defined in the following way: Φ measures the 
difference between the numbers of buyer or seller initiated transactions within a given 
interval, and Ω means the difference between the numbers of the traded stocks 
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through a buyer or seller initiated transactions. Namely, in the first case they 
examined the imbalance in the number of transactions while in the second case they 
observed the imbalance in the volume. Plerou et al. (2002) determined whether a 
trade is buyer or seller initiated in a way that if during the transaction price is higher 
than the mid price then the transaction is buyer initiated; if it is smaller, it is seller 
initiated; and if it is the mid price, then it is indeterminated.14 
Researchers have primarily examined the correlation of price-change (G) with 
variables Φ and Ω, and have found that the shorter the time interval was between the 
price-change and the measured time of Φ and Ω, the higher the correlation was. For 
most of the stocks the correlation was significant for cca. 15 minutes. Figure 6 shows 
the change in correlation in the function of time. 
 
Figure 6: Change in correlation in the function of time 
 
Source: Plerou et al. (2002), p. 3. 
 
Then the researchers have examined how the growth of number imbalance (Φ) 
and volume imbalance (Ω) in a 15-minute interval affected price-change 
predictability. The authors have found that the higher the imbalance was, the less it 
affected the price-change and this relationship could be the most appropriately 
described with a concave function-shape, as it is shown by Figure 7. 
 
                                                 
14
 17% of trades were indeterminated in their database. Lee and Ready (1991) have examined this 
phenomenon more thoroughly. 
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Figure 7: The effect of imbalance on price-change 
  
Source: Plerou et al. (2002), p. 3. 
  
Another significant research in this field was accomplished by Maslov and 
Mills (2001). The authors have got the result that the high imbalance concerning the 
volume of the orders on the buy and sell sides had made the price-change predictable 
in a short term, which is the consequence of the law of supply and demand. This was 
true for the cases in which imbalance was significant and a notable part of orders 
were close to the current mid price (Maslov and Mills, 2001). The size of imbalance 
was defined by 10,000 stocks on the examined database, but they suggested as a rule 
of thumb that this size of imbalance should be proportional to the daily turnover. 
During their research they did not consider the whole order book, they only picked 
out the orders at the best order level for consideration. The examined period were the 
few minutes following the occurrence of the imbalance. The authors have found that 
the prediction capability lasted only for a few minutes, in the case of some stocks 
only for 30 seconds at maximum. 
Maslov and Mills (2001) used another method to examine the supply-demand 
effect on price-change. The essence of the method is that they have observed the 
average price-change in the case of the given supply-demand imbalance levels during 
a given ∆t time interval. Researchers have found that supply-demand had a significant 
effect on price-change in this case as well. However, the lower the stock’s turnover 
was, the stronger this effect prevailed.  
Finally I intend to present Chordia and Subrahmanyam’s research (2002), who 
have examined the relationship between stock returns and order imbalance. The 
starting point of their research was a model which examined how market makers took 
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the sort of imbalance into consideration which is caused by the fact that big investors 
do not submit their transactions in one amount, but they split them. The authors have 
found that there is a positive relationship between the order book imbalance and the 
stock returns. These statements were tested by empirical data, and they drew the 
conclusion that the imbalance-based trading strategy resulted in significant returns 
(Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004, p. 485). 
After this it is legitimate to ask the question: if the order direction and order 
volume are a predictable, long memory processes; and we can anticipate the returns 
from the supply-demand formation in the short term, then how can this be reconciled 
with the commonly observed fact that returns and thus the price-formation still cannot 
finally be predicted and we can characterize the latter process as random walk? What 
is it that still guarantees market efficiency?  
The answer to all these questions is market liquidity: this ensures that the 
market functions efficiently and market prices cannot be predicted. Namely, Farmer 
et al. (2006) state that buy and sell side imbalance move together with the liquidity 
imbalance of the two sides, thus a certain amount can be bought or sold with a 
different price impact on the buy and the sell sides. This statement was based on 
Bouchaud et al.’s (2004), and Lillo and Farmer’s (2004) findings, who have also 
come to the same conclusion.  
Supply-demand and liquidity imbalance guarantee market efficiency 
according to the followings: in the case when a buyer initiated order is executed, then 
the prices should go up. But in the case, when most of the market participants expect 
to have a buy order more likely, the available volume on the best ask price level will 
be greater then the buy market order, which will result a smaller price change – if 
there is a change at all – than is expected. In sum, simultaneously with the expected 
price-shift, a liquidity imbalance evolves, and the price impact of a buy order soon 
ceases with the liquidity increase, thus assuring market efficiency and the 
unpredictability of the directions of the price-shift (Farmer et al. 2006). Therefore the 
relative size of the orders on bid and ask side and the relative liquidity of the two 
sides moves in the opposite direction than the imbalance in the order sign (Lillo and 
Farmer, 2004). Among others, this is why liquidity has a crucial role in market 
functioning. The concept of market liquidity will be described in the following 
chapter. 
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II. The Budapest Liquidity Measure 
 
1. Basic concepts of market liquidity 
 
The concept of liquidity does not have a uniform definition. The different 
definitions are collected by Michaletzky (2010). However, in the present dissertation 
I am concerned with the market liquidity of financial assets, accordingly I am going 
to use the liquidity concept spread on the financial markets, which is a definition also 
accepted by the Bank for International Settlements since 1999.  
 
BIS (1999, p. 13): “Liquid markets are defined as markets where participants 
can rapidly execute large-volume transactions with little impact on prices.” 
  
Thus in the sense of this definition the larger the volume which can be sold or 
bought and the smaller the price shift and the shorter the interval, the more liquid the 
particular market is. It depends on each market participant’s utility function to what 
extent they take these three different factors – time, price impact as transaction cost, 
volume – into consideration. For instance, in the case of a given volume there are 
market participants who rather find it important that the transaction is quickly 
realized, while for other participants it is more important to have the most favourable 
average price possible, and they are willing to wait more in order to minimize the 
transaction costs. 
Therefore, market liquidity determines how easily and cheaply a particular 
investment instrument can be traded with. For this reason, the concept of liquidity is 
very important for all market participants, especially from the investors’ point of 
view. Namely, if the liquidation of a position is only possible with high costs in the 
future, then the market will built this fact into the current price. Thus the risk caused 
by low liquidity will appear in the expected returns under normal market 
circumstances (Csávás – Erhart, 2005).  
Amihud and Mandelsen (1991), and Fleming (2003) have shown that the 
volatility of expected returns will be higher because of the low liquidity, therefore 
considering two assets which have entirely identical attributes, invertors will expect 
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an extra return (premium) from the one with the lower liquidity. Besides, Amihud and 
Mandelsen (1986), Amihud (2002), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) have also 
found, that if they filter all risk factors during the estimation of the expected return of 
a certain asset, then the asset with a lower liquidity has a higher return.  
The loss due to the lack of liquidity cannot only be sensed in the price, but it 
can have a time-value loss as well, namely that the transaction is not executed 
immediately, and therefore the time value of money is the reason behind the reduction 
in the value of a financial asset (Major, 2008). 
According to the BIS report in 1999, researchers have identified three main 
stylized facts concerning the dynamics characterizing market liquidity. These stylized 
facts are the following:  
1. Concentration of market liquidity: in the case of substitutable assets liquidity 
often concentrates in one or only in a few assets. This can be observed on the 
market of government bonds or even on the market of forward contracts where 
the most liquid asset is generally the one that expires the soonest (BIS, 1999). 
2. Evaporation of market liquidity: Muranaga and Shimizu (BIS, 1999) examined 
with help of simulation how liquidity affects price discovery during the crisis. 
During the simulation they got the result that after a market shock the evaporation 
of liquidity guaranteed for the market that prices would not fall any further and 
would not drop below a value which is justified by the fundamentals.  
 Through simulation the authors have also examined the conditions under which a 
secondary price-fall also occurs during a shock on the market. They got the result 
that if after a shock market actors upgraded their views on the market value of an 
asset, then the secondary price-fall would not occur. However, in case that the 
expected future market price is low, a secondary shock occurs and entails a 
further price-fall, which is not justified by the change in fundamentals. 
3. Flight to liquidity: a fact can be observed on the market, that in the case of shocks 
and crises, the investors invest their wealth into assets that can be considered as 
liquid. During crises investors are willing to pay a premium in order to possess a 
liquid asset. However, it does not mean that during crises liquidity would rise on 
the market of these products (BIS, 1999). 
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1.1. Dimensions of liquidity 
 
Market liquidity is important for numerous market actors. Hence it is 
indispensable to measure it appropriately. However, the market liquidity concept is 
too complex to be possible to capture it with a single indicator. A vast number of 
indicators are at the market actors’ disposal, which tends to highlight different aspects 
of liquidity. Before the thorough analysis of liquidity and the presentation of its 
possible indicators, it is worth to define the various dimensions of liquidity along 
which it can be measured. It is important, because each indicator can only measure 
liquidity in certain dimensions. In the literature an enumeration distinguishes the 
following dimensions (BIS, 1999) which are completed by Kutas and Végh (2005) 
with the dimension of diversity: 
- Static dimensions: 
o tightness, 
o depth, 
 breadth, 
- Dynamic dimensions: 
o resiliency, 
o immediacy. 
- Diversity. 
 
Static dimensions and resiliency dimensions are linked to Kyle (1985) who 
first used these concepts and defined liquidity along these dimensions. The 
enumeration was completed with the dimension of immediacy by Harris (1990) and 
with diversity by Kutas and Végh (2005). 
There are some indicators which quantify one dimension, these are called one-
dimensional indicators. Besides, there are indicators which measure liquidity along 
more than one dimension (von Wyss, 2004). However, there is no single indicator 
which would incorporate all dimensions.  
During the quantification of liquidity the problem occurs that different 
measurement methods and indicators do not give the same results, as each dimension 
highlights different aspects of liquidity (Csávás and Erhart, 2005).  
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1.1.1. Static dimensions 
 
Indicators of the static dimensions of liquidity can be divided into two main 
groups: one measures tightness, the other measures market depths. Dimension of 
tightness means the transaction costs of the trading, namely the lowest cost of 
matching supply and demand. This is generally quantified by the bid-ask spread 
(Kyle, 1985), which can be determined as the difference of the best buy and sell 
prices.  
Depth of the market means the amount of orders on the bid and ask sides 
above and below the market price. In a narrower sense depth shows the extent of the 
order that has the highest volume which can be executed without a price shift in case 
of selling or buying (BIS, 1999). Depth is generally approached by market turnover.  
The concept of market breadth is closely linked to market depths, which can 
also be regarded as a dimension of liquidity. Csávás and Erhart (2005) determine the 
concept of breath by modifying Sarr and Lybec’s (2002) definition. Breadth is the 
wider interpretation of depth, i.e. whereas in the case of depth the amount available at 
the best price was taken into consideration, in the case of breadth we also count the 
amounts belonging to other market orders. The breadth indicator is generally the 
price-sensitivity which can be counted as the slopeness of the line determined by 
aggregated orders and the price as it is shown in Figure 8. The gentler the slope of 
this line is, the broader the market is. It has a favourable effect on liquidity if the 
volumes belonging to the same prices grow and if the differences between each order 
price levels are as low as it is possible. Besides, in the case of breadth dimension it is 
also important that as many investors as it is possible should appear on the market 
with their order, because this also has a favourable effect on liquidity (von Wyss, 
2004). 
The recently mentioned three dimensions can be quantified according to the 
data in the order book. Therefore, as long as order book data are available on a 
market, tightness, depth and breadth can easily be determined, as it is shown in Figure 
8. 
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Figure 8: Quantification of static dimensions according to the order book 
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Cumulated volume of bid offers Cumulated volume of ask offers
 
Source: Ranaldo (2001), p. 312. 
 
These three dimensions are called static dimensions, because they characterize 
the order book at a given moment. Market liquidity is approached by tightness from 
the aspect of price, whereas it is measured by depth and breadth from the aspect of 
volume. However, liquidity is influenced by the change of the order book with the 
passage of time, thus it is necessary to examine liquidity from dynamic aspects as 
well. 
 
1.1.2. Dynamic dimensions 
 
Dynamic dimension has two types: resiliency and immediacy. Resiliency 
refers to the speed with which price-fluctuations originated from trades flatten, i.e. it 
gives information on how quickly the price returns to an equilibrium level after a 
shock (Borio, 2000). This equilibrium price can either be a value determined by 
fundamentals, or even by a state when buy and sell orders were balanced in the order 
book. In this case liquidity can be measured with the time the bid-ask spread returns 
to its original value. Besides, liquidity can also be assessed by price impact indicators 
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which quantify how a transaction of a given size changes the price. These indicators 
are related to the concept of resiliency in the aspect that they can quantify to what 
extent the trading of different financial assets causes price change. As long as it is low 
in the case of a certain asset, then it is probable that its resiliency is higher, i.e. its 
price returns to the equilibrium price quicker. 
The dimension of immediacy refers to the time during which a certain size 
portfolio can be sold or bought in a determined price-range, i.e. it contains the cost 
connected to the delayed execution of orders (Harris, 1990). It can be measured with 
the number of transaction realized within a given interval, with the frequency of 
transactions or even with the number of new orders (von Wyss, 2004). 
 
1.1.3. Diversity 
 
Apart from static and dynamic dimensions, another one exists: the diversity, 
which shows the market investors’ homogenity according to motivation, size, 
information and home country or foreign residency. The more heterogeneous the 
composition of the investors is, the more stable the market is in tough market 
situations. Diversity can be measured with concentration analysis (Kutas and Végh, 
2005).  
The calculation of concentration serves not only for measuring market 
participants’ homogeneity, but it also can be used to measure the concentration level 
of market participants doing business with a given market maker. However, in this 
case we measure market depth with concentration, i.e. the lower this sort of 
concentration is, the bigger the liquidity is, because the share of large market 
participants decreases, and therefore the chance that they shift the market price with a 
bigger transaction size decreases as well. 
Besides, concentration can serve as the measurement of market tightness, 
since the smaller the concentration, the more the volume is distributed among market 
makers, thus during quotations, market makers can read similar pieces of information 
from the turnover  data, and as a result quotations reflect a more accurate value 
(Csávás and Erhart, 2005). 
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1.2. Indicators of liquidity 
 
After visiting the dimensions of liquidity I present its indicators according to 
Csávás and Erhart’s (2005) classification. Von Wyss (2004) provides a more detailed 
categorization for these indicators. I dedicate a separate subchapter (Subchapter 1.3) 
to the liquidity measure indicator, since this indicator group is the basis of my 
empirical analysis. The liquidity indicators can be categorized as follows (Csávás and 
Erhart, 2005, p. 69): 
1. Indicators of transaction costs: 
a. Bid-ask spread: BidtAsktt PPSpread −= , where  PtAsk / PtBid is the best ask/bid 
price. 
b. Relative spread: ( ) 2/PP
PP
RSpread
Bid
t
Ask
t
Bid
t
Ask
t
t
+
−
=  
 Analysts generally calculate bid-ask spread and also the relative spread with 
an actual and an indicative method. The difference between them is that actual 
spread is counted based on the prices at which a transaction is actually 
realized, whereas the indicative spread is calculated according to market 
makers’ orders which do not classify as transaction orders. However, the time 
series of the two different types of spread calculation move tightly together, 
thus both time series are used for the investigation of liquidity (Chordia et al., 
2001). 
 
2. Indicators of volumes: 
a. Frequency of transactions: 
T
N
n t = , which gives the number of transactions 
(N) during a given T interval. 
b. Order volume: 
2
qqQ BidAskt
+
= , where qAsk and qBid mean the average buy and 
sell volume in the order book within a given t interval. 
c. Turnover: ∑
=
=
tN
1i
i
t
i
tt qpV , where p denotes the price, q the volume of the ith 
trade at time t. 
d. Average transaction size: 
t
t
t N
V
AvgTrSize = . 
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3. Indicators of prices: 
a. Price impact indicator I.: 
t
t
t TrSize
p∆
=γ , where tp∆  is the price change caused 
by the tth transaction (alternatively the price change in time period t), and 
tTrSize  is the size of the tth transaction (the overall transaction size in time t ). 
b. Price impact indicator II.: 
t
t
t AvgTrSize
Spread∆
=δ , where tSpread∆  is the change of 
the spread of the tth transaction (period), and tAvgTrSize is the average size of 
the transactions in the tth period. 
c. Spread resiliency indicator: 
t
t
t imeSpreadConT
Spread∆
=ε , where timeSpreadConT  
shows the convergence time of the spread. In other words, if a transaction 
widens the spread, this is the time needed for the spread to return to the pre-
transaction level. 
 
4. Concentration: 
 Concentration cannot measure liquidity as directly as the bid-ask spread or the 
turnover can, but indirectly it is a good indicator of market liquidity. Berlinger, 
Michaletzky and Szenes (2011) examined the uncollateralized interbank HUF 
market, and found that concentration was closely related to market liquidity and 
economic cycles. Also Csávás and Erhart (2005) explained the size of the bid-ask 
spread with concentration, volatility and turnover in a regression model. The 
authors have found that concentration had a significant explanatory power 
concerning the bid-ask spread. 
  Statistics provide a wide range of methods for the measurement of 
concentration. In the case of market liquidity the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 
used most frequently , which is calculated by the ∑
=
=
N
1i
2
iZHHI  formula, where Z 
shows a particular market participant’s relative market share and N is the number 
of market participants. The value of this index moves between the limits of 1/N 
and 1. In case of lack of concentration, i.e. if all the market actors have the same 
share of the total value, then HHI = 1/N. If all the elements of a statistical 
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population can be found at a certain sub-unit of this statistical population, then 
1HHI =  (Hunyadi and Vita, 2003).  
The above enumerated liquidity indicators – as I have mentioned before – are 
not suitable to examine liquidity in all dimensions. Table 3 shows which dimensions 
of liquidity can be measured by the recently presented indicators.  
 
Table 3: Categorization of liquidity indicators 
Liquidity dimension Liquidity indexes 
Transaction-based indexes 
Concentration of market maker’s clientele Tightness 
Liquidity measures15 
Amounts belonging to the best prices 
Average transaction size 
Turnover 
Concentration of market maker’s clientele 
Depth 
Liquidity measures 
Supply-demand price sensitivity 
Breadth Liquidity measures 
Resiliency Price impact indicators 
Frequency of transactions 
Immediacy Turnover 
Diversity Concentration of market participants 
Source: Csávás és Erhart, p. 19, and my own additions 
 
According to Table 3 it can be stated that there are hardly any indicators 
which could measure liquidity along more than one dimension, which is however an 
indispensable condition for getting an exact view of market liquidity. Dömötör and 
Marossy (2010) have accomplished a more detailed analysis and a categorization 
along several dimensions than Table 3 by using multivariable statistical tools. In the 
following chapter I present a liquidity indicator, which can measure liquidity along all 
the static dimensions and thus can give a more complete view of market liquidity. 
 
1.3. Liquidity indicators based on the Xetra Liquidity Measure 
 
The Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) has been created by the Deutsche Börse 
Group in 2002. Based on XLM a few other countries have developed similar 
indicators. One of them was in Hungary at the Budapest Stock Exchange, the other 
                                                 
15
 I will explain this notion in the subchapter 1.3.  
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one in Slovenia, at the Ljubljana Borza. The name of the indicator in Hungary 
became Budapest Liquidity Measure (BLM), while in Slovenia it was named CGT. 
The only difference between the three indicators – XLM, BLM, CGT – that they are 
calculated for those securities which are traded in the respecive country. 
The liquidity measure was created by the Deutsche Börze to provide the 
market with a simple index which assists market participants in making investment 
decisions by showing how liquid the individual security and the entire market are at 
the moment. The liquidity measure quantifies the transaction cost of a certain trade in 
order to help market participants in their investment decision. Liquidity is calculated 
as the sum of the adverse price movement (APM) – originated in the transactions of 
the investors – and the liquidity premium (LP) to be paid for the transaction. The 
adverse price movement occurs if the total volume of the order cannot be fulfilled on 
the best price level i.e. on other levels are needed as well. Then the average price of 
the total order will be worse than the best possible price, while the liquidity premium 
is the half of the bid-ask spread. These two factors (APM and LP) together are also 
referred to as the implicit cost or indirect cost of trading (Gomber and Schweikert, 
2002). The size of this cost depends on the current state of the order book. Trading 
also incurs explicit or direct costs, e.g. brokerage fees and commissions, stock 
exchange fees, taxes, etc. (Kutas and Végh, 2005). These costs are not included in the 
BLM as these can easily be identified and quantified, and the aim of the BLM is to 
measure the implicit costs not measured earlier. While calculating the liquidity 
measure we cannot take the opportunity cost into account and the costs of timing, 
either. In sum the total cost of a transaction is built up as follows, based on Gomber 
and Schweikert (2002): 
- Implicit costs 
o Market impact costs 
 Liquidity premium 
 Adverse price movement 
o Costs of timing 
o Opportunity costs 
- Explicit costs 
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According to this liquidity measure is one of the transaction based liquidity 
indicators, but it can interpret liquidity more broadly than the bid-ask spread, since it 
can measure liquidity not only in the dimension of tightness, but in respect of depth 
and breadth as well. 
The XLM liquidity indicator measures that the percentage of the total order 
size being paid as a transaction cost. The indicator can be interpreted only at certain 
order sizes, as it is shown in Figure 9. The figure shows how the liquidity measure 
quantifies the transaction costs. The grey area shows the total implicit costs. If it is 
divided by the total order size, then we get the relative cost, the Xetra Liquidity 
Measure. 
 
Figure 9: Calculation of the implicit cost  
 
Source: Stange and Kaserer, (2009b), p. 6.  
  
  Figure 9 shows the calculation of the Xetra Liquidity Measure, which is used 
also by the Budapest Stock Exchange to calculate the Budapest Liquidity Measure. 
Figure 10 shows also the calculation of the liquidity measures from another approach. 
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Figure10: The calculation of XLM 
 
Source: Gomber and Schweikert (2002), p. 3. 
 
The calculation of the indicator in detail is as follows:  
The calculation of the bid-ask spread (Spread) and the liquidity premium (LP) is 
based on the following formulae: 
 
mid
bid1ask1
P
P-PSpread = ,                 (3) 
 
2
SpreadLP =
                          (4) 
 
where Pbid1 = the price level of the best bid orders, Pask1 = the price level of the best 
ask orders, and Pmid is the mid price, where 
( )
2
PP
P ask1bid1mid
+
= . 
The adverse price movement (APM) should be calculated for both the bid and 
the ask side of the order book, since the two sides can differ substantially from a 
liquidity perspective. The way the APM is measured: 
 
( )
mid
ask1w_avg_ask
P
PP
APM_ask
−
=      (5) 
 
( )
mid
w_avg_bidbid1
P
PP
APM_bid
−
=      (6) 
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The software calculating the BLM uses the following formula for Pw_avg_ask, 
the weighted average ask price in Equation 5. The weighted average bid price is 
similarly determined. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that the order is 
fulfilled at the three best price levels: 
 
( )
sizen transactio
size2size1sizen transactioPsize2Psize1PP ask3ask2ask1w_avg_ask
−−⋅+⋅+⋅
=
  (7) 
 
where Pask1 is the price level of the first best ask order, Pask2 is the price level of the 
second best ask order, Pask3 is the price level of the third best ask order, size1, size2 
are the quantities transacted at the given price levels. In case the market is not deep 
enough, and – let’s assume – that there isn’t any order on the third price level – or if 
there are orders, but not enough to be able to fulfill the whole order – then the 
software calculates BLM as if the order book included infinite orders at the last 
available price level. This distorts the value of BLM, since it shows a higher liquidity 
on the market than in reality. 
The value of the liquidity measure is the sum of the liquidity premium and 
both sides’ adverse price movement: 
 
Liquidity Measure = 2LP + APM_bid + APM_ask   (8) 
 
Based on Equation 8, BLM gives the total implicit cost of turning around a 
position in basis points (Kutas and Végh, 2005).  
For example, if we calculate BLM for an order size of EUR 500,000, and the 
result is 60 bps, then since the order is not fulfilled at the mid price, the implicit cost 
of turning around a position of EUR 500,000 is EUR 3,000 (500,000 × 0,006 = 
3,000).  
The calculation of all three liquidity measures’ (XLM, BLM, CGT) is the 
same than the one I have shown above. The difference is that the three liquidity 
measures are calculated for different order sizes on each stock exchange.  
Deutsche Börse Group provides the market the XLM indicator for standard 
order sizes. The order sizes at which the XLM is calculated differ from stock to stock. 
It depends on the turnover of a certain stock (Gomber and Schweikert, 2002). The 
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XLM is calculated for the following order sizes in each case: EUR 10 thousand, 25 
thousand, 50 thousand. In case of stocks with a higher turnover, the measure is 
calculated also for the following order sizes: EUR 75 thousand, 100 thousand, 150 
thousand, 250 thousand. In a few cases calculation takes place also for much greater 
sizes, like: EUR 500 thousand, 750 thousand, 1,000 thousand, 2,000 thousand, 4,000 
thousand, 5,000 thousand. 
The CGT is the liquidity measure of the Ljubljana Borza (LJSE). The liquidity 
measure on this stock exchange is published twice a day, at 11:00 AM and 12:55 PM 
for only one order size, to EUR 7,500. The value of the published CGT is the 
arithmetic average of the CGT values of that certain day (LJSE, 2011). 
The BLM database determines the BLM values for 5 different order sizes – 
therefore I have 5 different BLM figures for each of the shares listed on the BSE – i.e. 
for transactions worth EUR 20 thousand (BLM1), 40 thousand (BLM2), 100 
thousand (BLM3), 200 thousand (BLM4), and 500 thousand (BLM5). 
In case of OTP, the average BLM values of the five order sizes between 1st 
January, 2007 and 16th July, 2010 are shown in Figure 11. It can be seen, that the 
bigger transaction an investor wants to execute, the higher the BLM value is. 
 
Figure 11: Average BLM values for OTP 
Average value of the BLM in case of the OTP
1st January 2007 – 16th July 2010
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Source: own figure, published in Gyarmati et al.(2010a), p. 502. 
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The previously introduced XLM cannot measure liquidity along the dynamic 
dimensions (resiliency, immediacy), only along the static dimensions (tightness, 
depth, breadth). Since the calculation of the measure is based on the actual state of the 
order book, so its calculation can be carried out only for the given moment. 
Nevertheless the XLM-type liquidity measures give a more precise picture of the 
liquidity, since it can measure it along more dimensions. 
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2. Empirical research: analysis of Budapest Liquidity 
Measure 
 
The goal of the chapter is to give a detailed description about the database of 
BLM and its relation to other liquidity indicators in the case of the 13 stocks of which 
BUX consisted as of April 1, 2009. Apart from this, I also examine the relationship 
between volatility and liquidity during the crisis, as well as both before and after it. I 
do this in order to receive a more complete view of the indicator before I present the 
two possible application opportunities on which my dissertation is based. Namely, 
how to build a VaR model adjusted with liquidity risk and how to estimate a price 
impact function with the aid of BLM. 
However, before describing the database which is the basis of my analysis, I 
present my main research questions, the applied methodology, and shortly the 
Hungarian literature which preceded my examinations and which also analyzed the 
liquidity of stocks in Budapest Stock Exchange.  
 
2.1. Research on the Budapest Stock Exchange for the time being 
 
On Budapest Stock Exchange Kutas and Végh (2005), Barra (2008), Margitai 
(2009), and Michaletzky (2010) have made significant research.16 The starting point 
of my dissertation was Kutas and Végh’s (2005) research, these authors having 
created the BLM following the pattern of XLM in 2005. The authors have presented 
the build-up and the calculation method of BLM. Furthermore, they have 
accomplished an international comparison in the case of stocks which were listed 
both on the BSE and on foreign stock exchanges as well. They came to the conclusion 
as a result of their research that on Budapest Stock Exchange the BLM, i.e. the size of 
the implicit cost is remarkably lower in a case of a particular stock than on other 
exchanges where the stock was simultaneously listed (Kutas and Végh, 2005). 
In his research, Barra (2008) has examined the dynamics of the liquidity 
indicators based on volume weighted transaction duration and capital weighted 
                                                 
16
 Apart from these studies numerous Hungarian publications are available, which were concerned with 
stock exchange database analysis (e.g.: Fazakas and Juhász, 2009; Móricz, 2005), but I have only 
highlighted the ones that analysed the liquidity on BSE.  
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transaction duration according to the trades and quotes (TAQ) database of MOL 
within the framework of an ACD model (autoregressive conditional duration).17 By 
duration he meant the expected time period during which a particular quantity or 
value of stocks can be bought/sold. In his thesis, Barra (2008) has presented the 
functioning of ACD models and the way we can predict duration-based liquidity 
indicators with the help of it, and how to create estimation for the future liquidity 
through it. One of the author’s most important findings is that the Log-GGACD (1,1) 
model fits the data best; although it fit the examined data well, but there were periods 
regarding the examination of the out of sample data when the model did not work 
properly. The author has explained this with the fact that presumably there was a 
structural break in the database. 
Margitai (2009) has also made a research relying on MOL TAQ database. His 
most important research questions were the following:  
1. What are the underlying reasons behind the stylized facts which characterize 
the orderflow?  
2. What is the relationship between liquidity and market efficiency?  
3. Why is the price impact function concave?  
4. What are the factors that influence the size of the spread?  
5. What influences the formation of gaps between the price-levels in the order 
book?  
One of the many answers he came up with is the one, that the sign of 
transactions is a long memory process (see Subchapter I/2.5 of my dissertation). 
Furthermore, the author has also shown that the better is the prediction concerning the 
direction and the size of an order, the lower price impact the order would have, which 
can be due to the compensatory role of liquidity strategy. 
During his research, Margitai (2009) has also estimated an empirical price 
impact function based on the MOL TAQ database (see the Subchapter IV/1.4 of my 
dissertation). He has concluded that the more transaction he aggregated, the more 
concave shape the price impact function would have (which is similar to the 
experience in international researches). 
Michaletzky (2010) has accomplished a time-series and cross-sectional 
analysis of different liquidity indicators on the TAQ database of the four biggest 
                                                 
17
 For more details about ACD models see Engle and Russell, 1998. 
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stocks traded on Budapest Stock Exchange (OTP, MOL, Magyar Telekom and 
Richter). Furthermore, he attempted to predict future liquidity with the help of the 
Hurst-exponent, which he did by analyzing the indicators: turnover and bid-ask 
spread predictions. 
On one hand, one of Michaletzky’s (2010) most important findings is that the 
intervals between transactions (durations) are predictable, however, in turbulent 
periods this effect is less significant. The author has also pointed out that in the case 
of each stock there was no big difference concerning the predictability of the 
duration, whilst the forecast of bid-ask spread was not significant in the case of none 
of the stocks. The author’s other important achievement was that there was a strong 
positive relation between the relative spread and the turnover (measured in pieces), 
the extent of correlation was 0.82, which – according to his statement – indicates that 
liquidity improvement in one dimension is often accompanied with its deterioration 
concerning another dimension. Thirdly, his further interesting finding is that there is a 
strong positive relation (correlation is 0.82) between the percentile true range (TR) 
and relative spread, which indicates that the uncertainty appearing in the high price 
fluctuation increases the spread. 
Finally, I intend to present Csávás and Erhart’s (2005) research, which 
however is not based on the stocks of Budapest Stock Exchange, but on the data of 
Hungarian foreign exchange- and government bond markets. Regardless I consider 
this to be worthwhile to review, because they have also examined the relationship of 
liquidity and price fluctuation as Michaletzky (2010) did. 
During the examination, the researchers have proceeded from the same 
observation that Michaletzky (2010) made, i.e. there is a strong positive relation 
between bid-ask spread and turnover. Csávás and Erhart (2005) have explained this 
phenomenon with volatility. According to their statement, as a consequence of 
increasing volatility market makers raise the spread in order to price their increased 
risk, while the augmented volatility entails turnover growth, especially in turbulent 
periods. According to their opinion, if the spread-growth is caused by the increasing 
volatility, it does not necessarily imply the decrease of liquidity. In order to make 
conclusions, we should know the reason of volatility increase (Grossman and Miller, 
1988). Namely, the rise of volatility can be the consequence of the fact that the 
expectations concerning fundamentals change faster, or perhaps new pieces of 
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information arrive at the market more quickly. In this case volatility is not harmful for 
liquidity, but it implies that the market fulfils its main function: the displaying of 
expectations in market prices (Csávás and Erhart, 2005, p. 24). 
However, the authors have not found a model in the literature which could 
appropriately analyze the relationship between volatility and liquidity. For this reason 
they have applied the spread model which was also the basis of previous research 
(e.g.: Galati, 2000; Wei, 1994; Huang and Masulis, 1999, etc.). The model analyzed 
by them was the following linear regression, which they have completed with other 
factors in different phases of their research:18  
 
Spread = α + β1 · volatility + β2 · turnover + β3 · concentration + ε   (9) 
 
Taking this linear regression for basis, Csávás and Erhart (2005) analyzed the 
factors influencing the spread, during which their most important findings concerning 
volatility and spread were the followings: 
– One of the strongest impacts on forint market bid-ask spread was exerted by 
volatility.  
– The coefficient of the chosen volatility indicator19 is positive. The 1 percentage 
point increase of the intraday fluctuation of volatility causes a 2 basispoints 
increase in bid ask-spread other conditions being equal.  
– According to the results they could not clearly decide whether the spread-increase 
caused by volatility implies the deterioration of market liquidity. In their opinion 
it depends on the reason causing volatility increase.  
– The decrease of volatility significantly lessens the spread, which is favorable for 
the investors because of the lower trading costs, and for the market makers 
because of the lower risk. 
– They have divided volatility into two components: expected and unexpected 
components and thus they have also inserted it into the model. The authors have 
filtered the part from the volatility which had been expected for the given day 
                                                 
18
 I do not present these other factors in my dissertation, because during my research I will only apply 
equation (9), based on the method described in Subchapter II/2.4. For more details about the further 
models applied by these authors, see Csávás and Erhart’s (2005) research. 
19
 The authors have defined the volatility indicator in two different ways: in one case with the aid of 
GARCH model, in the other case they have observed the difference between the daily minimum and 
maximum price levels in percentage. I will give a more detailed description about these in Subchapter 
2.4.  
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based on past information, and then they considered the rest as the unexpected 
component. From the expected and unexpected components of volatility only the 
unexpected one became significant, therefore the shocks affecting volatility are 
reflected in the spread. It may refer to the fact that only newly arriving pieces of 
information affect the spread change, whilst the impact of expected volatility is 
already included in the spread.  
 
2.2. Database 
 
The database of Budapest Liquidity Measure forms the basis of my research. 
The BLM values can be determined by the actual order book. During my research I 
have examined the data between 1st January, 2007 and 3rd June, 2011 from the BLM 
database which was created based upon the order book. In the examined period the 
database contains the BLM data for every second of each trading day from 9:02 AM 
until 4:30 PM when any change occurred in the order book. Furthermore, the 
database contains the BLM data of every security traded on BSE, on all the five order 
sizes (EUR 20 thousand, 40 thousand, 100 thousand, 200 thousand and 500 
thousand). However, the database contains not only the BLM data, but also the three 
components of BLM on every transaction size: bid-ask spread, APM_bid and 
APM_ask. Furthermore, it contains some other data which provide information about 
the trade. Table 4 and 5 show a small part of the OTP BLM database on 12th 
September, 2007.  
 
Table 4: The BLM database 
Date Time LP (bps) 
spread 
(bps) 
APM_ 
bid1 (bps) 
APM_ask1 
(bps) 
BLM1  
(bps) … 
APM_bid5 
(bps) 
APM_ask5 
(bps) 
BLM5   
(bps) 
2007.09.12 10:00:01 4.36 8.72 0.00 5.28 14.00   35.47 14.71 58.90 
2007.09.12 10:00:07 4.36 8.72 0.00 4.07 12.78   35.47 14.12 58.31 
2007.09.12 10:00:15 4.36 8.72 0.00 0.13 8.85   35.47 13.88 58.07 
2007.09.12 10:00:34 4.36 8.72 0.00 0.13 8.85   35.30 13.88 57.90 
2007.09.12 10:00:36 4.90 9.81 0.00 0.13 9.94   34.73 13.88 58.42 
2007.09.12 10:00:39 4.90 9.81 0.00 0.13 9.94   34.73 13.88 58.42 
2007.09.12 10:00:49 4.90 9.81 0.00 0.13 9.94   28.94 13.88 52.63 
…                     
Source: my own edition based on the database of Budapest Stock Exchange 
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Table 5: Other data in the BLM database 
Time 
Mid 
price 
(HUF) 
bid 
number 
Bid 
price 
levels 
 Bid 
value 
(thHUF) 
ask 
number 
Ask 
price 
levels 
Ask 
value 
(thHUF) 
Last 
traded 
price 
(HUF) 
Quantity Turnover (thHUF) 
10:00:01 9 176 517 173 1 186 121 728 249 2 703 746 9 180 238 280 2 186 499 
10:00:07 9 176 517 173 1 186 121 729 250 2 717 531 9 180 238 280 2 186 499 
10:00:15 9 176 517 173 1 186 121 730 250 2 719 367 9 180 238 280 2 186 499 
10:00:34 9 176 518 173 1 186 578 730 250 2 719 367 9 180 238 280 2 186 499 
10:00:36 9 175 518 173 1 186 571 730 250 2 719 367 9 180 238 280 2 186 499 
10:00:39 9 175 518 173 1 186 571 731 250 2 719 967 9 180 238 280 2 186 499 
10:00:49 9 175 519 173 1 204 871 731 250 2 719 967 9 180 238 280 2 186 499 
…   
                  
Source: my own edition based on the database of Budapest Stock Exchange 
 
2.3. Research question 
 
During a series of interviews about market liquidity,20 market participants 
have told me that they also take liquidity into consideration as a significant risk factor 
for their investment decisions. According to them, market participants commonly 
categorize stocks into liquidity classes and they decide about their market entrance 
and strategy based on this. There are participants who are only willing to invest in 
liquid stocks, e.g. a significant part of technical analysts. However, there are those 
who are also willing to purchase illiquid stocks, for instance the passive fund 
managers. Furthermore, participants who are fundamental analysts are also willing to 
buy illiquid stocks. They act this way in the case when they assume that the 
fundamental value differs from the market value to such extent that it is worthwhile to 
buy/sell even if they face significant transaction costs caused by the lack of liquidity, 
because they will recover the loss by the rise/fall of market price. Concerning 
fundamental analysis, the interviewees’ opinion was that the shorter the period in 
which somebody trades, the more significant role mathematics and statistics will 
have, whilst fundamentals are pushed to the background. They explained this with the 
fact that if e.g. somebody accomplishes a one-second or an even more frequent-period 
trading, she takes advantage of the inefficiency committed by those who trade for 
instance in one-day periods and do not constantly modify their portfolio as fresh news 
appear. However, those who trade on a daily bases profit from the mistakes 
                                                 
20
 The series of interviews was realized with the participation of Edina Berlinger, Ákos Gyarmati, 
Márton Michaletzky, Balázs Árpád Szűcs, Kata Váradi and Gábor Völgyes and its topic was market 
liquidity.  
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committed by those who trade only once a month, etc. The longer the period is in 
which we invest, the more fundamental analysis comes to the forefront and the role of 
mathematics and statistics will be pushed to the background. Therefore, time scale is 
very important when we take liquidity into consideration during a portfolio decision. 
As follows from the preceding information, the shorter the period in which market 
participants invest, the higher the value of a particular stock’s liquidity will be for 
them. 
In order to state whether a stock is considered to be liquid or illiquid, market 
participants use simple rules of thumb. The most commonly used indicators for 
assessing liquidity are the bid-ask spread and turnover (Szűcs and Váradi, 2012).  
Based on the interviews, and on the Hungarian studies done in the past, I will 
compare the BLM to the two most commonly analyzed liquidity indicators, to the 
bid-ask spread and turnover. I examine to what extent these three liquidity indicators 
(i.e.: bid-ask spread, turnover and BLM) give similar results regarding liquidity and 
under what market circumstances can the use of bid-ask spread and turnover be 
misleading as far as liquidity is concerned.   
In addition, I will also examine the relationship between volatility and 
liquidity, since according to the literature (Michaletzky, 2010; Csávás and Erhart, 
2005) we can state that these two variables have a strong positive relation. I am going 
to examine the relationship between volatility and liquidity during a calm period and 
– based on this – how much predictive strength the growth of volatility has regarding 
the decrease in liquidity. After this, I observe what decrease in liquidity the growth of 
volatility caused on the market during the crisis period and I then make a comparison 
whether this value is higher or lower than it would have been estimated based on the 
calm period. If I come to the conclusion that the liquidity is lower than I estimated, 
then Csávás and Erhart’s (2005) statement can be justified that only the volatility 
increasing effect of the new pieces of information is built into the bid-ask spread 
growth – and consequently into the liquidity decrease – as, the expected volatility is 
already reflected in the value of the bid-ask spread. Furthermore, based on the result I 
can also draw a conclusion whether the 2007/2008 crisis was actually also a liquidity 
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crisis21 or with the volatility increase only a „natural” decrease in liquidity was 
accompanied with.  
The main questions I examine in the chapter are the followings:  
– What average value does the BLM take on the five order sizes in the case of 
different stocks during the examined period?  
– What kind of relationship does the BLM have with the two liquidity indicators 
which are most commonly applied by market participants, i.e. with the bid-ask 
spread and turnover?  
– How strong is the relationship between liquidity and volatility of an asset?  
 
I consider the examination of these questions as important above all for three 
reasons. On the one hand because by responding to these questions we can determine 
which one of the three examined liquidity indicators is worthwhile to use, and which 
one renders the most reliable result concerning liquidity. On the other hand, I 
consider this to be important because I intend to provide a basis for liquidity to be 
able to be traded as a product in the future – even with the help of an indicator as 
BLM –, and to be able to serve as an underlying asset for derivatives.22 As a result the 
risk originated from liquidity could be hedged. However, to achieve this it is 
inevitable to know the relationship between volatility and liquidity. Thirdly, I find it 
important because when market participants execute a dynamic portfolio optimization 
on the market, then it is not sufficient to decide along the return-volatility dimension, 
they also have to include liquidity into the decision mechanism, since the market risk 
consists not only of the price-risk, i.e. the change of the mid price, but also of the 
liquidity risk. For this reason liquidity cannot be ignored during the optimization, and 
its relationship with return and volatility has to be borne in mind.  
Based on the research questions in this phase of my research I am going to 
find answers for the following hypotheses: 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 For more details on the crisis and the lack of liquidity that evolved during the crisis see Király 
(2008), Berlinger, Horváth and Vidovics-Dancs (2012). 
22
 For the pattern by which volatility has started to be traded with see Berlinger et al. (1998). 
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H1: BLM, and the most commonly used liquidity indicators in practice 
(bid-ask spread, turnover) provide different ranking from the aspect of 
liquidity for individual stock:   
 H1/a: during a calm period, and  
 H1/b: during a crisis. 
 H1/c: in the case of a liquid and  
 H1/d: an illiquid stock.  
 
H2: There is a positive relation between volatility (standard deviation, 
true range) and BLM.  
 
2.4. Research methodology 
 
Benefitting from previous Hungarian research I am going to examine BLM 
database based on the above presented Equation 9. The difference will be that I divide 
the linear regression into three parts and I will examine the impact of turnover and 
volatility separately. Furthermore, instead of concentration I am going to examine the 
bid-ask spread as an explanatory variable. In all three cases the dependent variable 
will be the BLM. All in all, the empirical analysis of BLM indicator can be divided 
into three main parts: 
1. First, I present how the BLM database looks like, what are the average values 
between 1st January 2007 and 16th July 2010. In this part of the research I am 
going to put together a cross-sectional analysis.  
2. Second, I determine the average BLM, bid-ask spread and turnover data for 
different periods – for a complete time series as well as before, during and after 
the crisis. After this I observe to what extent the three indicators provide a 
different ranking, which I am going to test with two rank correlation methods: 
Spearman’s rank correlation method,23 and Kendall’s rank method.24 Following 
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population. The value of the index can be between -1 and 1. If its value is -1 then the order is perfectly 
opposing, whilst if its value is 1, then the order is perfectly identical (Kerékgyártó and Mundruczó, 
1995). 
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this, I determine the correlation of each indicator with one another, and with the 
help of a linear regression I observe the explanatory power of bid-ask spread and 
turnover concerning BLM. Finally, I also examine the connection between the 
change in the bid-ask spread/turnover and the change of BLM. 
3. Third, I assess the relationship of liquidity – which will be quantified by BLM– 
with volatility. I am going to examine the connection with a linear regression. 
However, volatility can be measured in different ways, so I have defined it in my 
dissertation as follows:  
a. Standard deviation of the logreturn: ( )∑
=
−=σ
D
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d
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−
= ), r  is the average return during the given period, and D 
is the number of periods during a (0,T) time interval. If we estimate the 
standard deviation according to this, we assume that the time series on which 
we based the estimation is stationary, i.e. the distribution of the returns is 
equal to the long-term „average” distribution of the returns, which means that 
the expected value and the standard deviation are constant in time.  
b. Standard deviation estimated from GARCH model: If we assume that the time 
series of returns is not stationary, we can estimate the standard deviation of 
returns with the GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity) model. GARCH models take the fact (which is commonly 
observed in practice) into consideration that the standard deviation of returns 
is persistent, i.e. if the standard deviation once increases, then its value 
remains high for a long period. This phenomenon causes the clustering of 
volatility (heteroscedasticity), which is the basis of GARCH models 
(Bollerslev, 1986).  
                                                                                                                                           
 
24
 Kendall’s method: 
( )
( )nnm
CC12
W 33
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j
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∑
=
where ( )2j CC − shows the sum of squares of each rank 
number sum’s deviation from its mean, n is the number of the units in the statistical population, whilst 
m shows the number of ranking lists we compared. The value of the index can be between 0 and 1. If 
its value is 0, then the order is perfectly opposing, whilst if its value is 1, then the order is perfectly 
identical (Kerékgyártó and Mundruczó, 1995). 
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c. Difference between the daily minimum and maximum price in percentage: 
L
t
L
t
H
t
P
PP
vol
−
= , where HtP is the daily maximum price, and LtP  is the lowest one. 
d. True range: ( ) ( )C1tLtC1tHt P;PminP;PmaxTR −− −= , where HtP / LtP is the highest/lowest 
price experienced during the period, whilst C1tP −  is the closing price at the end 
of the previous period (Wilder, 1978). 
As I observe the relationship of BLM and volatility with the help of the 
linear regression, it is inevitable that volatility data should be available for every 
trading day. In the absence of data, the standard deviation of logreturn cannot be 
examined: the intraday prices should be known for this, but they are not at my 
disposal. Instead, I estimate the standard deviation for each day with the aid of the 
GARCH model. In this case I have the implicit assumption that the returns I 
observed are from the distribution which is assumed by the GARCH model 
during the estimation of the standard deviation, namely from Student’s t-
distribution in the current case.  
I undertake the estimation of the standard deviation with the help of the 
following AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model:  
 
t1tt rcr ε+φ+= −      (10) 
ttt ησ=ε        (11) 
2
1t1
2
1t10
2
t baa −− σ+ε+=σ ,    (12) 
 
in which Equation 10 is the equation of the expected value (conditional expected 
value), where rt signifies the logreturn of the particular day, which depends on the 
logreturn of the preceding day, rt-1. This is referred to as AR(1), i.e. an equation 
describing an autoregressive process in which the value of the return of a given 
day depends on the value of the return of one period preceding it. However, we 
can estimate the εt residuum value of this AR(1) process with a GARCH(1,1) 
process, where we receive the εt value as the product of σt conditional standard 
deviation and tη  (Equation 11), where tη  is a ( )1,0IID 25 probability variable. 
However, for this we need to determine the conditional standard deviation, for 
                                                 
25
 IID(0,1) means the probability variables are independent, and identically distributed, where the 
expected value is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. 
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which we need the variance Equation 12 (conditional variance). Equation 12 gears 
the square of the conditional standard deviation (i.e. variance) to the variance of 
the previous period ( 2 1t−σ ), and the square of the residuum of the previous period 
( 2 1t−ε ). As both the variance ( 2 1t−σ ) and the residuum ( 2 1t−ε ) are from the period 
directly preceding the current variance, therefore this process is referred to as 
GARCH(1,1) (Tulassay, 2009). 
However, apart from the standard deviation values determined by 
GARCH model, I am also going to analyze another volatility index, the “true 
range” (TR). The reason why I use this index instead of the “difference of the 
daily minimum and maximum price in percentage” is because true range shows 
market volatility the best, as well as this is the index which is most commonly 
used by technical analysts to quantify volatility (Makara, 2004). 
However, I am going to modify the TR formula previously presented in 
3/d subpoint in order to be expressed in a percentile form, namely dividing the TR 
values by the average market price of a given day. Thus TR calculation will be the 
following, where MtP  shows the average price of the particular day: 
 
( ) ( )
M
t
C
1t
L
t
C
1t
H
t
P
P;PminP;Pmax
TR −−
−
=
    (13) 
 
2.5. Results 
 
2.5.1. Average BLM values of the BUX shares 
 
From the perspective of the investors it is important to know which instrument 
has the lowest value of liquidity measure, since the lower this figure the smaller the 
implicit cost the investors face when they buy/sell the stock. The following Figures 
(12; 13; 14; 15) show the average value of liquidity measures of stocks in BUX in 
years 2007-2010. In Figure 12 it is clearly visible that BLM values monotonously 
increase in the case of every stock, namely BLM1 shows the lowest, while BLM5 
shows the highest value.  
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Figure 12: Average BLM values in 2007 
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Source: proprietary 
 
Figure 13: Average BLM values in 2008 
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Source: proprietary 
 
Furthermore, it is also conspicuous that the stock order formed on the basis of 
BLM1 value is not similar to the order of BLM3. This phenomenon is due to the fact 
that the order book of each stock may have different shapes. Whilst in the case of a 
stock (e.g. FHB) many orders are in the first few rows of the order book, it is possible 
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that in the case of another stock (e.g. TVK) there are many in the higher levels of the 
book. Thus it can occur that FHB is more liquid on the first two order sizes. I found 
similar results concerning data in the other years.  
 
Figure 14: Average BLM values in 2009 
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Source: proprietary 
 
Figure 15: Average BLM values in 2010 
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Source: proprietary, published in Gyarmati et al. (2010a), p. 505. 
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In order to facilitate investment decisions for investors, it is worthwhile to 
place the BLM values of the examined stocks on a heat map, which includes the BLM 
values belonging to the different order sizes in a chart. The higher value the BLM 
takes, the darker coloring the particular cell gets, thus facilitating better transparency 
and quick decision making for investors concerning liquidity.  
 
Table 6: Heat map 
Heat map BLM1 BLM2 BLM3 BLM4 BLM5 
OTP 17 21 30 42 74 
Mol 31 39 59 91 201 
MTelekom 35 46 77 127 383 
Richter 36 46 76 130 406 
Egis 109 169 431 1,046 2,601 
Fotex 244 444 1,250 2,302 4,058 
FHB 257 464 1,214 2,327 4,116 
Econet 315 512 1,237 2,279 4,157 
Rába 372 705 1,563 2,535 4,109 
TVK 497 937 2,151 3,521 5,107 
Synergon 510 954 2,015 2,975 4,382 
Pannergy 607 1,088 2,096 3,030 4,169 
ÁNY 630 1,172 2,421 3,547 4,590 
Source: own table, published in Gyarmati et al., (2010a), p. 507. 
 
According to the heat map, I categorize the stocks into three groups from the 
aspect of liquidity: liquid, medium liquid and illiquid groups. The four bluechip 
stocks which received a white coloring on the heat map based on BLM1 level, i.e. 
OTP, MOL, MTelekom and Richter, are considered liquid stocks. For the 
determination of medium liquid stocks I did not consider BLM1 level, since the heat 
map did not show a significant color difference there. Therefore, in this case I took 
BLM4 values for basis, and thus it occurred that the following stocks are considered 
medium liquid stocks: Egis, Fotex, FHB, Econet, and Rába. I classified the other 
stocks into the illiquid category, i.e. the illiquid ones are the: TVK, Synergon, 
Pannergy and ÁNy. Figure 16 and 17 show the two columns of the heat map along 
which I divided the stocks into groups. 
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Figure 16: Categorization of stocks based on liquidity I. 
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Source: proprietary 
 
 
Figure 17: Categorization of stocks based on liquidity II. 
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2.5.2. The relation between BLM and other liquidity indicators 
 
The advantage of BLM compared to other liquidity measures is that it is able 
to measure liquidity along all static dimensions (tightness, depth, breadth), and thus it 
gives a more precise view about market liquidity situation. In this subchapter I 
examine to what extent BLM provides different results than the liquidity indicators 
most commonly used in practice: the bid-ask spread and turnover. Among static 
dimensions, bid-ask spread can measure liquidity in the dimension of tightness, while 
volume can measure depths and from dynamic dimensions it can also be applied to 
measuring immediacy.  
Concerning the whole period (1st January 2007 – 16th July 2010), Table 7 
shows the average values of each liquidity indicators, in which stocks are visible 
according to the ranking which was  formed based on BML1.  
Regarding the average of the whole period, it can be seen that different 
liquidity indicators provide different ranking concerning liquidity. The difference 
appears to be significant in the case of the turnover data, since in that case a 
difference in the ranking can be found in all the three liquidity groups, whilst based 
on the bid-ask spread a difference can only be found in the medium liquid and illiquid 
groups. In my opinion, the difference in ranking is a consequence of the fact that the 
indicators measure liquidity in different dimensions.   
 
Table 7: Comparison of liquidity indicators  
based on the average values of the data of 01/01/2007-16/07/2010. 
  
Order based 
on  
BLM1 (bp) 
Order based on  
bid-ask spread 
(bp) 
Orders based on 
turnover 
(mHUF) 
OTP 17 1. 11 1. 14 090 1. 
MOL 31 2. 19 2. 6 450 2. 
MTelekom 35 3. 20 3. 1 606 4. 
Richter 36 4. 23 4. 2 140 3. 
Egis 109 5. 48 5. 288 5. 
Fotex 243 6. 58 6. 157 6. 
FHB 256 7. 73 8. 84 9. 
Econet 312 8. 114 11. 86 8. 
Rába 368 9. 70 7. 137 7. 
TVK 496 10. 106 10. 39 12. 
Synergon 510 11. 93 9. 84 10. 
PannErgy 600 12. 134 13. 63 11. 
ÁNY 626 13. 132 12. 29 13. 
Source: proprietary 
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For the sake of a better comprehension, Figure 18 demonstrates the data of 
Table 7, where I ranked the stocks also according to BLM1. Instead of the turnover 
data itself, I displayed its reciprocal on the figure, because it is easier to demonstrate 
the turnover data in the same figure together with the BLM1 and the bid-ask spread. 
 
Figure 18: Comparison of liquidity indicators 
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According to Table 7 and 18, it can be stated that in the group of liquid stocks 
the order based on bid-ask spread seemingly differs less compared to the order by 
BLM than in the case of the turnover. This is a consequence of the fact that the bid-
ask spread is a component of BLM, thus it naturally influences the BLM value. It can 
also be observed on Table 7 that the less liquid a stock is, the less relative proportion 
bid-ask spread has within the BLM value, as the more significant the value of the 
adverse price movement will be within the BLM value.26 For this reason the orders 
will differ in the more illiquid categories. Figure 19 shows the proportion bid-ask 
spread represents within each BLM value on different order sizes in the case of stocks 
in BUX, which thus shows in case of which stock can the value of the adverse price 
movement be considered as significant. 
  
                                                 
26
 BLM = 2LP + APMask + APMbid = bid-ask spread + adverse price movement on the bid side + 
adverse price movement on the ask side.  
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Figure 19: The average proportion of bid-ask spread within BLM values on different order sizes 
between 02/01/2007-16/07/2010. 
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The figure shows that the higher the size of the order we consider, the smaller 
the share proportion the spread represents within the BLM value, and the bigger the 
adverse price movement does. Furthermore, the more liquid the stock we consider, 
the higher the bid-ask spread share within the BLM value. For this reason in the case 
of liquid stocks the BLM and the bid-ask spread provide a nearly similar ranking for 
stock liquidity.  
In the case of medium liquid and illiquid stocks it is interesting that whilst 
according to BLM1 and turnover the classification into the two big categories 
(medium liquid, illiquid) is the same – although the ranking differs within each 
category –, based on the spread the categorization is however dissimilar. For instance, 
according to BLM1 Econet belongs to the group of medium liquid stocks, while 
based on the spread and used the rules of thumb applied by investors, then we would 
slot the stock into the illiquid category.  
With the help of rank-correlation I examined whether in the case of the bid-
ask spread or in the case of the turnover, the BLM provides a similar result from the 
point of view of ranking. Carrying out the calculation according to Spearman’s rank 
correlation I received the result that the rank correlation value between BLM1 and the 
spread is 0.945, whilst this value between the BLM1 and the turnover is 0.956. 
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Therefore, even though  according to the data it appears as though the ranking 
accords less in the case of BLM1 and turnover – as it differs in more locations –, 
based on the calculations, I concluded  that the ranking differed more according to the 
BLM1 and the spread. This is the consequence of the fact that if there is difference in 
the ranking in the case of the spread and BLM1, then this difference is more 
significant there than in the case of BLM1 and turnover. This may cause a problem in 
case the different rankings have the consequence of slotting a stock into another 
liquidity category, which has happened for instance in the case of Econet.  
I also determined to what extent the three indicators provide a similar order 
with another rank correlation method. This method is Kendall’s rank correlation, with 
which I could examine the three indicators simultaneously. I received the result that 
the value of the index is 0.965, which shows the same as Spearman’s rank correlation, 
i.e. that the order can be regarded nearly similar based on different indicators.   
However, the whole examined period also contains the phase of the crisis 
started in 2007/2008. For this reason I considered it worthwhile to divide the time 
series into the following sections: before crisis (01/01/2007-16/10/2008), during the 
crisis (17/10/2008-03/04/2009) and after crisis (04/04/2009- 16/07/2010) phases,27 
and examine whether the same can be stated about the order formed according to the 
three indicators also for the three different periods than regarding the whole period. 
Table 8 contains the values of the rank correlation for each period.  
 
Table 8: Rank correlation 
Methods Indexes Whole period 
Before 
crisis 
During 
crisis 
After 
crisis 
BLM-spread 0.945 0.956 0.907 0.896 Spearman’s 
rank 
correlation BLM-turnover 0.956 0.967 0.775 0.934 
Kendall’s rank 
method BLM-spread-turnover 0.965 0.982 0.896 0.918 
Source: proprietary 
 
Based on Spearman’s rank correlation, it can be stated that before and also 
after the crisis the connection was stronger in the ranking formed between the BLM1 
and turnover than between BLM1 and the spread – although both could be considered 
                                                 
27
 I have accomplished the division into periods with the help of the bloxplot diagram and with the 
examination of structural breaks, about which I give a detailed description in Subchapter IV/2.4.4. 
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as strong. However, during the crisis this reversed and the strength of the relationship 
between BLM1 and turnover significantly reduced, while between BLM1 and the 
spread it did not decrease equally significantly. This entailed that between the 
rankings provided by spread and BLM1 the connection became stronger than between 
the rankings according to turnover and BLM1. 
It can also be experienced in the case of the correlation index calculated with 
the help of Kendall’s rank method that during the crisis the strength of the connection 
decreases, which again increased following the crisis. In order to comprehend this 
phenomenon it is worthwhile to observe the formed ranking in the three examined 
periods, which are shown in the following three figures (20; 21; 22). On these figures, 
I ranked the stocks according to the BLM1 value of the whole time series. I did this in 
order that it could be seen that the categorization of stocks can change in each period, 
and for this reason it can be important to often revise which liquidity category each 
stock belongs to. An instance for this during the crisis is Rába, which would have 
belonged to the group of illiquid stocks instead of the medium liquid ones. 
Furthermore, it is also visible on the figures (Figures 20-22) that based on different 
indicators we would have sorted the stocks into different liquidity groups, as we did 
for the whole examined period, e.g. in the case of Econet. 
 
Figure 20: The average values of liquidity indicators before crisis 
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Source: proprietary 
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Figure 21: The average values of liquidity indicators during crisis 
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Figure 22: The average values of liquidity indicators after crisis 
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Table 9 summarizes the data of the above figures. It can be observed on the 
table how the economic crisis originated from the subprime crisis of 2007/2008 
affected the values of liquidity indicators. It can be seen that as a consequence of the 
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crisis the values of BLM and spread have significantly grown in 2008, as well which 
in some cases did not return to their pre-crisis level. The same appears in the turnover 
data, i.e. that the turnover slumped in the case of all stocks. However, while BLM1 
and bid-ask spread did not return to their pre-crisis level only in some instances, for 
the turnover data it can be observed that except for OTP and MTelekom, the turnover 
of none of the stocks returned to its pre-crisis level. In the table the particular 
indicators of stocks whose liquidity did not return to their pre-crisis level after the 
crisis are highlighted. 
 
Table 9: Average values of liquidity indicators  
BLM1 (bp) Spread (bp) Turnover (mHUF) 
  
Before 
crisis 
During 
crisis 
After 
crisis 
Before 
crisis 
During 
crisis 
After 
crisis 
Before 
crisis 
During 
crisis 
After 
crisis 
OTP 16 30 14 12 16 9 13,405 9,666 16,497 
MOL 25 53 30 19 27 17 9,763 2,958 3,038 
MTelekom 33 48 32 21 25 19 1,691 1,599 1,485 
Richter 34 55 33 24 31 20 2,523 1,599 1,801 
Egis 102 201 88 52 67 36 333 185 261 
Fotex 131 651 256 47 101 59 263 44 49 
Rába 147 1,255 372 53 145 68 221 23 57 
FHB 217 617 186 85 97 48 96 30 85 
Econet 226 755 282 87 173 132 102 13 88 
Synergon 254 1,368 560 81 170 84 142 25 24 
TVK 353 1,172 459 107 178 80 58 12 22 
Pannergy 481 1,470 477 157 240 67 87 36 39 
ÁNy 559 1,119 554 148 172 97 32 20 28 
Source: proprietary 
 
Therefore, on the whole we can state based on Figure 20-22 and Table 9 that 
during the examination of rank correlation the relationship can be considered as 
strong concerning the ranking formed by liquidity indicators. However, there are 
differences in the order which can be important during an investment decision. An 
instance for this is when we sort a stock into a different liquidity category because of 
the differing order. This phenomenon only occurs in the medium liquid and illiquid 
categories. In the case of liquid stocks i.e. the four bluechip stocks, the stocks can be 
considered as liquid according to all three liquidity indicators. It follows from this 
that if we regard the four bluechip stocks then the rules of thumb used by market 
actors – namely that they consider the bid-ask spread and the turnover as liquidity 
indicators – typically lead to a correct result in the sense that they sort the stocks into 
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the liquid group.  However, the same cannot be said about the sorting into the other 
two categories.  
Another important conclusion is that during a crisis the rank correlation 
decreases, therefore it increases the inaccuracy of the categorization if we sort a stock 
into a liquidity group based on an inappropriate indicator.  
Based on Table 7 and 9 a further interesting phenomenon can be observed, 
namely that the liquidity of each stock compared to each other highly differs 
according to different indicators. Having examined the four bluechip stocks, Table 10 
shows this difference. For instance it can bee seen that based on BLM1 OTP is 1.82 
times more liquid than MOL, whilst according to turnover data it is already 2.18 
times more. What is even more significant that OTP is nearly 2 times more liquid 
than MTelekom from the aspect of BLM, while if we regard turnover, then OTP 
appears to be 9 times more liquid. 
 
Table 10: Liquidity of stocks compared to each other 
 BLM1 Spread Turnover 
OTP-MOL 182% 173% 218% 
OTP-MTelekom 206% 182% 877% 
OTP-Richter 212% 209% 658% 
MOL-MTelekom 113% 105% 402% 
MOL-Richter 116% 121% 301% 
MTelekom-Richter 103% 115% 75% 
Source: proprietary 
 
This is essential because if traders decide what position they should take in 
each stock according to their respective liquidity then it is not the same according to 
which indicator they make such decision. Namely, based on BLM they would take 
two times bigger position in OTP than in MTelekom, while based on volume they 
would create a nine times bigger position.  
Therefore it is important to check how strong the relationship is between the 
three liquidity indicators, since in spite of the fact that stocks are nearly similarly 
categorized in respect of liquidity, it does not necessarily mean that there is a strong 
relationship between each liquidity indicator. 
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2.5.2.1. Relationship between liquidity indicators 
 
During the comparison of the three liquidity indicators, I considered it 
worthwhile to examine the correlation between the three indicators, i.e. to observe 
how strong the relationship is between them.  
 
Table 11: Correlation of liquidity indicators between  
02/01/2007 and 16/07/2010 
Correlation between liquidity 
indicators 
  
BLM1- 
Spread 
BLM1-
turnover 
OTP 0.911 -0.092 
Mol 0.884 -0.273 
Richter 0.746 -0.241 
MTelekom 0.919 -0.178 
Egis 0.838 -0.328 
Fotex 0.794 -0.313 
Rába 0.736 -0.213 
FHB 0.557 -0.099 
Econet 0.738 -0.239 
Synergon 0.648 -0.297 
Pannergy 0.554 -0.095 
TVK 0.694 -0.273 
ÁNy 0.521 -0.105 
Source: proprietary 
 
According to the table it can be stated that there is a strong positive 
relationship between the BLM and the spread, but the less liquid the stock, the weaker 
is this relationship. 
There is a weak negative relationship between the turnover and the BLM. 
Namely, when the turnover on the market is low/high, it does not predict well 
whether the liquidity would be also low/high according to the BLM or the spread. 
Therefore, the a conclusion can be drawn according to Table 11 that the BLM and the 
spread provide a similar result concerning liquidity based on daily data, but the 
turnover gives a significantly different result. As a consequence, in Subchapter 
2.5.2.2 I am going to carry out a more detailed examination about the relationship 
between BLM and turnover data also in the case of intraday data. But before that, I 
present how the relationship changed between the BLM and the spread, and also 
between the BLM and the turnover before, during and after the crisis. With the help 
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of linear regression, I examine the extent of the explanatory power of the spread and 
turnover concerning BLM in the three different periods. I made the examination in 
the case of a liquid (OTP), a medium liquid (Egis) and an illiquid (Pannergy) stock. 
As a result, I have concluded that compared to turnover, the spread had a higher 
explanatory power regarding BLM, which is shown by Table 12 which contains the 
R-squared values. In the table it can be seen that during the crisis the explanatory 
power decreased in the case of all three stocks, which did not return to its pre-crisis 
level in the case of liquid and medium liquid ones. Moreover, for OTP the turnover 
did not have a significant explanatory power concerning BLM after the crisis at all. 
Furthermore, it can be seen in the data – which we can also observe in Table 11 – that 
the less liquid a stock, the lower is the explanatory power of bid-ask spread. This 
phenomenon cannot be observed in the case of turnover, since there the explanatory 
power is higher before and after the crisis in the case of a medium liquid stock, while 
during the crisis it is higher for the liquid stocks – although this explanatory power is 
not considered as significant in any case. 
 
Table 12: Explanatory power of spread and turnover 
  Spread-BLM Turnover-BLM 
R-squared OTP Egis Pannergy OTP Egis Pannergy 
Before crisis 0.924 0.766 0.421 0.019 0.126 0.007 
During crisis 0.899 0.654 0.111 0.124 0.081 0.012 
After crisis 0.875 0.674 0.641 0.002 0.159 0.020 
Source: proprietary 
 
Figures 23-24 show the result of the linear regression for OTP in the case of 
bid-ask spread and turnover before the crisis. The result of the other two stocks 
appears to be similar, therefore I dispensed with its illustration.   
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Figure 23: Relation between spread and BLM before the crisis (OTP) 
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Figure 24: Relation between turnover and BLM before the crisis (OTP) 
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It is seen in the figures as well that the connection between the spread and the 
BLM is strong, while between the turnover and the BLM it is not. However, apart 
from the fact that the relationship between the indicators is not strong, it is 
worthwhile to observe what is characteristic for the change of these indicators, i.e. 
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when there is a high increase or decrease in the bid-ask spread or in the turnover, then 
what can be said about the BLM value. Thus I examined the extent to which the 
spread and turnover change explain the change of BLM.  
I carried out the examination for all the three periods. Table 13 contains the 
results, where this time I have chosen another stock from the illiquid group: the 
Synergon instead of Pannergy. In Table 13 I bolded the values where the relationship 
was not significant.  
 
Table 13: Explanatory power of ∆spread and ∆turnover 
 ∆spread-∆BLM ∆turnover - ∆BLM  
R-squared OTP EGIS Synergon OTP EGIS Synergon 
Before crisis 0.925 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.004 
During crisis 0.846 0.476 0.041 0.005 0.145 0.003 
After crisis 0.876 0.402 0.021 0.000 0.036 0.001 
Source: proprietary 
 
From the results it can be seen that in the case of liquid and illiquid stocks the 
turnover change is not able to explain the change of BLM in any period. For medium 
liquid stocks it can, although the relation was not strong either.  
 
Figure 25: Relation between ∆spread and ∆BLM before the crisis (OTP) 
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However, the explanatory power of spread change decreases with the liquidity 
of stocks, i.e. the more illiquid a stock is the less the spread change explains the BLM 
change. This is due to the above presented reason, namely that the more illiquid a 
stock, the lower the share bid-ask spread represents within the BLM value. I 
demonstrate the results as well, in the case of OTP for the pre-crisis period, which are 
shown by Figure 25 and 26.  
 
Figure 26: Relation between ∆turnover and ∆BLM before the crisis (OTP) 
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2.5.2.2. Relationship between liquidity and turnover based on intraday data 
 
Regarding the relationship of BLM and turnover, we would have a prior 
expectation that the higher turnover a stock has the lower its BLM value, i.e. the 
better investment it appears to be from the point of view of liquidity. In the case of 
daily data we observed that the relationship between the two indicators is weak, 
however, it is also worthwhile to examine how this phenomenon arises intradaily, i.e. 
if the BLM value of a stock is low during the day, then whether it also has a high 
turnover at the same time.  
I have carried out this examination on the four bluechip stocks, based on 
average intraday turnover and BLM data of September 2007, which are shown by 
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Figures 27-30. The average values were calculated in a way that I took the average of 
the BLM and the turnover data belonging to the same second of each day. The basis 
of the calculation were those days of September 2007 when there was trading on 
BSE.   
Figure 27: BLM1 and turnover values of MOL (Sept. 2007)  
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Figure 28: BLM1 and turnover values of OTP (Sept. 2007) 
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Figure 29: BLM1 and turnover values of MTelekom (Sept. 2007) 
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Figure 30: BLM1 and turnover values of Richter (Sept. 2007) 
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The intraday average values calculated from the data of September 2007 by no 
means support the hypothesis that the liquidity measured by BLM co-moves with the 
turnover. The tendency that the higher turnover goes together with low BLM values is 
not realized.  
During the interviews with market participants, (Szűcs and Váradi, 2012) we 
experienced that as a rule of thumb they regard the formation of intraday turnover as 
though it formed according to a „U-shape”, i.e. it is higher at the beginning and the 
end of the day than during the day. However, this „U-shape” can only be observed in 
the case of OTP, for the other stocks only the end-day increasing turnover is visible, 
which can be linked to the opening of the American stock exchange in all the four 
cases. The American stock exchange opens at 3:30 PM Hungarian time, which 
generates a significant turnover on BSE in the last trading hour. While this impact can 
be seen in the turnover data, it does not influence the value of BLM. While with the 
increase in turnover should be accompanied with the increase in liquidity, this is not 
reflected in the indicator. 
Moreover, it can also be observed in the figures that the trading activity is low 
in the first hour after the opening, it intensifies at about 10 AM, thus the first hour of 
trading cannot be considered as typical for the daily average trade, therefore its 
BLM1 data do not provide reliable information about liquidity. Furthermore, it is also 
possible that the BLM1 values are higher in the first hour, because the investors build 
up the order book with their orders at that time. According to this, it can be stated that 
between turnover and BLM data there is no strong relationship even intradaily.  
This finding is important for day traders (namely those who close the opened 
position by the end of the same trading day at the latest), because if they intend to 
decide at the beginning of the day based on turnover whether a stock is liquid or not, 
then it is not certain that they receive a correct result. Namely, based on Figures 27-
30 there is also an instance that high turnover is accompanied with low liquidity 
(OTP, Richter), and also there is a further example that by low turnover the liquidity 
is also low (MOL, MTelekom). Therefore, the high turnover at the beginning of the 
day did not entail that the order book was built up faster, and thus the particular stock 
was more liquid. 
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2.5.3. Relationship between volatility and liquidity  
 
In the classical portfolio theory of Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952) every 
investor optimizes in the standard deviation-return space in order to maximize utility. 
According to Markowitz, if we can assume that the distribution of returns is normal, 
then it is sufficient to know the expected value and the standard deviation, and based 
on them investors are able to carry out the optimization (Bélyácz, 2009, 2011). 
However, the model ignores an essential factor, namely that the product cannot be 
traded at the mid price. Therefore, it does not consider the transaction cost originated 
from the lack of liquidity. In case we take this additional transaction cost into 
consideration, then traders do not only have to solve a utility maximization problem 
in the standard deviation-return space, where the aim is to achieve the highest return 
with the lowest risk (Riecke et al., 1985), but they would also have to minimize the 
occurring costs simultaneously. For solving such a complex task, we need to know 
the relationship of liquidity compared to the standard deviation and the return. In the 
present chapter I do not provide a solution for the optimization task, I only present the 
connection between the three factors (liquidity, return, standard deviation). 
The reason why I find the collective examination of the three factors 
important is because during the series of interviews we found that these are the three 
factors that market actors strive to predict. They create their strategy based on the 
forecast of return-standard deviation-liquidity, for instance how to accomplish the 
order splitting of big orders or where to put the stop limits exactly. 
During the analysis I observed the correlation between the BLM and the 
standard deviation values estimated from the GARCH-model, and between the BLM 
and true range (TR) values in the case of three liquid, one medium liquid and one 
illiquid stock. Table 14 contains the results.  
 
Table 14: Correlation between volatility and liquidity 
BLM-TR BLM-standard deviation 
Correlation Before 
crisis 
During 
crisis 
After 
crisis 
Before 
crisis 
During 
crisis 
After 
crisis 
OTP 0.723 0.632 0.391 0.598 0.582 0.606 
MOL 0.638 0.423 0.311 0.523 0.224 0.414 
Richter 0.276 0.636 0.224 0.248 0.523 0.403 
Egis 0.526 0.424 0.118 0.410 0.373 0.162 
Pannergy 0.302 0.107 0.245 0.059 0.179 0.246 
Source: proprietary 
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According to the data, the correlation between volatility and liquidity before 
and during the crisis is always bigger if we measure volatility with the true range and 
not with the standard deviation. During the crisis, it is only in the case of the illiquid 
stock that the correlation is higher between the standard deviation estimated from 
GARCH model and BLM than between the true range and the BLM. However, after 
the crisis the correlation in every case is higher between the standard deviation and 
the BLM. According to the data, it can also be observed that the more liquid a stock 
is, the higher the correlation tends to be between liquidity and volatility for every 
period.  
In the case of OTP, apart from correlation I also examined the explanatory 
power of volatility concerning liquidity, and I observed what estimation could have 
been given for liquidity, based on the pre-crisis period assuming the knowledge of 
volatility. I accomplished the examination with linear regression, on one hand 
because this model is used in the literature, on the other hand because only the fitting 
of a very high (six) degree polynomial provided a better estimation than linear 
estimation, but also in that case only with a small percentage did the R-squared value 
improve. Thus applying the linear regression appeared to be justified. 
 
Figure 31: Linear regression 
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Referred to BLM, I examined the explanatory power of standard deviation and 
the explanatory power of true range separately. It can be stated based on Figure 31 
that the explanatory power concerning the formation of liquidity is higher in the case 
of the true range, since there the R-squared value is 0.52, whilst in the other case it is 
only 0.36. For this reason, I am going to apply the linear regression estimated with 
the true range in order to assess the extent liquidity decrease could have been caused 
by a volatility rise such as the one occurred during the crisis.  
 Figure 32 shows the extent of the difference between the actual and the 
estimated liquidity. According to the figure it can be stated that almost every day (100 
times out of 114 days) the estimated BLM was lower than the actual one, i.e. the 
shortage of liquidity was bigger than it could have been expected. Therefore, based 
on this the conclusion can be drawn that there was also a real liquidity crisis during 
the year 2008. Furthermore, it justifies Csávás and Erhart’s (2005) statement that in 
the liquidity decrease the rise of the unexpected volatility is reflected.  
 
Figure 32: Difference between the actual and the estimated BLM during the crisis 
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 I also examined for the post-crisis period what estimation we would give 
concerning liquidity. During this assessment, I experienced exactly the opposite as for 
the during-crisis period, i.e. we overestimated the shortage of liquidity almost every 
day based on the linear regression. 
 
Figure 33: Difference between the actual and the estimated BLM after the crisis 
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2.5.4. Time series of BLM 
 
In my dissertation, I intend to use the BLM database for presenting how it 
could be utilized in risk management by supplementing a VaR-type model with it, 
and by estimating a virtual price impact function from it and then carrying out a 
statistical analysis on the estimated database. I present these in the following two (III 
and IV) chapters. However, for this I find it inevitable to describe how the BLM 
database evolves in time. Namely, I am going to carry out the examinations on the 
time series data of the price impact function based on this. The following figure 
shows the formation of daily BLM1 and daily price of OTP between 1 January, 2007 
and 3 June, 2011: 
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Figure 34: Average daily BLM1 and price data of OTP during the period of   
01/01/2007-03/06/2011 
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In the figure mean-reverting can be observed in the BLM1 time series, 
furthermore it is also to be seen that there is a correlation between the BLM1 of the 
preceding day and the BLM1 values of the current day , since it can be observed that 
typically low BLM1-value days are followed also by low BLM1-value days, and the 
same can be stated when the BLM1 takes a high value.  It also appears in the figure 
that during the financial crisis of 2008 the value of the indicator significantly 
increased, which well reflects the shortage of liquidity on the market during this 
period.  
According to this, in Subchapter IV.2 I am going to examine the database of 
the virtual price impact function estimated from the BLM time series from the angle 
whether a mean-reversion can be found in the time series, whether there is an 
autocorrelation in the time series data, and whether there is a structural break in the 
database as a consequence of the ongoing economic processes.  
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2.6. Conclusion  
 
I have shown that BLM is a liquidity indicator which is able to measure the 
liquidity of the assets traded on the stock exchange along several dimensions, thus it 
provides a reliable view of the current liquidity situation of the market. The analysis 
also revealed, that the rankings based on the bid-ask spread, the turnover or the BLM 
are nearly the same, though the relation between the bid-ask spread and the BLM is 
stronger than between the turnover and the BLM. In sum, the BLM is an indicator 
which is easy to use, and can help investment decisions from the viewpoint of 
liquidity. Moreover it gives a more reliable picture of the assets’/market’s liquidity, as 
opposed to a situation in which the investor would base her decision only on the 
turnover or the bid-ask spread. My main statements in this chapter and my answer to 
the first hypothesis are the following:  
 
H1: BLM, and the most commonly used liquidity indicators in practice 
(bid-ask spread, turnover) provide different ranking from the aspect of 
liquidity for individual stock:   
 H1/a: during a calm period, and  
 H1/b: during a crisis. 
 H1/c: in the case of a liquid and  
 H1/d: an illiquid stock.  
 
S1: In the case of medium liquid and illiquid stocks, bid-ask spread does not give the 
same ranking as BLM, however the difference is not significant.   
S2: In the case of liquid, medium liquid and illiquid stocks, turnover does not give the 
same ranking as BLM, however the difference is not significant.  
S3: In a calm period i.e. before and after crisis, ranking differs less from the ranking 
provided by BLM based on turnover than from the one based on bid-ask spread.  
S4: During a crisis, the ranking based on bid-ask spread differs less from the ranking 
provided by BLM than from the one based on turnover.  
S5: During the crisis the rank-correlation has decreased between BLM and the spread 
and between BLM and the turnover.   
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S6: In the case of the medium liquid and illiquid stocks it would be worthwhile to 
take also the BLM into consideration as a liquidity indicator, because in their case 
the ranking in the wrong order is more significant. In respect of these stocks I 
have also shown during my analysis that there is a chance that a particular stock is 
sorted into a wrong liquidity category.  
S7: In the case of liquid stocks, the values of BLM and the bid-ask spread returned to 
their pre-crisis level, while in the case of turnover it could only be observed in the 
case of OTP and MTelekom.   
S8: In the case of medium liquid and illiquid stocks liquidity of some stocks did not 
return to the pre-crisis level according to the BLM and bid-ask spread, while it did 
not happen to any stocks according to turnover.  
S9: Each stock’s liquidity related to one another can significantly differ in the case of 
different liquidity indicators.  
S10: The correlation between bid-ask spread and BLM can be regarded as strongly 
positive, while the correlation of BLM and turnover shows a slightly negative 
relation.  
S11: The less liquid a stock is, the lower the correlation between the liquidity 
indicators.  
S12: The change of bid-ask spread has a strong explanatory power about BLM 
change in the case of a liquid stock, whilst in the case of medium liquid stocks 
this explanatory power is not significant. In the case of illiquid stocks, bid-ask 
spread change has very limited explanatory power, which cannot even be 
considered as significant before the crises.  
S13: The turnover change cannot explain BLM change in the case of liquid and 
illiquid stocks, whilst it has also only a low explanatory power in the case of a 
medium liquid one.  
S14: Turnover and liquidity do not co-move intradaily, for instance at the beginning 
of the day liquidity is low in every case regardless whether the turnover is big or 
small.   
S15: BLM can be important for those market participants who invest in illiquid stocks 
or intraday.   
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According to my statements, I can conclude that I reject the first hypothesis, 
namely that the ranking of the different liquidity indicators differ notably. Though I 
reject the hypothesis, in the course of making investment decisions it is worth taking 
into account the differences among the ranking provided by the liquidity indicators.  
Apart from the fact that the investors could base their trading strategy on the 
BLM from the view of liquidity, market participants can use this indicator for several 
other things, as well. For example, brokers would be able to optimize the order 
splitting of larger blocks of shares, or it could help traders to set the prices of the stop 
limits. Above these, BLM could be used for creating new derivative products, which 
would enable market participants to hedge liquidity risk. In relation to these possible 
applications, I have analyzed the relation between volatility and liquidity. I have 
based my second hypothesis on this analysis. In the following I am listing my 
statements, and my answer to the second hypothesis.  
 
H2: There is a positive relation between volatility (standard deviation, 
true range) and BLM.  
 
S1: On the Budapest Stock Exchange it has been justified, that there is a positive 
correlation between BLM and volatility, namely that the more volatile markets 
are, the transaction cost caused by the lack of liquidity is higher. 
S2: The less liquid a stock is, the lower the correlation between liquidity and 
volatility tends to be.  
S3: Before and during the crisis, the correlation between the true range and liquidity 
was stronger than the one between standard deviation and liquidity. However, 
after the crisis this has reversed.  
S4: The crisis of 2008 can be regarded as a liquidity crisis based on the liquidity 
estimated from volatility, i.e. the estimated BLM value is lower than the actual 
BLM value.  
S5: After the crisis, the estimated BLM value is typically higher than the actual value, 
i.e. liquidity is higher after the crises than it had been expected.  
 
From my statements it follows, that I cannot reject the second hypothesis, 
namely that there is a positive relation between volatility and liquidity. 
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III. Liquidity adjusted Value-at-Risk 
 
Liquidity risk becomes more and more important in risk management, i. e. 
during the crises of the past decades, market participants had to face that the lack of 
liquidity caused significant losses to them. This could be observed during the fall of 
two giant hedge funds, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, or even 
Amaranth Advisor in 2006. What contributed to their bankruptcy was that they took 
such big positions that were impossible to liquidate in a short period without a 
significant price impact, which resulted in significant losses for them (Jorion, 2007). 
Furthermore, also in the case of the subprime crisis between 2007 and 2008 it caused 
great losses that money-markets dried out and liquidity completely disappeared from 
the markets (Stange and Kaserer, 2009a). 
Apart from market participants, regulatory authorities have also recognized 
that there is a need to take liquidity into consideration, as well when drafting new 
regulations.28 Thus, the Basel II accord did not prove to be adequate for the regulation 
of financial institutions anymore, since it did not address the issue of liquidity 
management. During the crisis of 2007 and 2008, numerous reports and guide-lines 
were created referring to the handling of liquidity. As a consequence, the Basel 
Committee called upon the banks to use conservative methods when the assessing 
their assets from the point of their marketability. Besides, the Committee has also 
prescribed to the banks to integrate the costs, benefits and risks of liquidity into their 
pricing, performance assessment and into the process of accepting new products in 
the case of every significant business activity (Basel Committee, 2008). The Basel 
Committee has created the main scheme of Basel III regulatory standard in 2009, 
whose aim is to provide a regulatory framework concerning the capital requirement 
and liquidity of banks, thus expanding the Basel II regulation. 
Referring to liquidity, the Basel III elaborated two indexes so that the banks 
could be more resistant during the periods when the lack of liquidity occurs on the 
market. One index incorporates the short-term liquidity of banks, whereas the aim of 
the other index is to regulate the refinancing of less liquid assets with appropriate 
long-term liability (Kovács, 2011). The first index is the so called LCR (liquidity 
                                                 
28About more detailed information on the relationship of the crisis and the regulations see: Antalóczy 
et al. (2009). 
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coverage ratio),29 and the other is the so called NSFR (net stable funding ratio) 
index30 (BIS, 2010).  
However, I am not concerned with the liquidity of banks in my dissertation, 
thus I do not undertake the analysis of the indexes applied in the framework of the 
Basel III regulation, but my analysis is going to centre around the liquidity adjusted 
value-at-risk (LAVaR) models, since for market participants this index provides 
important information regarding risk.   
A vast number of research were created during the past few years about how 
to include the concept of liquidity into risk management, and how to integrate 
liquidity into the conventional VaR models. For this, it is inevitable to determine a 
unified framework for the quantification of liquidity, which is a complicated task, 
namely liquidity in all asset classes is a concept which is highly difficult to quantify 
(Basel Committee, 2005). Chapter III/1 is concerned with the research which 
supplement the conventional VaR models with liquidity risk.  
 
 
1. Literature of the LAVaR models 
 
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a commonly used model in the risk management 
systems, since it is easy to use and to understand. The VaR measure shows us the 
maximum loss of the portfolio over a predefined time horizon (T) at a given 
significance level (α). It can be expressed either in forint or as a percentage of the 
portfolio value (Jorion, 2007). The significance level is usually 95% or 99%, while 
the time horizon can be anything, usually one day, one week, one month, one year, 
etc. There is a relation between the time horizon and the significance level, since the 
longer the time horizon, the lower significance level can be, because we require a 
lower security level in that case. 
In order to be able to calculate the value of the VaR, we need to know the 
probability distribution of our position in the certain security/portfolio at time T. The 
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(1-α)th percentile of this distribution will give us the value, from which our 
security/portfolio will be worth less with a probability of (1- α) at time T (Jorion, 
2007).  
 
P(Vt<K)= 1-α       (14) 
 
where the value of our position is V and the difference of its percentile (K) will give 
us the value-at-risk in forint. For example, if our portfolio’s value is normally 
distributed at time T, which has an m mean value, and an s standard deviation, then K 
can be determined according to the next equation (Öcsi, 2007), where N shows the 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution: 
 
α−=




 − 1
s
mKN
     (15) 
 
The conventional VaR calculation doesn’t contain the total market risk, since 
it doesn’t take into account the liquidity risk. The conventional VaR assumes that one 
can trade on the mid price within a fix time period. This is not true in case of real 
market situations. Because of this one needs to take into account, that it is not 
possible to trade on the mid price, and liquidity should be quantified. A variety of 
studies have showed that liquidity risk constitutes a significant share of total market 
risk therefore it is worth considering it. For instance, Bangia et al. (1999) state that in 
emerging markets models underestimate market risk by as much as 25-30% because 
of ignoring liquidity risk. Lawrence and Robinson (1997) reach a similar conclusion. 
According to their study neglecting liquidity risk may underestimate VaR by 30%. 
Stange and Kaserer (2009a) analyzed the data of the Deutsche Börse AG and found 
that conventional VaR measures underestimate risk by 25% even for liquid stocks. 
Finally, Dowd (2001) states that the costs of illiquidity may reach the extent of losses 
suffered from price fluctuations. 
The results above all suggest that, when calculating VaR, above price risk we 
must take into account liquidity risk, therefore the conventional VaR model should be 
amended with the quantification of liquidity risk.  
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In sum, market risk can be split into two main parts: the price risk, namely that 
the mid price changes as a result of market processes; and liquidity risk, namely that 
market participants cannot trade on the mid price. Furthermore liquidity risk itself can 
be divided into two parts, to exogenous risk, and endogenous risk, which is shown at 
Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35: Decomposition of market risk  
Market risk
Liquidity adjusted VaR model
Conventional
VaR
Price risk Liquidity 
risk
Exogenous
liquidity risk
Endogenous
liquidity risk
 
Source: Bangia et al. (1998), p. 3. 
 
Exogenous liquidity risk stems from market processes, and is uniform for all 
market players. None of the individual market participants can influence exogenous 
liquidity, although their aggregate activity certainly can. This liquidity risk can be 
measured, for example, with the size of the bid-ask spread, the turnover, or the 
quantity of buy and sell orders available at the best levels. On liquid markets the bid-
ask spread is quite stable, and small, while the quantity of the orders available on the 
best price level is usually high, and has a stable value as well. Besides these 
characteristics, it can be observed on liquid markets, that the turnover is high. In 
contrast, on illiquid markets – such as for example the emerging markets – the bid-
ask spread is quite variable, and has a higher value, than in case of liquid markets. 
Also the quantity of the orders available on the best price level is more variable as 
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well. Moreover it often happens that there are only a few orders on the market, and 
the turnover is lower than on liquid markets (Bangia et al, 1998, p. 4.). 
To the contrary, endogenous liquidity can be different for each of the market 
participants. Its value depends on the size of the position a market player has on that 
given market. Usually the size of the position has an effect on the endogenous 
liquidity risk (Bangia et. al. 1998, p. 4). 
The next figure describes the relationship between the size of the position, the 
endogenous and the exogenous liquidity: 
 
Figure 36: Exogenous and endogenous liquidity risk 
Quote depth Position size
Bid
Ask
Point of endogenous
illiquidity
Price
 
Source: Bangia et al. (1999), p. 5. 
 
Before the appearance of the liquidity adjusted VaR models, market 
participants have taken liquidity risk into account in case of large illiquid positions, 
that they have calculated the VaR measure for a(n) – ad hoc – longer time period. The 
length of the time period was influenced by what market participants thought about 
the time which was needed to liquidate the whole position. In this case the variances 
and covariances were not calculated for the whole time period, but for the shorter 
time period, and then these values were multiplied by the square-root of time (Bangia 
et al., 1998). This approach didn’t lead to the right result, and caused an over-
estimation in the value of the variance and covariance (Diebold et al., 1998). 
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Numerous papers published in the last decade have adjusted conventional 
VaR calculation for liquidity risk. This group of models is named LAVaR (Liquidity 
Adjusted Value at Risk) models, and is usually divided into two large groups: i) 
models based on the data of the order book; and ii) models based on optimal 
execution. Liquidity adjusted VaR models can be further split into the subgroups as 
seen below: 
- Order book based models: 
- Models considering exogenous liquidity risk, 
- Models considering endogenous liquidity risk, 
- Transaction or volume based models. 
- Optimal execution based models:  
- Stochastic time horizon models, 
- Price impact function based models. 
In the following I will introduce the models of the first group in detail, since 
my empirical research will be based on those LAVaR models. I have chosen a model 
that is based on the order book, because it has the advantage of not having to estimate 
numerous parameters as it is in the case of models based on optimal execution 
(Stange and Kaserer, 2009b). 
 
1.1. Models considering exogenous liquidity risk  
 
The first LAVaR model was created by Bangia et al. (1998), which become 
the reference point for all later models that estimate LAVaR based on the data of the 
order book. This model provided the market with a simple-, and easily applicable 
method, which enabled the market participants to incorporate liquidity risk into the 
VaR framework. The model they created is called BDSS in the literature, after the 
authors’ names (Anil Bangia, Francis X. Diebold, Til Schuermann, John D. 
Stroughair). 
The BDSS model quantifies only the exogenous liquidity risk, since it takes 
into account only the bid-ask spread. Hence, in this model the LAVaR value is the 
sum of the conventional VaR and the liquidity risk determined by the bid-ask spread. 
The LAVaR is calculated as follows: 
 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
94 
( ) ( )





σα++−= ασ−µ ~'S
2
1
e1PmidLAVaR t ,    (16) 
 
where Pmidt is the mid price of the asset at time t, µ is the logreturn, α  is a pre-
defined percent of the logreturn’s distribution, σ is the standard deviation of the 
logreturn, 
Pmid
PbidPaskS −= , is the average relative spread, σ~  is the relative spread’s 
standard deviation, while α’ is the pre-defined percent of the relative spread’s 
distribution.  
The practical advantage of the BDSS model is that it is easy to use, as bid-ask 
spread data are available for the market participants of various markets. However, 
there are also several disadvantages that inspired researchers to develop further 
models in this field. These shortcomings are as follows:  
1. It assumes the distribution of spreads to be normal. The experiences in 
practice show that the distribution of the spreads is not normal, since it is 
fat-tailed and more skewed than the normal distribution as a consequence 
of the trends on the markets. In some cases researchers found that the 
distribution has several modes, which can happen because of regime 
switches (Bangia et al. 1998). 
2. It ignores endogenous liquidity risk, hence it underestimates liquidity risk.  
3. It assumes perfect correlation between liquidity risk and price risk. 
According to the model price is the lowest when spread is the largest. This 
way the model overestimates risk. Stange and Kaserer (2009a) give 
empirical evidence that this assumption is not correct. On a theoretical 
level, Francios-Heude and Wynandaeale (2001), Angelidis and Benos 
(2006) and Jorion (2007) criticize this assumption.  
To address the first of the shortcomings of the BDSS model, it could make 
sense to use the empirical distribution of the bid-ask spread instead of the normal 
distribution. The problem with this however is, that we would need a long time series 
to estimate the distribution, and as a result, the time series could contain structural 
breaks, or have several modes, which should be taken into account when calculating 
VaR. 
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In the literature Ernst, Stange and Kaserer’s (2008) model is well-known, 
which tries to solve the problem caused by the assumption of the normal distribution. 
This model is also based on the bid-ask spread, like the BDSS model, but in case of 
Ernst et al.’s model, the percentile of the distribution is estimated by the Cornish-
Fisher estimation31 instead the historical estimation. The basic of the estimation is 
also the normal distribution, but it takes into account the skewness and curtosis of the 
distribution. Ernst et al.’s (2008) model give a more precise result, than the BDSS 
model, but the other shortcomings of the BDSS are not being solved by this model 
either. 
To handle the endogenous liquidity risk as well, the solution could be to use a 
LAVaR model that incorporates the whole order book, like for example the model of 
Francois-Heude and Wynendaele (2001) or Giot and Gramming (2005). I will 
introduce these models in more detail in Subchapter 1.2.  
The third critique of the BDSS model, namely that there is a perfect 
correlation between exogenous liquidity risk and price risk, could be solved by 
estimating the real correlation from real market data.  
Models similar to Bangia et al.’s (1998) model can be found in the Hungarian 
literature as well. Radnai and Vonnák (2009) have examined during the analysis of 
Basel III regulation, the possibility to specify capital requirements for those assets 
which can be found in a bank’s trading book. This capital requirement would serve to 
cover the possible losses caused by illiquidity. The authors have suggested using the 
bid-asking spread, since it is a good indicator of liquidity. According to their opinion 
the capital requirement should be a linear function of the bid-ask spread, or it could 
be determined with internal model based on the spread’s historical distribution 
(Radnai and Vonnák, 2009, p. 252).   
 
1.2. Models considering endogenous liquidity risk  
 
The most important feature of the models considering endogenous liquidity 
risk is that they not only quantify liquidity risk with the bid-ask spread but also with a 
quantity weighted spread measure (Stange and Kaserer, 2009b). In other words, they 
                                                 
31
 More detailes about the Cornish-Fisher estimation see: Jorion, 2007, p. 273.  
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take into account that a transaction is not necessarily executed at the best price level. 
Accordingly, the spread values are weighted with the quantities at the given price 
levels. These models can incorporate a liquidity measure, e.g. the BLM or the XLM, 
as these give the price of liquidity for a predefined trade size.   
These models give a better result, since they quantify exogenous and 
endogenous risk as well, and they are a more general approach than the BDSS model 
is.  
The first model that dealt with endogenous liquidity risk was elaborated by 
Francois-Heude and Wynendaele’s (2001). Their model is based on the BDSS model, 
with the difference that they used the first five levels of the order book, not only the 
best level. As a result the authors could measure the price impact of different 
transaction sizes, in case when the transaction is fulfilled on the first five price levels. 
Their model uses intradaily data. In Francois-Heude and Wynendaele’s (2001) model 
the following equation gives the liquidity adjusted VaR measure: 
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where Pmidt is the mid price at time t, ( )QSp  is the average spread at Q volume, 
Spt(Q) is the value of the spread at time t, at Q volume, α is a given percent of the 
distribution of mid price, and σ is the standard deviation of th return. 
 The next important research in this field was carried out by Giot and 
Gramming (2005). They based their model also on intraday data, but they analyzed 
stock portfolios as well. The authors examined price impact of an investor buying and 
selling a certain amount of stock. This price impact, namely, that what the price will 
be for those who give market order, will depend on the actual order book. The authors 
have called this measure CRT (cost of round trip), which was first introduced by 
Irvine et al. (2000). This measure was calculated as a weighted average spread. Giot 
and Gramming (2005) defined the LAVaR as follows: 
 
( ))q(rnet)q(rnetexp1LAVaR ασ+µ−= ,   (18) 
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where rnet(q) is the net return, )q(rnetµ is the expected net return, α is a given 
percentile of the net return32, while )q(rnetσ  is the standard deviation of the net return. 
The net return was defined as follows: 
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where rt is the return of the mid price, ai,t/bi,t is the ask/bid price on level i, ni,t is the 
ask/bid volume on level i, and Pmidt is the mid price at time t. 
The model has two important deficiencies. The first one is that it does not use 
the empirical distributions, but t-distribution. The second one is that it does not take 
into account the fact, that liquidity can be different on the bid and ask side of the 
order book. Stange and Kaserer (2009a) give a solution for the first problem, by using 
an empirical distribution. These authors have determined the LAVaR for the daily 
XLM database. The researchers have pointed out, that it is not proper to simply ad 
liquidity risk to the conventional VaR measure, since it causes the over-estimation of 
the total risk, because we ignore the correlation between liquidity- and price risk. A 
shortcoming of the model is that it assumes the symmetry of the book, that is, the 
transaction costs arising from illiquidity are equal on the sell and the buy side.  
Qi and Ng (2009) offer a solution for the second deficiency, by estimating 
liquidity for both sides of the order book. Namely they calculate liquidity risk for the 
bid and ask side, quantifying it through the VWAP (volume weighted average price). 
They named their model LAIVaR-nak (liquidity adjusted intraday VaR), since they 
calculate the VaR intradaily. In their study they pointed out that it is worth assuming 
an asymmetric order book since price movements are not symmetric: drops are 
always more significant and drastic than price increases. 
In their model Bt(v) and At(v) means the weighted average price for a given 
volume (v) for the bid and ask side for a given short period. 
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 The distribution of the return was assumed to be a student-t distribution. 
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where v is a given volume, which will be bought/sold at time t, and at least the first j 
levels of the order is needed to fulfill the transaction the way, that ∑≤ )nmin( t,ivv . 
Namely that the volume of the transaction is smaller than the sum of the volumes in 
the first i levels of the order book. The indicators in Equation 20 show the immediate 
transaction cost of the bid and ask side (Qi and Ng, 2009).  
Finally, Erwan’s (2001) model is worth mentioning as well, in which the 
author also develops the BDSS model by using weighted average spread. The 
interesting thing about the article, that the author shows, that the endogenous liquidity 
risk is about the half of the market risk in case of illiquid stock, so it shouldn’t be 
ignored.  
 
1.3. Transaction or volume based models  
 
I am going to present two models that are not based on the order book, but are 
using past transaction data to estimate liquidity risk. The major advantage of these 
models is that they can be used on markets where there are no order books. The 
models are proposed in Berkowitz (2000a, b) and Jarrow and Potter (2001).  
The basic assumption of the LAVaR model of Berkowitz (2000a, b) is that 
liquidity can be estimated by a linear regression, where the regressor is liquidity, 
while the regressand is the transaction price. The regression is the following: 
 
tqttt,mid1t,TA xNCPP ε++θ++= ++ ,   (21) 
 
where PTA,t+1 is the price after the transaction, θ is the coefficient of the regression, 
which measures liquidity, Nt is the number of sold stocks, C is the constant, εt is the 
residuum, and xt+1 is the effect of the risk factor’s change to the mid price.  
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This model assumes that the risk factor and the liquidity are independent, 
which means, that the correlation between return and liquidity is 0. The advantage of 
the model, that it is not necessary to know the order book to be able to calculate the 
LAVaR, so it can be used on markets, where there isn’t any order book. But its 
disadvantage is that if we want the estimation of the regression to provide a reliable 
result, we need to have sufficient quantity of available data. Berkowitz (2000a, b) 
applies his model to intraday data in order to have enough data. 
Jarrow and Potter (2005) display a model based also on a regression. The 
difference between their model and the Berkowitz model is that they only perform the 
estimation based on the data from a period of one particular market turmoil. A further 
difference is that Jarrow and Potter (2005) do not consider other risk factors in their 
model therefore they do not have to presume zero correlation between liquidity and 
return. Moreover, the authors use relative changes, hence they consider the data of the 
previous period, as well. In their case the regression looks like the following: 
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where rtµ  is the expected value of the mid price’s return, while 2rtσ  is the variance of 
the mid price’s return. 
There is another significant group of order book based models, the models 
based on volume weighted price impact. I would highlight the work of Cosandey 
(2001). The essential feature of the model, that the author estimates price impact from 
volume data. The price is a function of the number of shares traded (N), while the 
investors can only trade with a predetermined quantity (Q). So the price is calculated 
like: P=Q/N. If we assume that the number of traded shares (N) are constant, then the 
mid price will be: Pmidt (∆N) = Q/(N+∆N) = Pmidt*(N/(N+∆N)). Namely, the price 
impact will be the linear function of the traded volume. The calculation of the 
LAVaR in his model will be the following:  
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where „perc” means the percentile from simulated distributions. In Cosandey’s 
(2001) model, the change of the mid price and the change of the volume were 
modeled together. 
   
1.4. Stochastic time horizon models  
 
There is another group of LAVaR models next to the models based on order 
book, the models based on optimal execution. Two types of models belong to this 
group, the models based on stochastic time horizon and the models based on price 
impact functions. The essence of these models is to provide an optimal execution 
strategy for market participants, where the strategy is built on the optimal balance 
between the transaction cost of trading and the cost of delay caused by not executing 
the transactions immediately. In case the market participant waits with the execution 
she has the chance to face a better market liquidity, so her transaction will cause a 
smaller price impact. 
From the models based on stochastic time horizon I would like to present two 
models, one of them were developed by Lawrence and Robinson (1997), and the 
other one by Haberle and Persson (2000). The model of Lawrence and Robinson 
(1997) is based on the assumption, that the shorter the time horizon used in the 
calculation of VaR, the more VaR underestimates the possible losses. So their model 
contains the cost of illiquidity and the cost of delay, though the authors do not give 
the exact calculation of the cost of delay. The researchers give an optimal time-
horizon for the execution of the transaction, where this optimal time-horizon depends 
on the volume of the transaction and the market liquidity. The other shortcoming of 
the model in addition to the lack of defining the calculation of costs, that it does not 
take into account the time variations of liquidity (Francois-Heude and Wynendaele, 
2001).   
Haberle and Persson (2000) assume that a certain proportion of the daily 
turnover can be liquidated without notable price impact, but this proportion can be 
different for every asset. The value of that certain turnover is called price-neutral 
value. The authors do not provide any clue how to estimate the exact proportion. 
They state that the proportion should be defined empirically. 
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1.5. Price impact function based models 
 
The other group of the models based on optimal execution, are the models 
based on price impact function. Models in this group are made by Jarrow and 
Subrahmanyam (1997, 2001), Berkowitz (2000), Hisata and Yamai (2000), Almgren 
and Chriss (2000), Almgren (2003), Dubil (2003), Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 
(1997), Bertismas and Lo (1998), and Engle and Ferstenberg (2007).  
The essence of these models, that they assume the time-horizon to be fixed 
under which market participants can liquidate their positions. The authors quantify on 
the one hand how the market price has changed during this time-horizon, on the other 
hand they ask the question: what would be the optimal trading strategy on this same 
time-horizon which would minimize the transaction cost of trading caused by 
illiquidity.  
The most important shortcoming of the models based on optimal execution, 
that they can hardly be used in practice. This has several reasons. For example on the 
one hand in practice it is usually not always possible to wait with the transaction and 
not to execute an order immediately or within short period of time. During crisis it 
can be especially risky for the market participants to wait with a transaction. On the 
other hand the parameters of the optimization should be stable in order to realize the 
return by postponing the transaction otherwise it is possible to achieve a worse return 
compared with immediate execution. Thirdly the optimization depends on the 
estimation of several parameters, which are difficult to handle in practice (Stange and 
Kaserer, 2009b). 
 
1.6. Testing practical applicability of the models 
 
All the models presented so far have their own respective advantages and 
disadvantages. A particularly important question is that which model works best on 
real market data, which provides the best and the most reliable result. Ernst et al. 
(2009) have prepared a study comparing the estimates of the models based on order 
book data. I have singled out the following models: 
- Models based on endogenous liquidity risk:  
 Stange and Kaserer (2009) 
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 Giot and Gramming (2005) 
 Francois-Heude and Van Wynendaele (2001) 
- Models based on exogenous liquidity risk: 
 Ernst et al. (2008) 
 BDSS (1999) 
- Models based on transaction 
 Berkowitz (2000) 
- Models base on volume 
 Cosandey (2005) 
The various models were tested by Ernst et al. (2009) on real market daily 
data from the July 2002 –December 2007 time period. The authors studied the returns 
and the risks predicted by the various models. During their test they assumed that the 
positions must be liquidated immediately at the prevailing order book.   
In the test the authors compared the experienced returns with the risk 
forecasted by the different models. LAVaR has been estimated with a 99% 
confidence interval, which means that the realized returns may have exceeded the 
value estimated by the model in 1% of total occurrences (Ernst et al., 2009). Figure 
37 shows the acceptance ratios of the models, namely the percentage in which the 
models were able to properly forecast the stocks’ risk.   
 
Figure 37: Ranking of LAVaR models 
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Source: Ernst et al. 2009, p. 13. 
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The results of Ernst et al. (2009) demonstrate that those models produced the 
best results in terms of predicting which have taken endogenous liquidity risk into 
account. These models significantly overperformed the others.33  
Summing it up it can be stated that amongst the order book based LAVaR 
models, the ones utilizing a liquidity measure, such as the XLM, give the best 
forecasts. Accordingly, I will build a LAVaR model in the empirical part of my 
dissertation which incorporates endogenous liquidity risk as well. The basis of my 
model will be the work of Giot and Gramming (2005) and Stange and Kaserer 
(2009a). The difference will be that I will build it on a Hungarian database for single 
stocks and for different stock portfolios.  
                                                 
33
 For more results see Ernst et al. (2009). 
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2. Empirical research: building an own LAVaR model 
 
Besides the statistical analysis of BLM I will build a theoretical model in my 
dissertation. With the aid of this theoretical model the possible loss caused by the lack 
of liquidity is easily quantifiable. With building a LAVaR model I would like to show 
a possible application of the BLM, which is one of its most promising applications. 
Accordingly in this chapter I will introduce a liquidity adjusted VaR model for single 
securities and for stock portfolios. My hypotheses will be the following:  
 
H3: Market risk can be underestimated at least by 5% even for liquid 
stocks at the order size of EUR 20,000 on the Budapest Stock Exchange, if 
we do not take the liquidity risk into consideration.34 
 
H4: In case of stock portfolios not only price risk but liquidity risk can be 
diversified.  
  
2.1. Research method 
 
The work of Giot and Gramming (2005), Stange and Kaserer (2009a) were the 
starting point of my own model, who made their models based on XLM type 
measures.  
The technical tools I have used to estimate LAVaR were the same for single 
stocks and for stock portfolios. The difference in the analysis is that for portfolios it is 
not sufficient to know the BLM values at five different order sizes (20, 40, 100, 200, 
and 500 thousand Euros), since in this case not the value but the quantity of the stocks 
is fixed. Accordingly, we must have BLM figures for all “q”-s. This can be carried 
out in two simple ways: 1) to use linear interpolation based on the available BLM 
data for each day, or 2) to use a linear regression. 
In my modeling I have taken the second approach, since I will use the same 
approach during the estimation of the price impact function in the fourth chapter of 
my dissertation. Obviously, this is a serious simplification, but based on the available 
                                                 
34
 I have chosen 20,000 EUR, because this was the smallest available transaction size, on which the 
BSE calculates the BLM.  
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data, it is appropriate for a first approximation. Linear regression is a practical, easy 
to use method, and qualitative consequences can surely be drawn from the analysis. 
Furthermore daily BLM data can be well approximated by a straight line. 
In my dissertation I have calculated the conventional and also the liquidity 
adjusted VaR, in order to be able to compare them. In order to account for the 
clustering volatility of returns and net returns, I have fitted an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) 
model, where I have used t-distribution. The sample used to estimate the model was 
the first 2.5 years (1st January, 2007-15th July 2009), while the last year (16th July 
2009-16th July 2010) was used as a control period. I calculated the daily 95% and 
99% VaR using forecasts from the GARCH model. I used a rolling window of 2.5 
years to continuously re-estimate the GARCH model, i.e. I have estimated a GARCH 
model for the first 2.5 years and have made a forecast for the next year, and then I 
have repeated the procedure while rolling the sample period with one day. 
  The test of the correction of the risk forecasts was done in the following way: 
the predicted VaR values for both net and normal returns were compared to the 
corresponding values of the control period and empirical exceedance frequencies 
were calculated. Then the significance of deviation from the theoretical frequencies 
was determined statistically using the Likelihood Ratio Test of Kupiec (1995). The 
test is the following. Let Nu denote the number of days when the net returns exceeded 
the forecasted LAVaR values, and N the number of days in the sample. Then the 
empirical exceedance frequency is Nu/N, and let α denote the theoretical frequency. 
The test statistics using this notation is the following: 
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  Under the null-hypothesis of H0: α = Nu/N the test statistic is chi-squared 
distributed with one degree of freedom. I used the test uniformly on confidence level 
of 95%, thus H0 was accepted if LR ≤ 3.84. This test will reject the model if the 
empirical exceedance frequency is significantly below the theoretical value (model 
overestimates risk) or significantly above (model underestimates risk).  
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2.2. Value-at-Risk calculation 
 
The starting point of a LAVaR model is a conventional value at risk (VaR) 
calculation frequently used in everyday risk management. VaR calculation can be 
carried out according to the following formulae, for the returns (Equation 25) and the 
prices (Equation 26): 
 
α−∆+∆+
∆α∆α σ+µ== 1ttttt,tt,return qrVaR ,   (25) 
 
where returns are considered on continuous time horizon, thus 

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t
mid
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midt
t
P
P
lnr , tt ∆+µ  
is the expected value of the return in ∆t time, tt ∆+σ  is the standard deviation of the 
estimation, and α−1q  is the 1 – α-th quantile of a chosen distribution. 
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t
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∗−
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,  (26) 
 
where tmidP  is the mid price at time t, while ( )tttmidttmid rexpPP ∆∆+ ∗= . If , for example, 
VaR95%,1day = 5%, then with 95% probability the loss in one day due to the change in 
mid price will not be larger than 5% (Jorion, 2007). 
 
2.3. Liquidity adjusted returns 
 
The basic idea of a LAVaR model is to incorporate the liquidity measure into 
the returns, and to determine the VaR value based on these new returns, as follows:  
 
( ) ( )( )qrexp1qLAVaR t, t,actualt, ∆α∆α −= ,   (27) 
 
where ( )qr t, t,actual∆α is the net return including the BLM figure, thus allowing for the 
implicit costs of trading at a given „q” sized trade (Stange and Kaserer, 2009a). The 
net returns in Equation 27 is not given by Stange and Kaserer (2009a) in detail during 
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the calculation of LAVaR, they just introduce the results. According to this in 
Subchapter 2.3.1 I show broadly how I determined net return for a single stock, which 
is my own result. Beyond Stange and Kaserer’s (2009a) work I also determine in 
Subchapters 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 the net return of two different stock portfolios, to an 
equal volume stock (EVS) portfolio and for equal value stock portfolios as well, 
which is also my own result.  
 
2.3.1. Determining the return for a single stock 
 
For a single stock the return taking only the price risk into account at a given 
“v” trade size is as follows:  
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where rhypothethic denotes the return one would realize if trading with the asset were 
possible at the mid price. Accordingly, vP t,mid ⋅  and qt stand for the value we were to 
get for selling „v” quantity of stock, if they were traded at the mid price. vP 1t,mid ⋅−  
and qt-1 denotes the same but a period earlier.  
One must take the implicit cost of trading into consideration to calculate the 
net or actual return. For this, first based on Equation 29 the weighted average price 
should be determined:  
 
( )
v
vb
vb t,kt,kt
∑ ⋅
= ,    (29) 
 
where bt(v) is the weighted average price on the bid side of the book for a given „v” 
quantity, bk,t  is the price in the order book at level k at time t, while vk,t is the quantity 
available at level k of the order book at time t and „v” is the total quantity to be 
traded.  
The total proceeding from selling a stock at time t is ( ) vvb t ⋅ . This can be 
expressed as follows:  
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( ) ( )
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where nettq  stands for the value we get when selling the stocks, and tq  is the value we 
would get if we were able to trade at the mid price. This latter must be adjusted for 
the transaction cost stemming from illiquidity, which is represented by the BLM. 
During the adjustment I take only half of the BLM, since the BLM represents the 
implicit transaction costs of turning around a position at the same time. By doing this 
I implicitly assume that the bid and the ask sides are symmetric. This assumption can 
be released, although presuming symmetry for daily level data is not a substantive 
restriction.  
Based on the above, the actual return is to be determined by the following 
formula:  
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The actual return has been split into two components; the first showing the 
effect of illiquidity: 
( )






−
2
qBLM1ln t ; the second is the return one was to realize if 
trading at mid price were possible: rhypothethic. 
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2.3.2. Determining returns of an equal volume stock portfolio 
 
The return of a portfolio consisting of “n” number of stocks is calculated 
similarly to the return of a single stock. This is showed by Equation 32: 
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During my analysis I calculate an EVS (Equal Volume Stock) portfolio’s 
returns. This is a portfolio comprising of the same amount of each stock, that is iv  = 
v.  
For calculating the actual returns I need the value of the portfolio at different 
times:   
• The value of the portfolio at time t if there perfect liquidity: 
∑∑∑ ⋅=⋅==
=
i
t,mid
i
t,midit
N
1i
i
t PvPvqq ; 
• The proceedings from selling the portfolio at time t, considering transaction 
costs arising from illiquidity: ( ) ( )∑∑ 
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
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• The value of the portfolio at the previous period’s mid price: 
∑∑ −−− ⋅=⋅= i 1t,midii 1t,mid1t PvvPq . 
 
Determining the three values above is necessary, as during the calculation of 
the portfolio’s return I will once again split the return into two components: the first 
coming from illiquidity, the second arising from the change in mid price. In order to 
determine the return from illiquidity I need the value of the portfolio with and without 
transaction costs. For the return from the change in mid price I need the value of the 
portfolio at time t and in the previous period, supposed that there is no loss from 
illiquidity. I arrive at the following actual return: 
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In the above I took advantage of the fact that I used EVS type portfolios, and 
therefore, I could simplify with „v”. Naturally, the above formula can be used for non 
EVS type portfolios, but then „vi”-s will not let us to simplify the equation. In the 
next subchapter I show how the return calculation changes if I want to determine the 
LAVaR value for value weighted portfolios. 
 
2.3.3. Determining returns of an equal value stock portfolio 
 
In case of the equal value stock portfolio I assume that the value of the 
portfolio is constant for the whole period, for example EUR 20,000. I will sign the fix 
value proportion of each stock with wi. According to this I will define the value of the 
portfolio (qportfolio) as follows:  
 
∑∑
==
⋅⋅=⋅=
n
1i
t
i
t
i,midi
n
1i
t
iiportfolio
t vPwqwq
   (34) 
 
I will be able to define the number of stock I need to have in my portfolio in 
order to have the required value of each one of the stocks. To determine vi will be 
determined as follows: 
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The calculation of net return will be the same as it was in case of the equal 
volume portfolio, the difference will be, that the number of the stocks will change 
from time to time as the mid price changes, in order to keep the same value of each 
stock. This is the reason why I have used the assumption, that the value of the 
portfolio is the same every time. The return will be the following: 
 
( )










∑ ⋅
∑ +⋅
+






















⋅
∑


























 +
−⋅⋅
=
=










∑ ⋅
∑ +⋅
+






















∑


























 +
−⋅
+
=
=








++










+
+
=










+
=










∑ ⋅
∑ ⋅+
=
+
+
+
∑ t i,midPv
1t
i,midPvln
Pv
2
1t
iqBLM
1Ptiv
ln
t
i,midPv
1t
i,midPvln
q
2
1t
iqBLM
11tiq
ln
tq
1tqln
1tq
net
1tqln
tq
net
1tqln
iv
t
i,midP
ivivt1bln
actualr
t
i
t
i
1t
i,mid
t
i
1t
i,mid
t
i
t
i
1t
 (36) 
 
 After determining returns, the vi data should be updated, in order to keep the 
wi weights of the portfolio for the t+1-th period. This can be done according to 
Equation 35.  
Besides the LAVaR values I will also determine in Subchapter 2.4 the relative 
liquidity impact, while in Subchapter 2.5, I will show the diversification effect of 
liquidity risk. 
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2.4. Relative liquidity impact 
 
The LAVaR measure represents the total market risk that includes both price 
risk and liquidity risk. Identifying the share of liquidity risk within the LAVaR is 
easily performed using Equation 37:  
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   (37) 
 
In the literature ( )qλ  is named relative liquidity impact or relative liquidity 
measure (Giot – Gramming, 2005). This measure shows the maximum loss due to 
illiquidity at a given confidence level for a predefined time period. During my 
calculations I will determine this indicator as well for both single stocks and for stock 
portfolios. In case of the stock portfolios I will also determine the value of liquidity 
risk diversification, which to the best of my knowledge no one before me has done 
with this method. I show the calculation in Subchapter 2.5. 
 
2.5. Diversification 
 
In case of portfolios it is an important question whether the liquidity risk can 
be diversified. I have determined the Equation 38 – no one has used this before me as 
per the literature –, which shows whether liquidity risk can be decreased in case of 
portfolios. Equation 38 will help us to address this issue. 
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 (38) 
 
The ( )qγ  shows the additional effect of diversification, as a percentage of the 
price diversification impact of portfolios, if we consider illiquidity. Namely, the 
( ) ( )( )∑∑ ∆α∆α − it,it, qLAVaRqLAVaR  formula gives us the difference between LAVaR 
values (at a given confidence level and for a predefined time period) for single stocks 
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added together and for portfolios. The ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ∆α∆α − it,it, qVaRqVaR  formula uses 
the same logic for conventional the VaR measure. As a result, Equation 38 
demonstrates the diversification effect as a percentage of the price diversification 
impact.  
 
2.6. Results 
 
2.6.1. Single stocks 
 
  I will show the LAVaR calculation for the four bluechip stocks of the 
Budapest Stock Exchange, to the OTP, Mol, Richter and MTelekom.  
 
Figure 38: The conventional and liquidity adjusted VaR forecasts, compared to the actual 
returns on the transaction size of EUR 20,000 
 
 
 
Source: proprietary 
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  In Figures 38 and 39, I plotted the VaR forecasts and normal returns for the 
final year and the different stocks. I plotted both the LAVaR and the conventional 
VaR values in order to be able to make comparison and to see the difference between 
the two. 
  On Figure 38 I show the 95%, one day VaR estimations for order size of EUR 
20,000, while Figure 39 shows the same for EUR 200,000 (1 denotes the 20,000, 
while 4 denotes 200,000). On both figures the numbers on the horizontal axis show 
the time of the forecast (e.g. 650 means the forecast for the 650th trading day from 
01.01.2007.), while the numbers on the vertical axis are the percentage values. 
   
Figure 39: The conventional and liquidity adjusted VaR forecasts, compared to the actual 
returns on the transaction size of EUR 200,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: proprietary 
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  As it can be seen in Figure 38, in the case of OTP there is no significant 
difference in the conventional and LAVaR values, which exactly indicates that OTP 
is a very liquid stock, its liquidity risk is low. In case of Mol and MTelekom the 
situation is quite the same, though there is a little difference between the two VaR 
values. The difference is the largest in case of the Richter. In this case even for the 
smallest order size, there is clearly a visible difference between the two forecasts, and 
this increases drastically if we move to the larger order sizes. 
  The difference between the four bluechip stocks is more visible if we analyze 
the VaR measures on higher order sizes, for example on EUR 200,000, as it is shown 
in Figure 39. The difference between OTP and the three other stocks increase notably. 
This means, that Mol, Richter and MTelekom are less liquid, than OTP, so they have 
a higher liquidity risk.  
  During the test of exceedances for OTP and MTelekom both the conventional 
and LAVaR forecasts work properly, the empirical values do not differ significantly 
from the theoretical 5%. This means that in the case of OTP and MTelekom by taking 
liquidity into account we do not lessen the accuracy of forecasts. For Richter the 
situation is similar, only 99% LAVaRs for 100 and 200 order size are inaccurate, this 
is probably due to the mentioned calculation problem of BLM. In the case of MOL 
both the 99% traditional VaR and LAVaR values are inaccurate, we get too strict 
forecasts – instead of the expected 1% exceedance there are in fact no exceedances at 
all. This is probably due to the used sample as it contains the entire period of the 2008 
crisis. 
 To illustrate the difference between the conventional and LAVaR better, I 
looked at the time series of the ( )qλ  relative liquidity measure, defined in 
Subchapter 2.4, for the different stocks. In the Figure 40, the ( )20λ
 
and ( )200λ  
measures are plotted simultaneously. These figures show the percentage difference 
between the forecasts of the previous figures (the horizontal axis shows the time of 
the forecast, the vertical axis shows the value of the measure). 
Based on the relative liquidity measure, it can be stated, that with the increase 
of the transaction size, the liquidity risk is increasing as well. This is quite clear, since 
the liquidation of a bigger positions have greater cost as well.  
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Figure 40: Time series of the λ(q) indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: proprietary 
 
In case of the OTP if we examine the values of ( )qλ  we see that for the 
smallest order size liquidity risk is always above 1%, but can be up to 4%, while for 
the order size of EUR 200 thousand liquidity risk is always above 3% and can go up 
to as high as 9%. This is the added risk we ignore if we concentrate only on mid price 
risk. While these values may not be very large, we should bear in mind that OTP is 
(one of) the most liquid stock(s) at BSE.  
In case of the Richter, liquidity risk is significantly greater, even for the 
smallest order size it is always above 4%, but often reaches 8%, while for the order 
size of EUR 200 thousand it is mainly above 20%. This backs up numerically our 
previous conclusion from Figure 38 and Figure 39 that Richter is much less liquid 
than OTP and it has significant liquidity risk. In case of Mol and MTelekom I can 
conclude the same. 
In Figure 41 the relative liquidity measures of the major Hungarian stocks are 
compared for the smallest order size. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 117 
Figure 41: Time series of λ(q) in case of OTP, MOL 
 and Richter 
 
Source: proprietary 
 
The liquidity ranking of OTP-MOL-Richter is clearly visible, as expected.35 
The significant difference among them, however, shows that only OTP is a really 
liquid stock at BSE. 
It is worth looking at the average values of the above relative liquidity 
measures for the different stocks and order sizes. Table 15 summarizes these values. 
The average values clearly show the liquidity ranking of the stocks. OTP proves to be 
the most liquid again (has the smallest liquidity risk by far). 
 
Table 15: λ(q) values for different stocks for different order sizes  
95% OTP MOL Richter MTelekom 99% OTP MOL Richter MTelekom 
20 2.03% 4.61% 7.54% 8.46% 20 1.25% 3.07% 4.65% 4.78% 
40 2.41% 5.76% 9.57% 11.29% 40 1.47% 3.90% 6.40% 6.38% 
100 3.36% 8.91% 15.71% 18.78% 100 2.03% 6.25% 11.33% 10.71% 
200 4.72% 13.86% 26.29% 31.98% 200 2.83% 10.03% 18.00% 18.49% 
500 8.40% 29.75% 91.74% 133.52% 500 5.04% 22.24% 60.73% 97.43% 
Source: proprietary, Gyarmati et al. (2010b), p. 531. 
 
In the table above the methodological error of the BLM appears; I get 
unrealistic values for Richter and MTelekom (even above 100%!) for the largest order 
size. This phenomenon is the consequence of the order book not being deep enough, 
i.e. total limit orders in the book do not reach EUR 500 thousand on average, thus 
                                                 
35
 I didn’t show MTelekom’s relative liquidity measure, since it is quite similar to Richter’s. 
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orders of this size could not be executed in reality (this means that there should be 
‘infinite’ or ‘n.a.’ in the table). 
As a conclusion I can say that the above results show that liquidity risk is not 
irrelevant, it is highly advised to take it into account when calculating VaR measures. 
 
2.6.2. Portfolios 
 
I have calculated LAVaR and conventional VaR for four different portfolios. 
The four portfolios are the following:  
1. 1,000 – 1,000 Egis and Richter. The aim of this portfolio is to assess the 
behavior of LAVaR for portfolios of the same industry. Moreover, I wanted 
see whether liquidity risk can or cannot be diversified within an industry.  
2. 1,000 – 1,000 OTP and MOL. In case of the two most liquid stock on the BSE 
my objective was the same: is there room for diversifying illiquidity? I wanted 
to see if the liquidity of the two stocks behave the same way, or not, and 
liquidity risk can indeed be mitigated by constructing portfolios.  
3. 1,000 – 1,000 each from the blue chips of the BSE: OTP, MOL, Richter and 
MTelekom. I had the same objective as for the OTP-MOL portfolio, but I 
broadened my analysis.  
4. 1,000 – 1,000 OTP and Fotex. The aim was to show that liquidity risk is 
significantly mitigated if I couple an illiquid stock with a liquid one into a 
portfolio. For OTP and Fotex I have also examined a larger portfolio’s 
LAVaR, consisting of 100,000 stocks each.  
 
The different VaR and LAVaR values were calculated at a 95% significance 
level and for a one day time period. The results are shown in Figure 42, where the 
horizontal axis is the same as it was in the case of single stocks, namely the number 
of days passed since 1st January, 2007. The vertical axis shows the VaR 
(„egis_richter_var_95_N”), the LAVaR („egis_richter_var_95”) and the actual 
returns („return_actual”) as a function of time.  
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Figure 42: The conventional and liquidity adjusted VaR forecasts, compared to the actual 
returns in case of equal volume stock portfolios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: proprietary 
 
Since each of the different portfolios included 1,000-1,000 stocks, they have 
different values, hence the different figures cannot be compared to each other 
directly. As we can see in Figure 42 the liquidity adjusted VaR values are higher than 
conventional VaR values for each of the portfolios. 
The additional risk of illiquidity quantified by ( )qλ  is shown in Table 16. 
These figures, however, cannot be compared to each other directly due to the 
different portfolio values, as mentioned earlier.  
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Table 16: λ(q) values 
Portfolio vi λ(q) 
Egis – Richter  1,000 40.6% 
Bluechipek 1,000 21.3% 
OTP – MOL 1,000 7.7% 
OTP – Fotex  1,000 3.2% 
Source: proprietary 
 
The λ(q) value shows that for a portfolio of for example 1,000 Egis and 1,000 
Richter shares, the additional risk is 40.6%, which we ignore if we calculate only 
price risk. 
In case of stock portfolios besides the relative liquidity impact I have 
quantified the diversification effect, so I have determined the ( )qγ  figures, listed in 
Table 17. 
Table 17: γ(q) values 
Portfolio vi γ(q) 
Egis – Richter  1,000 58.24% 
Bluechipek 1,000 4.80% 
OTP – MOL 1,000 2.52% 
OTP – Fotex  100,000 336.07% 
Source: proprietary 
 
Based on Table 17 I state that significant diversification is possible by 
forming portfolios. In case of companies operating in the same industry, such as Egis 
and Richter, the diversification impact for a portfolio of 1,000-1,000 shares, 
respectively, is 58.24% larger if we account for illiquidity risk. For bluechips and the 
OTP-MOL portfolios the diversification impact of considering illiquidity is not as 
remarkable. This is due to the fact that they have similar and also relatively the best 
liquidity. These results, however, cannot directly be compared to each other due to 
the portfolios being volume weighted. The last row of the table shows a portfolio of 
much larger number of elements, a portfolio of 100,000-100,000 OTP and Fotex, 
respectively. In this case, as was expected, the diversification impact of accounting 
for illiquidity is huge: 336.07%. 
I have determined the LAVaR values for value weighted portfolios as well. I 
have chosen two portfolios, in which the weight of the stocks was 50-50%. The value 
of the total portfolio was fixed during the whole time. The results are shown in Figure 
43: 
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Table 43: The conventional and liquidity adjusted VaR forecasts, compared to the actual returns 
in case of equal value stock portfolios 
 
 
Source: proprietary 
  
 The advantage of the value weighted portfolio, that the different portfolios are 
comparable, since their value is the same.  
In case of the OTP-FHB portfolio, the value of λ(q), namely the risk we do 
not take into account if we are calculating only a conventional VaR is 21.14%, while 
in case of OTP-FOTEX it is: λ(q) = 20.46%-kal.  
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have shown how to make liquidity adjusted value at risk 
model. I have deducted how to define net return (sum of the returns caused by mid 
price change and illiquidity), which is the basis of the LAVaR calculation. I have 
pointed out that taking liquidity risk into consideration causes a significant increase in 
risk even in the case of the most liquid stocks. This means that liquidity risk shouldn’t 
be ignored either in case of single stocks, or in the case of stock portfolios.  
BLM and the method built upon it provide a simple and quick way to display 
liquidity in the capital requirement. Paying attention to the deficiencies and 
calculation problems of the index, the findings should be handled with precaution, but 
the presented model can appropriately reflect the essential empirical observations 
(e.g. OTP is the most liquid stock), thus in every case I recommend its integration 
into risk management systems. Based on the results in sum I cannot reject the H3 
hypothesis. 
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H3: Market risk can be underestimated at least by 5% even for liquid 
stocks at the order size of EUR 20,000 on the Budapest Stock Exchange, if 
we do not take the liquidity risk into consideration.  
 
In case of portfolios liquidity risk can be diversified. It worth to have more 
stocks in the portfolio, since not only the price risk, but liquidity risk can be reduced 
by diversification. Based on this I cannot reject H4 hypothesis. 
 
H4: In case of stock portfolios not only price risk but liquidity risk can be 
diversified.  
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IV. Virtual price impact function 
 
1. Literature of the price impact functions 
 
One of the most important concepts of market liquidity is the price impact (or 
market impact), and the price impact function (or market impact function). Despite 
the fact that the analysis and modeling of the price impact function is getting 
discussed wider nowadays, in the literature of market liquidity only a few pieces of 
research have analyzed the value of transactions’ price impact, i.e. the additional 
costs which cannot be paid as an explicit cost – e.g. brokerage fees, different 
exchange fees, etc – of trading. In subchapter 1.1 I introduce these results. 
 
1.1. Value of price impact based on empirical research 
 
Before introducing the literature of the price impact functions, it is worth 
analyzing the price impact of transactions on the market. One prominent study of the 
field is prepared by Torre and Ferrari (1999). The authors estimated the total 
transaction costs of trading with the stocks of the S&P 500 index. The authors have 
estimated the transaction cost to be 25 cents by assuming buying and selling of 
10,000 pieces of stocks with a median mid price of 400 dollars. Torre and Ferrari 
(1999) estimated that the composition of this 25 cent is built up as follows: execution 
costs 5 cents, while the remaining 20 cents can be accounted for as price impact. 
From these 20 cents, 7 cents cover the half of the bid-ask spread, while the adverse 
price movement is responsible for 13 cents. It is remarkable, that the adverse price 
movement equals the half of the total transaction cost.  
According to the data of ITG Global Trading Cost Review, in the last five 
years the average transaction cost of American corporations with high capitalization 
was 23 basispoints (bps). From this amount 9 bps were the fees, while 12 bps were 
the straightforward consequence of the price impact (Ferraris, 2008).  
The above examples show that the largest part of the transaction costs is 
caused by the price impact. The examples explicitly highlight that the price impact is 
indeed important and that market participant should be aware of this fact. Had they 
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take the price impact into account during trading, they could save substantial amounts 
of money. 
 
1.2. Virtual and empirical price impact functions 
 
Market participants can get information about the price impact from the price 
impact functions. These price impact functions show the expected relative price-shift 
caused by a particular order. Knowing the price impact is essential for the market 
participants, since they can predict the price impact concerning their orders in the 
future, i.e. the expected additional cost caused by price shift; or they can build a 
dynamic portfolio optimization by creating a trading algorithm based on the function.  
There are two different price impact functions, the virtual and the empirical 
price impact functions. The virtual price impact function (vPIF) shows that if we 
want to fulfill the transaction immediately, what would be the difference between the 
last price level in the order book, on which our order has been realized, and the actual 
mid price in the time the order was given. In this case it is called marginal price 
impact, which can be valuated according to Equation 39.  
  
1
P
P1
given order was  thesecond in the price Mid
orderlast   theof level Price)q(vPIF 1t
midprice
t
last
−=−=
−
      (39) 
 
The function shows the marginal price impact of an immediate execution 
(Bouchaud et al., 2008; Bouchaud, 2010a; Gabaix et al., 2003).  
Besides marginal price impact one can define a virtual price impact function, 
which gives the average price impact of the order. The calculation of the average 
price can be carried out with the aid of the order book. In this case we calculate the 
ratio of the average price to the actual mid price on the market.  
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The average price impact is a crucial information for the market participants, 
since it gives them the implicit cost of trading, namely the transaction cost which they 
have to pay because of illiquidity. 
A third kind of virtual price impact can be calculated as well, namely by the 
quantifying how the mid price has changed during a transaction. To be able to 
calculate it, we have to define the mid price before and after the transaction. The mid 
price can be determined based on the order book, namely it will be the half of the sum 
of the best bid and best ask price. The price impact will be the following in this case:  
 
 
1
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     (41) 
 
The vPIF won’t give us the actual values of the price impact, it gives us only 
the answer to the question what would be the marginal-, the average-, or the real price 
impact if we like to carry out a transaction immediately. The name ‘virtual price 
impact function’ stems from this fact. If a market player assumes on the basis of the 
virtual price impact function, that the planned transaction would change the market 
price notably, than most probably he does not add the transaction to the order book in 
one amount. Instead, he splits the order into lots and submits the order when he 
considers the price impact to be smaller. Accordingly, the virtual price impact, shown 
by the function only occurs, if the market player indeed submits the market order and 
it is executed immediately. 
Virtual price impact function can easily be estimated from the actual order 
book, since it can show a stock’s liquidity at different order sizes. To make it easier to 
understand the definition of the virtual price impact function, I show the calculation 
of the different price impacts in simple numerical example. To be able to calculate the 
price impacts, it is necessary to know the actual order book. In this case a fictional 
order book will represent it, as it can be seen in Table 18: 
  
 
 
 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
126 
Table 18: A fictional stock’s order book 
Order book 
Bidsize Bidprice Askprice Asksize 
300 9,980 9,990 200 
622 9,970 10,000 300 
400 9,960 10,010 220 
721 9,950 10,020 200 
1,200 9,940 10,030 100 
Source: proprietary 
 
Let’s assume that a given investor would like to buy the fictional stock for 
HUF 7,000,000. The order of the investor is executed on the first three price levels of 
the order book. On the first level he can buy 200 stocks for the price of HUF 9,900. 
On the second level he can buy another 300 stocks for HUF 10,000 each. After this, 
he has HUF 2,002,000 left to buy stocks on the third price level, for HUF 10,010 
each. This means, that he can buy another 200 stocks. I have summarized the 
elements of the executed buy order in Table 19: 
 
Table 19: Execution of a buy order 
Buy order Number Price Value (HUF) 
Executed on the first level 200 9,900 1,998,000 
Executed on the second level 300 10,000 3,000,000 
Executed on the third level 200 10,010 2,002,000 
Sum 700  7,000,000 
Source: proprietary 
 
At the time, when the order was given, the mid price was HUF 9,985, since 
this is the arithmetic average of the best bid and ask price. In this numerical example 
the marginal price impact can be calculated according to Equation 42, which is based 
on Equation 39. To be able to calculate the marginal price impact one has to know the 
last price level, where the order was executed. So the marginal price impact will be 
the ratio of this price and the mid price in the second the order was given.  
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This result means, that if an investor wants to buy stocks for HUF 7,000,000, 
then according to the actual order book, the relative price change of his order will 
cause 0.25% marginal price impact.  
Based on the order book, it is easy to calculate the average price impact as 
well, since it can be seen that how many stocks can be executed on each price level. 
The average price impact can be calculated as it is shown in Equation 43, which is 
based on Equation 40. The volume weighted average price can be found in the 
numerator, while in the denominator we can see the mid price at the time the order 
was given.  
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This result means, that if an investor wants to buy stocks for HUF 7,000,000, 
then according to the actual order book, the relative price change of his order will 
cause 0.15% average price impact.  
In order to be able to define the price impact of the mid price change, we need 
to define the mid prices. After the executed HUF 7,000,000 buy order – if we assume 
that no other orders were executed in the meanwhile –, the mid price became HUF 
9,995, which is the average of the best bid, namely the HUF 9,980 and the best ask, 
the HUF 10,010 order in the order book. The prompt mid price when the order was 
given was HUF 9,985, so the real price impact will be as it is shown in Equation 44. 
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The investor’s HUF 7,000,000 buy order has increased the mid price with 
0.10%, so this was the price impact of the buy order.  
In contrast, the empirical price impact function (ePIF) shows the actual price 
impact that can be measured from real transaction data. Namely the previous three 
numerical examples show the price impact in case the orders are given immediately. 
But this price impact will not necessarily occur in the market, it will depend on the 
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investor’s decision, whether to submit the order immediately, or rather wait and 
submit it only later. The empirical price impact function cannot be estimated from the 
order book, only from real trading data. From real trade data only the change of the 
mid price can be seen, so only the following price impact can be defined: 
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From the trading data one cannot quantify the average price, since only the 
mid price is included in the trading data, so it cannot be seen, that what were the 
prices on which the certain parts of the order had been executed. The only thing one 
can see is the mid price before and after the order was submitted.  
Empirical price impact function can be estimated from past trade, which 
means that the order book cannot be used, rather the trades and quotes (TAQ) 
database. TAQ database contains the information of the mid prices. In the previous 
numerical example Equation 41 shows the empirical price impact in the case the 
order is in reality submitted. One of the main differences between the empirical and 
virtual price impacts is that the empirical price impact function is never being 
estimated only from one single order on each order size, but from the average of 
single or aggregated transactions through a longer period. In case of single 
transactions, the professionals estimate how an order of a certain value/volume 
changes the mid price on average during a longer period, like e.g. a year. In the case 
of aggregated transactions, the estimation is a little bit more complicated. The 
aggregation can be done by time (e.g. order in a five minute interval) or by order 
numbers (e.g. 20 consecutive orders). After this aggregation they calculate the 
average mid price change on different order sizes for a longer period (e.g. a year). 
Analyst can calculate the price impact in case of the virtual and empirical PIF as well 
in the function of the volume (number) or in the function of the total value (EUR, 
HUF, etc.). 
In sum the most important difference between the virtual and empirical price 
impact function is, that the virtual price impact function can be estimated from the 
actual order book, and one can estimate the immediate marginal/average price impact, 
or the impact for the mid price change. Therefore on the one hand the virtual price 
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impact can be calculated for every second. On the other hand, the empirical price 
impact can be estimated for executed orders, and only for the mid price change, since 
in the TAQ database which contains trading data one can see only the information 
regarding the change in mid price. Moreover the ePIF cannot be estimated for every 
second, since it shows the average price impact of a longer period, so it cannot be 
used for time-series analysis.  
In my empirical research I will estimate a virtual price impact function, so I 
think it is important to show the estimation of the function in more details in a full 
chapter. Related to this, I will introduce a new concept, namely the marginal supply-
demand curve, which shows the actual state of the order book.  
 
1.3. Marginal supply-demand curve 
 
Marginal Supply-Demand Curve (MSDC) is an important concept during the 
estimation of the virtual price impact function, since the MSDC will represent the 
order book during the estimation. The MSDC shows the order book’s actual status, 
that is, the price levels and the volume of orders on each price level. According to this 
the MSDC shows the price on which a transaction’s last order was fulfilled, where the 
value of the transaction is „v” (which can be measure in volume or value) (Acerbi, 
2010). The MSDC is shown in Figure 44: 
 
Figure 44: The MSDC function 
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 Source: proprietary 
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Having the MSDC function at my disposal, the total transaction cost of a buy 
order (mid price plus implicit costs) can be determined as follows:36   
 
( ) ( )∫=
v
0
dxxMSDCvCost Total
    (46) 
 
A transaction’s total cost can be determined by the MSDC(v) function with 
Equation 46 only in the case, when MSDC(v) interprets the order book at a given 
moment. Note that MSDC(v) could be defined as the average data of a longer time 
period’s order book. In my dissertation I will define the MSDC(v) based on a certain 
second’s order book and not on an average order book for a period T. 
Supply Demand Curve (SDC) is a closely related concept to the MSDC. The 
SDC differs from the MSDC. The SDC shows the average price of a transaction. In 
contrast, the MSDC represents the transaction’s marginal price. Thus, the SDC does 
not show the new mid price after the transaction. Instead, it captures the average price 
a market player has to pay for a transaction. The relation between the SDC and the 
MSDC can be defined as follows: 
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There is an important difference between the two functions: the MSDC is 
never a continuous function, while the SDC is always continuous.  
With the aid of the MSDC and SDC the marginal (Equation 48) and the 
average (Equation 49) virtual price impact can be defined as follows:  
 
( ) 1
P
)v(MSDC
vvPIF
mid
−=
     (48) 
 
                                                 
36
 It can be written like Equation 46, because during the estiamtion of the vPIF I will estimate the 
MSDC(v) from the total implicit cost. The same will be true for the deduction of Subchapter 2.3. 
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1.4. The shape of the price impact function: empirical facts 
 
As a consequence of the different estimation of the virtual and empirical price 
impact functions, we can get very different shapes for the functions. Figure 45 shows 
the relation of the virtual and empirical price impact functions, which were estimated 
from real market data. On x axis the size of the transaction can be seen, while on y 
axis the relative change of the mid price.  
 
Figure 45: Virtual (triangle) and empirical (circle) price impact function 
 
Source: Bouchaud et al., 2008, p. 38. 
 
On the figure it can be seen that the vPIF can be estimated almost with a 
straight line, while the ePIF’s shape can be estimated with a concave curve in case of 
the ask side of the curve. According to the empirical facts, researchers have identified 
different shapes for the PIF-s, and reasons for these shapes. Usually researchers 
analyze the shape of the PIF on the ask side of the curve. The different shapes can be 
the result of several reasons. Mainly the price impact of transactions depends on the 
order size and on the time horizon of the analysis. In Tables 20-23 I have summarized 
the most important findings on limit order markets. The first three tables summarize 
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the findings for empirical price impact function, while the fourth table contains the 
researches carried out on virtual price impact functions.  
In the initial studies, the researchers plot the price impact functions without 
defining its functional form. The results of these studies are summarized in Table 20. 
Most of the researchers identify the price impact functions with positive slope and 
with a concave form. However, the studies differ in relation to the change of the 
function’s slope. 
 
Table 20: Initial studies on the shape of the price impact function  
Authors 
Examined 
stock 
exchange 
Period Shape of the PIF Remarks, specialties 
Hasbrouck 
(1991) 
Data of 
NYSE, 
AMEX and 
regional 
exchanges 
62 days 
from 
1989 
Positive slope, 
concave function. 
The price impact is 
delayed. The PIF haven’t 
been formalized. 
Hausman, 
Lo & 
MacKinlay 
(1992) 
10 
randomly 
chosen 
American 
stock 
1988 Positive slope, 
concave function 
with decreasing 
growth. 
The PIF haven’t been 
formalized. 
Biais, 
Hillion & 
Spatt 
(1994) 
Stock of 
Paris 
Bourse 
CAC 40 
index 
29/Oct-
26/Nov
1991. 
Almost a straight 
line, slightly concave 
function, which has a 
greater slope on the 
best price levels, than 
on other levels. 
The PIF haven’t been 
formalized. 
Niemeyer 
& Sandas 
(1995) 
30 stocks 
of the 
Stockholm 
Stock 
Exchange’s 
OMX 
index 
03/Dec
/1991-
02/Mar
/1992. 
Nonlinear function, 
which is not so slope 
at the best price 
levels. 
The PIF haven’t been 
formalized. 
Kempf & 
Korn 
(1999) 
DAX 
futures, 
aggregated  
in every 5 
minutes  
17/Sept
/1993- 
15/Sept
/1994.  
Nonlinear function, 
the concave function 
flattens on the sides: 
the large orders have 
relatively smaller 
price impact than the 
small orders.  
The authors just analyzed 
the relation between the 
order size and the price 
impact on the best price 
level. 
Evans & 
Lyons 
(2002)  
 
DM/USD 
& 
Yen/USD, 
daily 
aggregation  
1/May-
31/Aug
/1996. 
Strong positive 
relation: the net order 
flow explains a 
notable portion of the 
exchange rates’ 
volatility. 
The authors define quantity 
as the difference of the 
buyer or seller initiated 
signed orders. 
Source: proprietary 
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Table 21 shows the most important results of those studies that examine the 
price impact function on the level of single transactions. All the authors make efforts 
to define the functional form of the empirical price impact function. The majority of 
the studies identify a strongly concave function which differ in respect of the 
parameters. However, on different markets the price impact function can be 
formalized differently.37 
 
Table 21: Price impact of single trades 
Author 
Examined 
stock 
exchange 
Period Shape of the PIF Remarks, specialties 
Lillo, 
Farmer & 
Mantegna 
(2003) 
1000 stock 
from New 
York Stock 
Exchange, 
which have 
the highest 
capitaliza-
tion 
1995-
1998 
Concave function, 
which cannot be 
described with a 
power law function.  
The slope of the 
function changes in 
the function of order 
size. 
With appropriate average 
calculation and with the 
rescaling of the axis, 1000 
stocks’ price impact can be 
put to the same curve. The 
higher capitalized 
corporations stocks’ price 
impact is smaller by the 
same transaction size. 
 
Bouchaud 
& Potters 
(2002) 
Stocks of 
Paris Stock 
Exchange 
and LSE 
1/June-
15/July
2002. 
Logarithmic relation. The small transactions’ 
price impact is relatively 
larger, than the large 
transactions’. The price 
impact of trading is quasi-
permanent, which means 
that the market players look 
at the trading as new 
information. 
 
Farmer & 
Lillo 
(2004) 
Three 
stocks of 
London 
Stock 
Exchange 
May 
2000- 
Dec. 
2002. 
The price impact 
function can be 
estimated with a 
power-law function, 
where the exponent is 
0.26. 
 
The authors highlight the 
difference between the 
price impact on the NYSE 
and on the LSE. 
Lim & 
Coggins 
(2005) 
Australian 
Stock 
Exchange 
300 stock 
with the 
highest 
capitaliza-
tion  
 
2001-
2004 
Relation can be 
estimated with a 
power law function.  
Trading the same amount, 
the price impact is smaller 
in case of corporations that 
have higher capitalization.  
                                                 
37
 The power law function is concave/convex if the exponent is smaller/greater than 1. If the exponent 
equals 1, than the power law function is a straight line. 
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Hopman 
(2007) 
Stock of 
Paris Bourse 
CAC40 
index; price 
impact for a 
30 minute 
interval. 
 
04/Jan/
1995- 
22/Oct/
1999.  
The function can be 
estimated as a power-
law concave function, 
where the exponent is 
between 0.37 and 
0.47. 
The exponent’s value in 
case of market orders is 
0.37, an order which is 
between the bid-ask spread 
is 0.38, while in case of a 
limit order it is 0.47. 
Zhou 
(2011) 
23 stock 
from the 
Shenzen 
Stock 
Exchange 
2003 The executed orders’ 
price impact function 
is a power-law 
function, where the 
exponent is 0.65 on 
the bid side, and 0.69 
on the ask side.  
The partly executed 
orders’ price impact 
is constant in case of 
small values. 
  
With normalizing the 
returns and the quantities, 
independently from the 
capitalization, the price 
impact functions can be 
brought together to one 
curve. 
Cont, 
Kukanov & 
Stoikov 
(2011) 
TAQ 
database 
(NYSE, 
AMEX, 
NASDAQ) 
50 
randomly 
chosen 
stocks 
 
April 
2010. 
The price impact in 
the function of the 
imbalance of the bid-
ask side is linear. 
 
The slope of the linear price 
impact function is inversely 
proportional to the market 
depth. 
Source: proprietary 
 
Table 22 summarizes the results of the studies which estimated the price 
impact function with aggregated transactions. The second column of the table the 
aggregation level is shown as well. It can be seen, that researchers have arrived at 
different results, and formalized the ePIF differently. Bouchaud et al. (2008) state, 
that these differences can be the consequence of the differences in markets, assets, 
time, and aggregation level. On shorter time horizon the price impact is nonlinear (on 
high aggregation level), but the price impact becomes linear on longer time horizon, 
and also slope of the curve decreases on higher level of aggregation. 
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Table 22: Price impact of aggregated trades 
Authors 
Stock 
exchange & 
aggregation 
Period Shape of the PIF Remarks, specialties 
Gabaix et 
al. (2003, 
2006) 
1000 biggest 
stocks of the 
TAQ 
database, the 
aggregation 
is based on 
15 minutes 
intervals   
1994-
1995 
Growing, concave price 
impact, which can be 
described with a 
square-root function. 
 
 
The authors state the 
large price movement is 
the consequence of the 
large transactions. In 
contrast Farmer and Lillo 
(2004) say that the large 
changes in price are the 
consequence of the lack 
of liquidity. See Farmer 
and Lillo (2004) of this 
discussion. 
 
Plerou et 
al. (2002) 
116 most 
traded stocks 
of New York 
Stock 
Exchange, 
aggregated 
for 5 to 195 
minute 
intervals 
1994-
1995 
Defining two different 
price impact functions, 
on one hand in the 
function of the 
imbalance of order 
numbers (φ), and on the 
other hand in the 
function of the volume 
imbalance (Ω). In both 
cases the function is a 
concave, tangent 
function, which flattens 
with in the case of 
higher imbalance.  
φ: is the difference 
between the orders given 
by the sellers and buyers; 
Ω: is the difference of the 
number of the seller and 
buyer initiated orders.  
 
If Ω is close to 0, the 
price impact <G>Ω ~ Ω1/σ 
can be written with a 
power-law function, 
where the exponent 
increases with the 
decrease of σ, by 
increasing ∆t. 
 
Almgren 
et al. 
(2005) 
30 thousand 
transaction of 
Citigroup 
US, 
aggregated 
for 30 
minutes 
interval 
Dec. 
2001- 
June 
2003.  
 
Defining two different 
price impact functions. 
The permanent price 
impact is linear. The 
temporary price impact 
is a concave power-law 
function with an 
exponent of 0.6. 
 
Only the linear permanent 
price impact guarantees 
the market to be arbitrage 
free, and to the price 
impact to be independent 
from time.  
Hopman 
(2007) 
Stocks of 
Paris Bourse 
CAC40 
index, 7 
aggregation 
level: 10 min, 
30 min, 1 day 
(without 
night), 1 day 
(with night), 
1 week, 1 
month, 3 
months 
04/Jan/
1995 - 
22/Oct/
1999. 
Estimating it with 
linear regression. The 
daily aggregation 
provided the best result, 
with R2=43.5%. The 
slope of the line 
decreases with the 
aggregation level.  
 
The author defines the 
order flow on different 
time intervals with a 
square-root 
function:
∑∑
∈∈
−=
aski
5,0
i
bidi
5,0
i vvSQRT  
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Margitai 
István 
(2009) 
Budapest 
Stock 
Exchange: 
MOL, 
aggregation: 
5 and 20 
transactions 
251 
tran-
saction 
days 
from 
8/Mar/
2007  
Estimated with square-
root function. With the 
increase of aggregation 
level, the exponent of 
the function is 
increasing, and the 
function flattens. 
The result he got is 
consistent with the 
empirical literature. 
Bouchaud, 
Farmer &  
Lillo 
(2008)  
Stocks of 
NYSE and 
LSE, 
aggregation 
of 
transactions: 
N=1, 8, 64, 
512 
2000-
2002 
 
With increasing the 
aggregation level, the 
price impact function 
flattens.  
Increasing linearity: 
with the increase of N, 
around the balance of 
order values, the price 
impact function 
becomes linear.  
Decreasing slope: The 
slope of the linear 
regression decreases 
with increasing N. 
The relation is true for the 
aggregation of the 
transactions (N) and for 
the signed imbalance of 
the value (Q) as well. 
Source: proprietary 
 
In addition to the empirical researches summarized in Table 22, Bouchaud’s 
(2010a) research is worth mentioning in which the author summarizes the most 
important characteristics of the price impact function. The author concludes based on 
the result of past research, that the price impact function is nonlinear, concave and 
can be estimated with a power law distribution which has an exponent smaller than 1. 
This exponent is increasing with the increase of the aggregation level: on single 
transaction level the exponent is between 0.1 and 0.3, and if the aggregation is based 
on aggregating around 1,000 transactions, then the exponent will be close to 1. 
In the literature it is an accepted view, that the number of transactions has a 
more important role in the price impact, then the order size (Bouchaud, 2010a, b). 
Beside this it is also accepted, that the price impact is proportional to the bid-ask 
spread, and to the volatility per trade (Bouchaud, 2010b). 
Finally, in Table 23 the literature on the virtual price impact function is 
reviewed briefly. Early research found that the virtual PIF can be estimated with a 
power-law function, where the exponent is significantly higher than in case of the 
empirical PIF. Weber és Rosenow (2005) identify a square-root function, but the 
authors state as well, that the virtual price impact is much bigger, than the empirical. 
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The authors state that it can be the consequence of the negative correlation between 
returns and limit orders. 
  
Table 23: Shape of the virtual price impact function38 
Authors 
Examined 
stock 
exchange 
Shape of PIF Remarks, specialties 
Challet & 
Stinchcombe 
(2001) 
4 stocks 15 best 
bid and ask 
price level on 
Island ECN 
(NASDAQ) 
The vPIF can be 
estimated with a 
power-law function. 
The exponent is 
between 1 and 3, 
depends on the day 
and on the stock.  
The authors mainly talk 
about the static and 
dynamic properties of the 
limit order book, not about 
vPIF. 
Maslov & Mills 
(2001) 
 
NASDAQ 
Level II  
The virtual PIF is a 
power-law function, 
where the exponent is 
between 1.7 and 2.2.  
The authors state that the 
high exponent is the 
consequence that the virtual 
price impact differs from 
the empirical price impact. 
Smith, Farmer, 
Gillemot & 
Krishnamurthy 
(2008) 
London Stock 
Exchange 
The virtual price 
impact function can 
be linear or concave, 
it depends on the 
parameters of the 
model.  
The authors have built up a 
theoretical model, which 
was tested on an order book 
of the London Stock 
Exchange. They have found 
that the model gives back 
the statistical properties of 
the real data.  
Weber & 
Rosenow (2005) 
10 most 
frequently 
traded stocks 
on Island ECN 
(NASDAQ), 
aggregated for 
5 minute 
interval, data of 
2002  
In case of the limit 
orders, the vPIF is a 
convex square-root 
function. 
In case of the market 
orders, the vPIF is a 
concave square-root 
function.  
 
The virtual price impact is 
four times greater than the 
real one. They explain this 
difference with the negative 
correlation between the 
returns and the limit orders. 
Source: proprietary 
 
It is worth mentioning that I haven’t found other studies on the shape of the 
virtual price impact besides those which are in Table 23. I think that this can be traced 
back to the fact, that the majority of the researchers looked for the reason for the price 
change, namely whether the price change is caused by the big order or by the lack of 
liquidity. Researchers can analyze this only on real transaction data, since they had to 
examine the real price changes.  
                                                 
38
 I haven’t shown the period, since it was not available. 
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Tables 20-23 show that research done so far have found the shape of the price 
impact function can be mainly a power-law-, square-root-, concave function, or it can 
be linear. The concave shape is interesting, because it would encourage the market 
participants to give larger orders, since the price impact seems to be inversely 
proportionate with the size.  
The literature gives two reasons for the concave shape of the empirical price 
impact function (Bouchaud et al. 2008). The first explanation can be related to 
Barclay and Warner (1993): the authors state, that the concave shape can be the 
consequence of the information content of the transactions. Namely if the small 
transaction have the same information content than the large transactions, than the 
price impact of large transactions won’t be higher than that of small transactions. The 
second explanation was given by Bouchaud et al. (2008). These authors have 
explained the concave shape with the concept of selective liquidity. Selective 
liquidity means, that market participants’ decision to submit an order or not will 
depend on the market liquidity. If they see, that there is liquidity on the market, they 
would give a large transaction otherwise they submit only small ones. Namely the 
market participants always try to give an order, which can be fulfilled on the best 
price level, and try to avoid that their orders delete a lot of levels from the limit order 
book.  
It follows from the previous, that the shape of the empirical price impact 
function will be determined by the shape of the volumes on the best price level. 
Namely, price impact will occur, if the order deletes all the orders on the best price 
level. In this case the ePIF can be concave if ( ) ( )rEvP +  expression is concave, where 
( )rE
 shows the price impact – the relative change of the mid price –, while ( )vP +  
shows the probability of the price change at an order size of „v”. It can happen only if 
( )vP +  is concave, because of the non-negativity of E(r). If φb stands for the volume on 
the best price level on the opposite side of the book, which is a random variable from 
a ( )bbP φ  distribution, and independent from the order size „v”, then a price impact 
will occur if bv φ≥ . In sum, the probability of the price impact will be the following 
(Bouchaud et al., 2008):  
( ) ( )∫ φφ=+
v
0
bbb dPvP
     (50) 
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From the deduction, a connection can be shown between the virtual and 
empirical price impact, according to Equation 51. The left side of Equation 51 
symbolizes the empirical price impact ( ( )vrE ), while on the right side the virtual 
price impact ( ( )rE ) can be found, which is multiplied by the probability of 
occurrence of the price impact ( ( )vP + ). 
 
( ) ( ) ( )rEvPvrE +=
     (51) 
 
 
1.5. Time-variation of price impact 
 
The price impact’s effect on a larger timescale was analyzed by Bouchaud 
(2010a, b), who emphasizes the permanent nature of the price impact, which is the 
consequence of the order flow’s long memory. Several studies have analyzed the 
permanent and temporary nature of the price impact, from which I would like to 
highlight Bouchaud et al.’s (2008) and Almgren et al.’s (2005) work.  
Bouchaud et al. (2008) have concluded that if single transactions are being 
analyzed, than the price impact function is concave, but the function becomes more 
linear if we aggregate the transactions. Based on this observation the authors have 
tested the effect of the price impact on a larger timescale, and concluded that it is 
worth discerning the PIF to a permanent PIF and to a temporary PIF, since the two 
functions behave much differently.  
The researchers have tested for single transactions, the permanent and 
temporary proportion of the price impact, and whether these values have a fix or a 
variable value. They have tested also the effect of the order flow prior to the 
transaction.  
Bouchaud et al. (2008) found, that the price impact disappears with the 
passage of time, and that the permanent price impact is asymmetric and depends on 
the past order flow. Asymmetry means, that every transaction has a price impact, but 
this price impact depends on the order flow in the past, and on the predictability of 
the transaction. The more it is predictable, the smaller the price impact will be. 
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Their viewpoint is, that the dynamics of the price formation, and the price 
impact, will depend on the dynamics of the order flow, and also on the information 
the liquidity provider has, and on the method the market players predict the future 
order flows (Bouchaud et al., 2008). 
Almgren et al. (2005) have split the price impact also into a temporary and to 
a permanent part. Their opinion is that the permanent price impact reflects the 
information available for the market participants, and can be calculated from the 
imbalance of supply and demand. This effect is independent from the time of the 
transaction. In contrast, the temporary price impact is caused by the market 
participants’ different short term notions of the price formation. Timing has a notable 
effect on the value of the price impact. In sum the realized (empirical) price impact, 
will be the result of the following two effects:  
 
Realized price impact = Permanent price impact + Temporary price impact + Noise 
(52) 
 
1.6. Theoretical modeling of the price impact 
 
In Subchapter 1.4 I covered the shape of the price impact function determined 
by real stock exchange data and also discussed the formal description of it. 
Simultaneously with empirical research, and sometimes in the same paper, many 
researchers try to model the evolution of price impact. The majority of these models 
try to capture the price impact by analyzing the behavior of rational agents and 
making assumptions about the order flow.  
The classic model of Kyle (1985) presumes linear price impact. The models of 
Seppi (1990), Barclay & Warner (1993), and Keim & Madhavan (1996) suggest that 
the price impact is concave. The models of Zhang (1999) and Gabaix et al. (2003, 
2006) are based on the optimal decisions of fund manager’s resulting in a square-root 
function. In the popular model of Iori et al. (2003) market and limit orders are made 
randomly, the order flow is supposed to follow Poisson distribution. According to the 
authors, if the depth of the order book is increasing monotonically, then the price 
impact function is concave, and its shape is in line with empirical researches: ∆p~wβ, 
where β≤1. The authors attribute the concavity of the function to the trading 
mechanism and market structure and not to optimal trading strategies based on 
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rational decisions. The results of Iori et al. (2003) show a price impact function 
matching the shape of the real one, although the orders were randomly given in the 
model. 
The paper of Bouchaud et al. (2004) models the evolution of the price impact 
in time by defining the price as the result of past transactions. An interesting attempt 
to model price impact is the neural network of Kempf & Korn (1999), the model of 
Challet & Stinchcombe (2001), in which the authors map the orders to particles and 
the paper of Rosenow (2008), where the author is using the popular spin model of 
physicists. 
A part of the theoretical models sheds light on the factors determining the 
shape of the function. The majority of these models were created by the research 
divisions of market participants, e.g. Almgren et al. (2005) made their model within 
Citigroup. The primary goals of these models is to forecast the price impact of the 
future orders of the firm, to estimate the transaction costs of trading due to price 
impact and to design optimal trading strategies. According to e.g. Torre & Ferrari 
(1999) the size of the price impact (κ) is driven by six factors: 
 
) , , ,, F(V, χτξσε=κ      (53) 
 
Table 24 contains the description of the parameters of the previous equation 
and their effect on price impact. 
 
Table 24: Factors effecting price impact 
Notation Description of the factor The effect of the growth of the factor on price impact 
V The volume of traded stocks expressed in 
USD 
V ↑ κ ↑ 
ε Elasticity: the reaction of order flow to 
price impact 
ε ↑ κ ↓ 
σ The volatility of stock price σ ↑ κ ↑ 
φ Measure of intensity, describes the 
frequency of trading 
φ ↑ κ ↓ 
Ξ Shape indicator, describes the 
distribution of traded volumes 
ξ ↑ κ ↓ (if the expected 
value increased) 
κ ↑ (if standard 
deviation increased) 
τ  The indicator of the mood of the market, 
describes the price of liquidity 
τ ↑ κ ↑ 
χ The indicator of investor expertise χ ↑ κ ↓ 
Source: based on Torre and Ferrari (1999) 
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Torre and Ferrari (1999) give a detailed explanation on how each of the above 
factors affects the size of the price impact. The main disadvantage of their study is 
that the shape of the function F remains hidden from the reader, it continues to be 
treated confidentially for competitive considerations. 
I disregard abstain from the further demonstration of the theoretical models, 
since in my dissertation I am not supposed to build a theoretical model with respect to 
price impact functions. In chapter IV/2 of my dissertation I will show how to estimate 
a price impact function from the BLM database.  
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2. Empirical research: estimation and analysis of the price 
impact function 
 
One of the explicit goals of my dissertation is to provide the market 
participants with a method that would enable them to estimate the price impact 
function easily without having to recourse to the data of the order book. Knowing the 
price impact function is important for the market participants, in order to be able to 
predict the price impact of trades in the future, and to estimate the additional trading 
costs related to the price impact, and also to be able to build an optimal trading 
algorithm based on the price impact function. Namely traders will submit their orders 
according to the time-variation of the virtual price impact function. In this chapter I 
show how a price impact function can be estimated based on the Budapest Liquidity 
Measure database. In other words I show the relationship between the PIF and the 
liquidity measures. In the course of the estimation I will define a virtual price impact 
function. The time series of the virtual price impact function can be analyzed by the 
market participants in order to establish a trading strategy. Namely the advantage of 
virtual price impact function as opposed to the empirical price impact function is, that 
it is suitable for time series analysis to be carried out on it. It is impossible to make a 
time series analysis on the empirical price impact function, since it gives the average 
value of the price impact for a longer period (e.g.: a year). The virtual price impact 
function on the other hand can be estimated for every second. In addition to the 
estimation of a virtual price impact function, I will make a time series analysis on the 
estimated database.  
 
2.1. Research questions 
 
I will analyze the time-variation of the price impact, and its basic statistical 
characteristics, in order to get a picture of the time series of the transaction cost that 
occur as a result of the lack of liquidity. During the analysis I will answer the 
following questions:  
1. What are the basic statistics of the vPIF (average, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, skewness, curtosis and distribution)? 
2. Is there a trend in the time series? 
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3. How does volatility change over time? 
4. Are there outlier data, and are there structural breaks? 
5. Can the time series data of vPIF be described as a mean reverting process? 
 
My hypotheses based on the research questions will be the following: 
 
H5: The dynamics of the virtual price impact function can be described 
by the following: 
H5/a: symmetry, 
H5/b: trend, 
H5/c: cycles, 
H5/d: mean reverting, 
H5/e: shock resistance. 
 
2.2. Research method 
 
I will carry out the analysis of the virtual price impact function on the OTP 
stock’s BLM database in Subchapter 2.4. The time series contains the BLM data 
from 1st January 2007 till 3rd June 2011. To be able to analyze the vPIF of OTP it is 
necessary to define the vPIF(q) function for every day from the BLM(q) function. As 
a first step I estimate the BLM(q) function, which I will do with a linear regression. I 
will describe the exact estimation of the BLM(q) and vPIF(q) in Subchapter 2.3.  
After the estimation of vPIF I will analyze the time series of vPIF and the 
basic statistical characteristics of the function. I do this in order to get a closer 
picture of the behaviour of the transaction cost caused by the lack of liquidity in the 
past. The methods I have used during the analysis can be found in the next listing. In 
more details I will show the methods in Subchapter 2.4.  
- Descriptive statistics: average, standard deviation, median, minimum, maximum, 
curtosis, skewness. 
- Trend analysis: fitting of polynomial trend, calculating moving average. 
- Symmetry of bid and ask side: correlation of the two sides. 
- Shock resistance: testing the autocorrelation in the database with Breusch-
Godfrey LM test (Breusch, 1979; Godfrey, 1978). 
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- Structural breaks: using Chow test (Chow, 1960), and Quandt-Andrews test 
(Andrews, 1993). 
- Outlier data: analyzing boxplot figures. 
- Mean reverting: using an extended Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey és Fuller, 1979).  
 
2.3. Estimating virtual price impact function 
 
Market participants would be able to calculate the price impact from the order 
book. But the order book is not available for most of the participants, so they don’t 
have precise information on market liquidity. This means that they cannot even define 
the MSDC(q) function, or the average price either, so they cannot estimate a price 
impact function. The only information they can read from the first few levels of the 
order book e.g. the bid-ask spread, or the volumes available on the first few levels of 
the book. Nevertheless a price impact function can be estimated not only from the 
order book, but from liquidity measures as well, as the liquidity measures are 
calculated from the order book data.  
A liquidity measure, like the BLM(q) in itself is not a price impact function 
yet, as the BLM does not inform the trader about the new mid price realized after the 
transaction. Instead, the BLM measures the implicit cost of trading (in basispoints) 
stemming from the illiquidity of the markets. Since BLM’s calculation is based on the 
order book, it is possible to estimate a marginal supply-demand curve (MSDC) 
(Acerbi, 2010), then to estimate the virtual price impact function. Namely in this 
chapter I will introduce a method which enables market participants to estimate a 
price impact function fast and easily without knowing the data in the whole order 
book. 
In order to be able to estimate an MSDC(q) function from the BLM database, 
a relationship should be found between the two notions. This relation is shown in 
Figure 46. In the figure the implicit cost of trading can be seen, since the bid and ask 
side of the MSDC(q) function is shown in the figure. The area between the two sides 
of the MSDC(q) function is the implicit cost, which occurs in the absence of liquidity. 
The size of the area is equal to the BLM value, if we multiply the BLM with the total 
transaction size, q.  
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Figure 46: Relationship between the MSDC and the liquidity measure 
P
MSDC_ask
P_mid
MSDC_bid
q 
= Absolute liquidity cost = BLM(q)*q
 
Source: proprietary 
 
In sum, the total transaction cost that occurs because one cannot trade on the 
mid price is shown by the banded area in Figure 46. So the total banded area shows 
that, what the transaction cost would be if one were to buy and sell immediately. 
Equation 54 shows how to calculate the size of the area, where q is the size of the 
transaction in Euros, while Ctotal shows the total implicit cost of trading.  
 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ −=
q
0
q
0
total dxxbid_MSDCdxxask_MSDCqC    (54) 
 
If we like to define the transaction cost only for the bid or the ask side, then it 
can be done by Equation 55 and 56,where Cask shows the implicit cost during a buy 
order, while Cbid shows the implicit cost of a sell order. 
 
( ) ( ) qPdxxMSDCqC mid
q
0
ask ∗−= ∫      (55) 
( ) ( )∫−∗=
q
0
midbid dxxMSDCqPqC     (56) 
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According to Figure 46 and Equation 54, the value of BLM(q) – in the 
function of q – can be defined by Equation 57: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
q
dxxbid_MSDCdxxask_MSDC
qBLM
q
0
q
0
∫∫ −
=
  (57) 
 
To give estimation for the price impact function – with the aid of the MSDC – 
I had to define the value of the MSDC with the BLM.  
The first step is to define the shape of the BLM(q) function. Based on a video 
made in Matlab about the time-variation of BLM(q) I have seen that the daily 
BLM(q) function can be estimated with a linear. The intraday BLM(q) function can 
have various shapes: linear, concave or convex. Since in my dissertation I am 
working with daily data, I have applied the assumption that the BLM(q) is linear, so it 
can be estimated with a linear regression. In this case the BLM(q) is defined by the 
Equation 58: 
 
( ) bqaqBLM +∗=
     (58) 
 
If we model the BLM(q) function separately for the bid ask side of the limit 
order book, then we get for the buy side: BLMb, and for the sell side BLMa: 
 
askbid APMAPMLP2BLM ++∗= ,     (59) 
ask
a APMLPBLM += ,      (60) 
bid
b APMLPBLM +=
     (61) 
 
In the equations LP is the liquidity premium, which is the half of the bid-ask 
spread, while the APMask is the adverse price movement on the ask side, and APMbid 
is the adverse price movement on the bid side. The sum of LP and APMbid/ask will 
give Equation 60 and 61, since BLMa, and BLMb will represent the implicit trading 
cost on the ask and bid side, which contains the half of the spread and the adverse 
price movement.  
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The linear regressions for the ask and the bid side can be defined by Equation 
62 and 63. This means, that when I estimate the vPIF for every day I have to estimate 
the parameters aask/abid and bask/bbid separately for the two sides. 
 
( ) askaska bqaqBLM +∗= ,     (62) 
( ) bidbidb bqaqBLM +∗=     (63) 
 
The estimation of the MSDC by means of the BLM(q) function requires the 
following steps on the ask side: 
 
1. step: Defining the total implicit cost on the ask side based on the BLM: 
 
( )
( )
q
Pqdxxask_MSDC
qBLM
mid
q
0a
∗−
=
∫
   (64) 
 
2. step: Rearrange the equation to MSDC(q): 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )qask_MSDCPqBLMqqdBLM
Pqask_MSDCqBLMqqdBLM
Pqdxxask_MSDCqqBLM
mid
aa
mid
aa
mid
q
0
a
=++∗
→−=+∗
→∗−=∗ ∫
  (65) 
 
3. step: Substitute Equation 60 in the equation, and rearrange the equation: 
 
( )
( )qMSDC_askPbqa2 midaskask =++∗∗
→=++∗+∗ qask_MSDCPbqaqa midaskaskask
   (66) 
 
The estimation of the MSDC by means of the BLM(q) function requires the 
following steps on the bid side, according to Equation 67: 
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( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )qMSDC_bidbqa2P bidbidmid =+∗∗−
→=+∗+∗−
→−=+∗
→−∗=∗
→
−∗
=
∫
∫
qbid_MSDCbqaqaP
qbid_MSDCPqBLMqqdBLM
dxxbid_MSDCPqqqBLM
q
dxxbid_MSDCPq
qBLM
bidbidbidmid
mid
bb
q
0
mid
b
q
0
mid
b
   (67) 
 
Finally, the virtual price impact function can be expressed in the function of 
MSDC(q), according to the Equation 48, which can be found in Subchapter IV/1.3. 
 
( ) 1
P
)q(MSDCqvPIF
mid
−=
     (68) 
 
During the deduction I have assumed a linear BLM(q) function, and as a result 
the vPIF became linear as well.39 Nevertheless I would have been able to estimate the 
function with any other shapes. I have three reasons why I have chosen the linear 
shape. Firstly, because in the literature – based on Subchapter IV/1.4 – the price 
impact function is linear in many cases (Almgren et al. 2005; Biais, Hillion & Spatt, 
1994; Bouchaud et al., 2008; Cont, Kukanov and Stoikov, 2011; Hopman, 2007; 
Smith et al., 2008). Secondly, because I have tested statistically the shape of the 
BLM(q) function, and I have found that in case of fitting a linear regression for the 
BLM data, the R2 value is around 0.95, so the linear approximation can be considered 
as good. Finally, I have chosen the linear shape, because I think that the relation 
between the BLM and the price impact function can be explained, understood and 
used most easily with the most simplest function-shape. In the next paragraph I 
shortly introduce the way to change the deduction if the BLM(q) is not linear.  
Since we assumed the BLM(q) to be linear, the MSDC(q) and the price impact 
function became linear as well. If I would like to estimate a convex or concave PIF, 
BLM(q) should be non-linear. The difference in the deduction will be, that in the step 
                                                 
39
 I will show this in Subchapter 2.4.1 on Figure 47. 
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N3, i.e. when I substitute the BLM(q) function, the equation changes. For example if 
I would estimate the BLM(q) with a power-law function, then the BLMa on the ask 
side would be the following:  
 
( ) askaska bqaqBLM +∗= α       (69) 
 
The result is, that during the estimation another parameter should be estimated 
as well, namely the α. Another change, that in step N3, and the deduction changes as 
follows:  
 
( )
( ) ( )qMSDC_askPbq-qa midaskask =++∗
→=++∗+∗
α
α qask_MSDCPbqaqa midaskaskask
   (70) 
 
However, concerning the daily data, estimation with a linear is proved to be 
enough. In further research it would worth estimating the BLM(q) with another shape, 
in order to compare the results with mine.  
On the basis of the vPIF the empirical price impact function cannot be 
estimated, on the one hand because the BLM database does not provide information 
on the probability of the occurrence of the price impacts, on the other hand because 
the estimation of the ePIF depend on real transaction data, not on the order book. The 
ePIF can be estimated, for example, from the TAQ (trades and quotes) database 
(Margitai, 2009). Estimating the ePIF from the TAQ database is a time- and 
calculation consuming task. In my dissertation my main goal was to provide the 
market participants with a method that enables them to estimate the price impact 
function easily. The price impact function based on BLM is the result of an easy and 
quick calculation. 
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2.4. Analysis of the time series of the virtual price impact function 
 
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The data I am going to analyze are based on the BLM data of OTP between 1st 
January 2007 and 3rd June 2011. I will estimate the virtual price impact function for 
every trading day with the method I have introduced in the previous chapter.  
 Figure 47 shows the virtual price impact function on the bid and on the ask 
side as well, for a few trading days. The four days have been chosen in order to show 
how the price impact is different in calm period (1st January 2007 and 2nd June 2011) 
and during crisis (20th October 2008 and 9th January 2009). On the figure it can be 
seen, that during a crisis the price impact function is steeper, which shows, that the 
transaction cost of trading is higher, because the markets are more illiquid, then 
during normal times.   
 
Figure 47: Virtual price impact 
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Source: proprietary 
 
In Figure 45, in Subchapter IV/1.4 the authors have estimated a virtual price 
impact function from order book data, and get the result, that the price impact 
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function is nearly linear. In my dissertation I got a linear function, because I have 
estimated the BLM(q) to be linear, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter.  
Before analyzing the time series of the virtual price impact function it is worth 
analyzing the descriptive statistics for a few order sizes, in order to get a full picture 
of the vPIF. The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 25:  
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the virtual price impact function  
for different order levels (bp) 
 
BID ASK 
  
vPIF 
(-5e) 
vPIF 
(-20e) 
vPIF 
(-40e) 
vPIF 
(-50e) 
vPIF 
(5e) 
vPIF 
(20e) 
vPIF 
(40e) 
vPIF 
(50e) 
Average -0.150 -0.606 -1.213 -1.517 0.143 0.568 1.134 1.417 
Median -0.082 -0.332 -0.665 -0.831 0.082 0.325 0.649 0.811 
St.deviation 0.222 0.894 1.789 2.2360 0.198 0.788 1.574 1.967 
Minimum -2.048 -8.237 -16.489 -20.620 0.014 0.055 0.110 0.137 
Maximum -0.015 -0.061 -0.123 -0.153 2.043 8.123 16.230 20.284 
Skewness -3.955 -3.952 -3.952 -3.952 3.895 3.898 3.898 3.899 
Curtosis 19.244 19.220 19.215 19.215 19.709 19.757 19.765 19.767 
Source: proprietary 
 
When a trader wants to sell on the market, the order will be fulfilled on the bid 
(buy) price, while in case he wants to buy, it will be fulfilled on the ask (sell) side of 
the book. Based on Table 25, the bid and ask side of the book have different 
characteristics. In case of the averages it can be seen, that on every order size level 
the average and the median have greater absolute value on the buy side of the 
function. I believe that the reason for that is the following: when investors buy stock, 
they don’t do it at the same time, but, while when selling stock it is common to try to 
do it at the same time, for example maybe because of a panic on the market. In these 
cases they are willing to close their position even with higher transaction costs, 
causing a large price impact with this. So the bid and the ask side of the vPIF can 
differ as a consequence of the so called herd effect. The market players want to sell at 
the same time, but buying stocks are more scattered. This can be seen in the vPIF, 
which is based on the limit order book. The database I was analyzing contains the 
crisis of 2007/2008, and this is reflected in the dissimilarity of the two sides of the 
price impact function, since during crisis a few times there was a panic on the market, 
which was coupled with the lack of liquidity. 
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The other results show the same, as the averages. Namely the value of the 
standard deviation, the maximum and the minimum are greater in absolute value on 
the buy side than on the sell side.40 I can conclude the same thing as I did in case of 
the averages, namely, that the limit order book reflects that the sell orders arrive at the 
market more concentrated than the buy orders.    
The analysis of the skewness and curtosis – namely that the distribution 
differs from the normal distribution – is easier to carry out by making histograms 
(Figure 48 and 49). It can be seen, that on the bid side of the price impact function, 
the probability density function is skewed to the right, while the ask side’s PIF is 
skewed to the left. Though the probability density function is more skewed on the bid 
side, which is because of the reasons mentioned before. 
 
Figure 48: Density function of price impact value at buying EUR 5,000 of OTP  
during the period of 01.01.2007-02.06.2011.  
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Source: proprietary 
 
                                                 
40
 The buy side maximum/minimum value should be compared with the sell side minimum/maximum 
value.   
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Figure 49: Density function of price impact value at selling EUR 5,000 of OTP  
during the period of 01.01.2007-02.06.2011. 
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2.4.2. Trend 
 
I will start the time series analysis with analyzing the trend of the time series. 
Knowing the trend is important, because it can help market participants to estimate 
when to open or close a position. Since knowing the trend one can forecast when the 
liquidity will increase or decrease. According to this it is worth plotting the time 
series vPIF values for a few order sizes, which is shown on the Figure 50. 
 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 155 
Figure 50: The time series of the virtual price impact function 
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Source: proprietary 
 
The figure shows that there isn’t a linear trend in the database on any order 
size level. This fact is logical, since if there would be a trend, then it would mean that 
the illiquidity is increasing or decreasing as a function of time. In a multi-year 
horizon it is hardly possible on the market that the liquidity is continuously increasing 
or decreasing. In order to clearly exclude the existence of a trend, I have made further 
analysis. Because of this I have analyzed whether there is a polynomial trend. I made 
the analysis for 5,000 Euros, and for 60,000 Euros. The R2 values in case of a sixth 
degree polinom were very small: R2(5,000) = 0.419,  and R2(60,000) = 0.413. In case 
of polinoms with smaller degrees, the R2 were even smaller. This means that the 
polinoms haven’t fitted well on the database, their explanatory power is small. 
Because of this I have tested another trend analysis method as well, the method of 
moving average.  Figure 51 shows the 21 day moving average for 5,000 Euros for bid 
and for the ask side. 
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Figure 51: The virtual price impact and its 21 day moving average values 
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The figure shows that the price impact follows a strange trend, since there 
isn’t a trend throughout the whole time series either on the bid or the ask side. The 
figure also shows, that before the crisis of 2008 the price impact was quite stable, 
then during the crisis it had increased, then at the end of the crises it decreased again, 
but never became as small as it was before the crisis. So there isn’t a trend in the 
database, but it seems that the price impact follows the economic cycles. Because of 
this cyclical effect, I have split the database into three parts: before the crisis, crisis 
and after the crisis period. The splitting has been made according to the analysis of 
the 2.4.4 chapter, where I have defined the structural break points. For the analysis 
one year has been chosen from the before crisis period, and one year from the after 
crisis period.   
I have got the same results before and after the crisis. One of these is that the 
price impact develops the same way on the bid and on the ask side, which means that 
the liquidity of both sides are nearly the same. The other result is that though there 
isn’t a trend in the database, but there is a cyclical effect in every quarter year. The 
results are shown in Figure 52 and 53:  
 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 157 
Figure 52: Cycles of price impact based on 21 day moving average before crisis 
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Source: proprietary 
 
 
Figure 53: Cycles of price impact based on the 21 day moving average after crisis 
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These cycles can be the result of the quarterly report in my point of view. On 
the day the quarterly reports are published, the investors’ information asymmetry41 
regarding the operation of OTP is smaller, so they are more willing to trade with the 
paper, which results in more liquidity for the paper. On Figures 52 and 53 it can be 
seen that at the time of the quarterly reports (15th January, 15th April, 15th July, and 
15th October) the price impact is the smallest, while their maximum values are 
halfway between two quarterly reports. 
 
2.4.3. Volatility and correlation in the time series 
 
I have analyzed the changing of the volatility of the price impact function on 
several order sizes. The results for the 5,000 euro order can be seen at Figure 54, 
where the volatility of a certain day is calculated from the price impact data of one 
month data prior to the day.   
 
Figure 54: The volatility of the price impact over time 
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41
 I ignore the detailed discription of information asymmetry, because it goes beyond the topic of my 
dissertation. More detailed on the information asymmetry in the international literature see e.g. 
Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1977; or in the Hungarian literature see e.g. Balla, 2006; 
Krénusz, 2007; Havran et al., 2010. 
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I have found that the volatility changes notably with the economic cycles. 
When the value of the price impact increases because of the lack of liquidity, then the 
volatility increases as well on both sides of the function.  
It can be seen from the figure, that on 5,000 euro order level the correlation is 
high between the bid and the ask side. I have analyzed the correlation between the 
two sides of the function, and between the different order levels. This is important, 
because I have assumed before the analysis that if the limit order book shows low 
liquidity for example on the bid side this shouldn’t mean that, that the liquidity is low 
on the other side of the book as well. If everyone would like to sell the stocks, it 
would be easy to buy, so the liquidity should be high as well on the ask side. But this 
is not the case according to the data. Table 26 summarizes the correlations: the 
correlation is nearly perfect in every case, which means, that the liquidity of the ask 
and bid side on every order size are strongly correlated, strongly moving together. 
 
Table 26: Correlations 
correlations vPIF(-5teur) 
_bid 
vPIF(-20 teur) 
_bid 
vPIF(-40 teur) 
_bid 
vPIF(-50 teur) 
_bid 
vPIF(-60 teur) 
_bid 
vPIF(5 teur) 
_ask -0.9516 -0.9520 -0.9521 -0.9521 -0.9521 
vPIF(20 teur) 
_ask -0.9513 -0.9517 -0.9518 -0.9518 -0.9518 
vPIF(40 teur) 
_ask -0.9513 -0.9517 -0.9517 -0.9518 -0.9518 
vPIF(50 teur) 
_ask -0.9513 -0.9517 -0.9517 -0.9518 -0.9518 
vPIF(60 teur) 
_ask -0.9513 -0.9517 -0.9517 -0.9517 -0.9518 
Source: proprietary 
 
Based on Figure 54 it can be seen, that there is a relation between the price 
impact values of each trading days, since if one day the price impact is low/high, it is 
quite possible that the next day it will be low/high again. With statistical methods I 
have analyzed the relation between the days following each other, namely I was 
testing a first-order and a second-order autocorrelation. The usually used Durbin-
Watson test for testing first-order autocorrelation cannot be applied in this case for 
two reasons (Darvas, 2004). On the one hand the residuals of the time series data of 
the price impact function on any order levels are non-normally distributed, and on the 
other hand it is quite possible that there is higher order autocorrelation in the time 
series as well. I will use instead the Breusch-Godfrey LM test, which has less 
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restrictive assumptions. Based on the Breusch-Godfrey LM test, it is clear, that there 
is a positive autocorrelation in the time series on every order sizes. The test have 
rejected that the residuals are not autocorrelated. There can be detected, that there is a 
very high-order autocorrelation in the time series data. The tenth or even the 
twentieth-order autocorrelation were significant.  
 
2.4.4. Outliers and structural breaks 
 
On the basis of Figure 50 the absolute values of the virtual price impact 
function increase significantly in October-November 2008 and January-February 
2009. The significant increase can be observed both on the bid and the ask side. With 
the aim of describing the turbulent period more properly and identifying the outliers I 
have prepared box plots (McGill et al., 1978). Box plots are based on quartiles, and 
represent a convenient way of graphically depicting the distribution of the values of 
the virtual price impact function belonging to various order sizes. Figure 55 shows 
the box plot of the bid values of the virtual price impact function belonging to 
contract sizes of EUR 5,000.  
 
Figure 55: Boxplot of the bid values of  the vPIF at the order size of EUR 5,000 
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Source: proprietary 
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On Figure 55 the upper edge (hinge) of the box indicates the 75th percentile 
(Q3) of the data set, which currently equals -0.0522. The lower hinge of the box 
indicates the 25th percentile (Q1) of the underlying data, which has a value of -0.1312. 
In the literature the range of the middle two quartiles, that is, the difference between 
Q3 and Q1, is known as the inter-quartile range (IQR). The box itself contains the 
middle 50% of the values of the virtual price impact function. The line in the box 
indicates the median value (-0.0821) of the data. On the basis of Figure 55 the median 
line within the box is not equidistant from the hinges, which refers to the asymmetric 
nature of the data. (Note that the skewness of the data was also highlighted in 
Subchapter 2.4.1.).  
 The figure also contains the maximum (-0.0149, short horizontal line above 
the box) and the minimum (-2.0480, the circle situated at the bottom of the figure) of 
the bid values of the virtual price impact function belonging to contract sizes of EUR 
5,000. The observations marked by circles represent those outliers that fall below the 
threshold calculated by the formula of IQR51Q ⋅− . As the threshold calculated by 
the formula of IQR53Q ⋅+  is higher than the maximum of the underlying values, 
this threshold is not shown in the figure. Instead, the maximum of the data set is 
shown in form of a short horizontal line situated right above the box. On the bid side 
the box plots belonging to various contract sizes look very similar to the one 
presented in Figure 55. The figures vary solely in the scaling of the y axis and in a 
couple of dates belonging to the outliers. (Note that for the sake of brevity the box 
plots belonging to various contract sizes are not shown.) 
Figure 56 shows the box plot of the ask values of the virtual price impact 
function belonging to contract sizes of EUR 5,000. On the figure the lower hinge of 
the box represents the 75th percentile (Q3) of the data set, which currently equals 
0.0532. The upper hinge of the box indicates the 25th percentile (Q1) of the 
underlying data, which has a value of 0.1269. The box itself contains the middle 50% 
of the values of the virtual price impact function. The values in the box fall between 
the borders of the inter-quartile range, that is, between 0.0532 and 0.1269. The line in 
the box indicates the median value (0.0819) of the data set. Figure 56 also contains 
the minimum (0.0142, short horizontal line below the box) and the maximum (2.043, 
the circle situated at the top of the figure) of the ask values of the virtual price impact 
function belonging to contract sizes of EUR 5,000. The observations marked by 
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circles represent either those outliers that fall below the threshold calculated by the 
formula of IQR51Q ⋅− or fall above the threshold calculated by the formula of 
IQR53Q ⋅+ . As the threshold calculated by the formula of IQR51Q ⋅−  is lower than 
the minimum of the data set, this threshold is not shown in the figure. Similarly to the 
bid side, on the ask side the box plots belonging to various contract sizes look very 
similar to the one presented in Figure 56.  
 
Figure 56: Box plot of the ask values of the vPIF at the order size of EUR 5,000 
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Source: proprietary 
 
I have identified all the outliers marked by circles on the box plots for each 
contract size. As a next step I have looked up the dates of these outliers. Turbulent 
days were defined as days on which the value of the virtual price impact function at 
each contract size was identified as outlier. As a result, I have identified 52 turbulent 
days within the period under analysis. The turbulent days fall within one of the above 
five periods: working days between 17 and 27 October 2008, period between 10 and 
20 November 2008, working days between 20 January and 4 February 2009, 12 
February 2009, and period between 18 February and 3 April 2009. All of the periods 
can be found during the time of the global crisis of 2008, which evolved from the 
subprime crisis of 2007. The price impact values of these outlier periods are shown in 
Figure 57. 
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Figure 57: The price impact during turbulent times 
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On the basis of Figure 50 could observe structural breaks in the time series of 
the virtual price impact function. Structural breaks exist both on the bid and on the 
ask side. To show this I have used a formal statistical test. The Chow-test (Chow, 
1960) is one of the most well-known tests to identify structural breaks. With this test 
the stability of two or three subsamples’ model parameter can be analyzed. In this 
certain case I have split the database into three subsamples, by removing the period 
between October 2008 and April 2009. During the research 17 October 2008 was 
identified as the starting date of the crisis. This was the first day in the time series, 
when I have identified outliers by means of the box plot method at each order size 
under analysis. 3 April 2009 was considered as the end of the crisis. This was the last 
day in the time series, when I have identified outliers by means of the box plot 
method at each contract size under analysis. According to the test on every 
significance level (5%, 1%) I have found that there is a structural break in the time 
series. The Quandt-Andrews test (Andrews, 1993) has also indicated the existence of 
structural breaks. This test shows that there is a structural break in the database, but it 
is not necessary to give the date of the break in advance. Based on these results I can 
state that there is a structural break in the database in October 2008 and April 2009.  
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In general, the absolute values of the price impact function became higher 
after the turbulence of October-November 2008 and Spring 2009. Thus, a shift can be 
observed in the time series data under analysis. After the stock exchange’s turbulence 
the values of the virtual price impact functions became on average 76% higher on the 
bid side. On the ask side the values became 86% higher in the post-crisis period in 
comparison to the pre-crisis period. This means, that after the crisis the market 
liquidity has decreased notably and as a consequence market participants had to face 
a significant increase – nearly twice as much – in the price impact, resulting in a 
higher transaction cost as well, than before the crisis.  
 
2.4.5. Mean-reverting 
 
On the basis of Figure 50 we might assume that the time series of the virtual 
price impact function do not follow a random walk. Instead, the values of the virtual 
price impact function can be characterized by mean reversion. I have tested the 
intuition of the mean reversion by the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. While 
the simple Dickey-Fuller test cannot be used in case of autocorrelation in the 
residuals, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test can also be used in the presence of 
autocorrelation (Darvas, 2004). In the ADF tests the lagged level of the series form 
part of the autoregressive process. The intuition behind the ADF test is that if the 
series is integrated, then the lagged level of the series will provide no relevant 
information in predicting the consecutive element of the time series. In that case the 
alternative hypothesis of having no unit root cannot be rejected. Thus, the time series 
sample can be characterized by a unit root, which refers to a random walk process. 
If the autoregressive process has a unit root, than the asymptotic 
characteristics of the estimated parameter are different. The characteristics depend on 
the fact whether the estimated model has a drift and/or a time trend and whether the 
underlying process is a random walk with lag or without lag. During the research I 
have used lags of orders according to Schwert (1989) criteria in the ADF tests. 
Besides, based on my a priori knowledge of the time series of the virtual price impact 
function, I have assumed that the autoregressive model has a drift, but does not have 
any deterministic time trend.  
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On the ask side of the virtual price impact function the values of the ADF test 
statistics is around -2.65 for every order size, while on the bid side of the PIF it is 
around -2.6 for every order size. As the obtained ADF test statistics are lower than the 
reference values in the ADF tables at each confidence level, the null hypothesis of 
having a unit-root in the time series is rejected. Thus, in the time series of the virtual 
price impact function no unit-root can be found. The lack of the unit-root refers to the 
fact that the values of the virtual price impact functions at a given contract size do not 
follow a random walk. Instead, they can be characterized by mean reversion. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
On illiquid markets, the participants have to carry out a dynamic portfolio 
optimization taking into account time, cost and transaction size. To be able to solve 
the task of dynamic optimization they have to have an assumption about the 
underlying stochastic process, namely the process of the transaction cost caused by 
illiquidity. I have introduced in this chapter how the Budapest Liquidity Measure, 
provided to the market participants by the Budapest Stock Exchange can contribute to 
this optimization process, since one can estimate a price impact function from the 
BLM without knowing the whole order book. I have shown a method with which one 
can estimate a price impact function fast and easily. After the estimation of the price 
impact function, I have made a time series analysis of the function. The analysis can 
help investors to forecast the future transactions’ price impact, the transaction cost 
caused by the lack of liquidity and it can also help to build and optimal trading 
algorithm. I have based my fifth hypothesis on the time series analysis of the price 
impact function.  
 
H5: The dynamics of the virtual price impact function can be described 
by the following: 
H5/a: symmetry, 
H5/b: trend, 
H5/c: cycles, 
H5/d: mean reverting, 
H5/e: shock resistance. 
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S1:  The value of the descriptive statistics i.e. the mean, the median or the standard 
deviation have shown a higher value in every case on the bid side of the 
function than on the ask side. I have explained the phenomenon with the herd 
effect, namely that the virtual price impact reflects that usually traders buy 
stocks separately from each other, but selling stocks is often concentrated, for 
example because of a panic situation. 
S2:  The time series data of the virtual price impact function do not contain trends, 
however quarterly cyclicity can be discovered in the data. 
S3:  During the cycles the price impact values reach their minimum level in the time 
of quarterly reports, while their maximum values are halfway between two 
quarterly reports. 
S4:  By examining outlier data I have identified 52 turbulent days. All these days fall 
into the period of the 2008 crisis, since they can be found between 17 October 
2008 and 9 April 2009. 
S5:  I have also identified a structural break in the time series with the aid of 
formalized statistical tests.  
S6:  There is a significant autocorrelation in the dataset, from which I draw the 
conclusion that the impact of an incidental shock prevails in the market data for 
a longer period of time.  
S7:  When liquidity ceases on one side of the order book, then liquidity will be lower 
on the other side of the book as well, i.e. the correlation between the buy and 
sell side price impact is very high.  
S8:  The vPIF process can be described as a mean reverting process.  
 
Based on the result the acceptation of H5 is the following:  
H5/a: I cannot reject the hypothesis that the price impact of the bid and ask side is 
symmetric. 
H5/b: I reject the hypothesis that there is a trend in the vPIF time series. 
H5/c: I cannot reject the hypothesis that there are cycles in the vPIF time series. 
H5/d: I cannot reject the hypothesis that the vPIF is a mean reverting process. 
H5/e: I cannot reject the hypothesis that effect of shocks on the price impact lasts 
longer.  
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Summary 
 
The main goal of my research was to promote that (il)liquidity as a concept 
should be integrated into the daily practice of risk management. Within this, I have 
focused on three main issues: (1) on the one hand I examined the cross- and 
horizontal sectional statistical attributes of the BLM time series; (2) on the other hand 
I have shown how the BLM indicator can be integrated into a VaR-based risk 
management system; (3) finally I explained the relation between the BLM and the 
price impact function and I have examined the time series of the price impact function 
in order to form a view about the attributes of this important risk factor. Chapters II-
IV contain my own findings; I hereby present the main statements as follows:  
 
(1) In Chapter II. I gave an exhaustive view on the concept of market liquidity and 
the group of indicators with which market liquidity is measured by the market 
participants. I have observed how the average BLM value formed during the 
examined period; its relationship with the two liquidity indicators which are the 
most commonly used by market participants; furthermore I have observed the 
correlation between liquidity and volatility. I have examined whether market 
participants make a mistake if they – as an applied rule of thumb – only regard the 
bid-ask spread and turnover data as liquidity indicators. My most important 
findings were the followings:  
Ranking of stocks based on the liquidity indicators: 
– In the case of medium liquid and illiquid stocks, bid-ask spread does not give 
the same ranking as BLM, however the difference is not significant.   
– In the case of liquid, medium liquid and illiquid stocks, turnover does not give 
the same ranking as BLM, however the difference is not significant.  
– In a calm period i.e. before and after crisis, ranking differs less from the 
ranking provided by BLM based on turnover than from the one based on bid-
ask spread.  
– During a crisis, the ranking based on bid-ask spread differs less from the 
ranking provided by BLM than from the one based on turnover.  
– During the crisis the rank-correlation has decreased between BLM and the 
spread and between BLM and the turnover.   
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– In the case of the medium liquid and illiquid stocks it would be worthwhile to 
take also the BLM into consideration as a liquidity indicator, because in their 
case the ranking in the wrong order is more significant. In respect of these 
stocks I have also shown during my analysis that there is a chance that a 
particular stock is sorted into a wrong liquidity category.  
Change of liquidity indicators during crisis: 
– In the case of liquid stocks, the values of BLM and the bid-ask spread 
returned to their pre-crisis level, while in the case of turnover it could only be 
observed in the case of OTP and MTelekom. 
– In the case of medium liquid and illiquid stocks liquidity of some stocks did 
not return to the pre-crisis level according to the BLM and bid-ask spread, 
while it did not happen to any stocks according to turnover.  
Relation between liquidity indicators: 
– The correlation between bid-ask spread and BLM can be regarded as strongly 
positive, while the correlation of BLM and turnover shows a slightly negative 
relation.  
– The less liquid a stock is, the lower the correlation between the liquidity 
indicators.  
– The change of bid-ask spread has a strong explanatory power about BLM 
change in the case of a liquid stock, whilst in the case of medium liquid stocks 
this explanatory power is not significant. In the case of illiquid stocks, bid-ask 
spread change has very limited explanatory power, which cannot even be 
considered as significant before the crises.  
– The turnover change cannot explain BLM change in the case of liquid and 
illiquid stocks, whilst it has also only a low explanatory power in the case of a 
medium liquid one.  
– Turnover and liquidity do not co-move intradaily, for instance at the 
beginning of the day liquidity is low in every case regardless whether the 
turnover is big or small.   
– BLM can be important for those market participants who invest in illiquid 
stocks or intraday.   
– Each stock’s liquidity related to one another can significantly differ in the case 
of different liquidity indicators.  
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Relation between liquidity and volatility: 
– On the Budapest Stock Exchange it has been justified, that there is a positive 
correlation between BLM and volatility, namely that the more volatile 
markets are, the transaction cost caused by the lack of liquidity is higher. 
– The less liquid a stock is, the lower the correlation between liquidity and 
volatility tends to be.  
– Before and during the crisis, the correlation between the true range and 
liquidity was stronger than the one between standard deviation and liquidity. 
However, after the crisis this has reversed.  
– The crisis of 2008 can be regarded as a liquidity crisis based on the liquidity 
estimated from volatility, i.e. the estimated BLM value is lower than the 
actual BLM value.  
– After the crisis, the estimated BLM value is typically higher than the actual 
value, i.e. liquidity is higher after the crises than it had been expected. The 
less liquid a stock is, the typically lower the correlation is between liquidity 
and volatility.  
 
Therefore, I have pointed out that the rules of thumb applied by market 
participants do not lead to the appropriate investment decision regarding liquidity in 
every case. Namely, I have shown that BLM is a liquidity indicator which is able to 
measure the liquidity of the assets traded on the stock exchange along more 
dimensions, thus it provides a more reliable view on the current liquidity situation of 
the market than decisions based only on turnover data or only on bid-ask spread. In 
the case of medium liquid and illiquid stocks it would be essential to take also BLM 
into consideration as a liquidity indicator, because in their case it is more significant 
that they can be sorted into different liquidity categories based on bid-ask spread and 
on turnover. Furthermore, in the case of these stocks correlation between liquidity 
indicators cannot be considered as tight, which further decreases in the case of a 
crisis. Therefore, BLM can be important for investors who trade in illiquid stocks. 
However, during a crisis it is worthwhile to pay attention to the value-formation of 
the indicator also in the case of liquid stocks.  
Based on the results of the analysis of the relation between the volatility and 
liquidity it can be said that the crisis of 2007/2008 was a liquidity crisis as well, 
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which means that the cause of the increased implicit cost was not only the increased 
volatility. My results also prove the statement of Csávás and Erhart (2005), that the 
decrease of liquidity reflects the increase of unexpected volatility. 
 
(2) In Chapter III. I have presented a theoretical model, in which I have described 
how the Value at Risk calculation can be supplemented with liquidity risk. In the 
first half of this part I have given a detailed description about the literature of 
liquidity adjusted VaR (LAVaR) models, while in the second half I presented my 
own model which was based on Giot and Gramming’s (2005) and Stange and 
Kaseres’s (2009b) work. My contribution to their work is that I set up the model 
on Hungarian database, because nobody had made tests based on it before, and I 
have calculated the VaR value also for liquid and illiquid stocks in the case of 
individual stocks and stock portfolios. My most important findings are the 
followings: 
– I determined the net return, namely how return calculation changes if we take 
into consideration the cost that occur because the lack of liquidity. I have 
determined both for the individual stocks and for the volume and value 
weighted portfolios.  
– Taking liquidity into consideration means a significant risk increase even in 
the case of the most liquid stocks both on the level of individual stocks and 
portfolios. Therefore it is not advisable to ignore this. 
– In the case of portfolios, liquidity risk can be decreased by diversification; 
therefore it is worthwhile to hold various stocks in a portfolio, because thus 
not only the price risk, but also the liquidity risk decreases. 
 
BLM and the method presented with the aid of it provide a simple and quick 
way to display liquidity in the capital requirement. Paying attention to the 
deficiencies and calculation problems of the index, the findings should be handled 
with precaution, but the presented model can appropriately reflect the essential 
empirical observations (e.g. OTP is the most liquid stock), thus in every case I 
recommend its integration into risk management systems.  
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(3) In Chapter IV. I presented how to estimate a virtual price impact function with the 
help of the BLM indicator, which nobody had done before me, i.e. the literature is 
typically concerned with the estimation and modeling of the empirical price 
impact function. As the estimation of the empirical price impact function is based 
on the average price impact of a long period, thus it cannot be a basis of a time 
series analysis. Hence I examined the price impact functions from a different 
approach, because in my opinion during trading it is important to know how the 
price impact evolves in time, since traders will base their trading strategy on it. 
The knowledge of the behavior of the price impact function in time helps market 
actors with timing their orders. When market actors decide whether to postpone a 
transaction in order to induce a lower price-shift effect on the market, then they 
have to have a notion on how the price impact function forms over time. 
However, the time series analysis of the price impact can only be carried out on 
the virtual price impact function, because in this case a sufficient amount of data 
is available. For this reason, after the estimation of the price impact function, I 
have made a time series analysis on the function, which had nobody had done in 
the literature before. My most important findings were the followings:  
– Estimation of a virtual price impact function from the BLM database.  
– The value of the descriptive statistics i.e. the mean, the median or the standard 
deviation have shown a higher value in every case on the bid side of the 
function than on the ask side. I have explained the phenomenon with the herd 
effect, namely that the virtual price impact reflects that usually traders buy 
stocks separately from each other, but selling stocks is often concentrated, for 
example because of a panic situation. 
– The time series data of the virtual price impact function do not contain trends, 
however quarterly cyclicity can be discovered in the data.  
– During the cycles the price impact values reach their minimum level in the 
time of quarterly reports, while their maximum values are halfway between 
two quarterly reports.  
– By examining outlier data I have identified 52 turbulent days. All these days 
fall into the period of the 2008 crisis, since they can be found between 17 
October 2008 and 9 April 2009.  
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– I have also identified a structural break in the time series with the aid of 
formalized statistical tests.  
– There is a significant autocorrelation in the dataset, from which I draw the 
conclusion that the impact of an incidental shock prevails in the market data 
for a longer period of time.  
– When liquidity ceases on one side of the order book, then liquidity will be 
lower on the other side of the book as well, i.e. the correlation between the 
buy and sell side price impact is very high.  
– The vPIF process can be described as a mean reverting process. The time 
series data of the virtual price impact function do not contain trends, but 
quarter-year cyclicity can be discovered in the data.  
 
The topic of my dissertation has evolved from the research activities I made in 
the past and from the series of interview series I did together with a few of my 
colleagues. My dissertation shows that the market participants use simple rules of 
thumb in order to be able to handle market liquidity easily, and they use simple 
indicators to measure its value. These indicators cannot capture market liquidity in 
full. In my dissertation I have used the Budapest Liquidity Measure – provided to me 
by the Budapest Stock Exchange – to show how this indicator can supplement the 
information other liquidity indicators provide about the liquidity of the market. 
Moreover I have shown methods that can reduce the liquidity risk market participants 
have to face, and methods that can help decision making. I think my achievement in 
addition to the my previous statements is, that I discuss the following in my 
dissertation in great detail: the importance of market liquidity; methods of liquidity 
risk management that already exist on the market, and also new, more complex ones; 
furthermore the possible research topics that could be undertaken in the future. 
For further research directions a number of proposals have emerged during my 
examinations, of which I intend to highlight the most important ones: 
– Concerning the set-up of the LAVaR model an important assumption was that 
the BLM(q) function can be estimated by a line. While in the case of daily 
data we can state that the BLM(q) function can be well approached by a line, 
on the other hand it is not valid for the intraday data anymore. Namely, for the 
modeling intradaily, we need to estimate the shape of the BLM(q) function for 
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every moment of time, which is a complex task. The intraday BLM(q) 
function can take on any shape, it can either be convex, concave or even a 
line. Since the daily BLM-value is calculated as the average of the intraday 
values, as the consequence of this averaging the incidentally outlier values 
have sleeked into the average, which resulted in the fact that I could approach 
the daily BLM(q) function well with a line. For the estimation of the shape of 
intraday BLM(q) functions, the methods applied for the estimation of the 
yield curve can possibly provide a solution during subsequent  research.    
– The determination of the LAVaR values based on intraday data referring to 
the portfolio is a further direction, which can be an essential issue to e.g. the 
portfolio managers. However, the modeling of this is a complex task, since the 
BLM(q) function has to be estimated  every second, which can have very 
different patterns during the day.   
– During the LAVaR modeling a further assumption was that the order book is 
symmetric on the bid and the ask sides. In the future, BLM value could be 
divided directly into its components – the bid-ask spread and the bid and ask 
side adverse price movement – and after this separation the bid and ask side 
LAVaR values could be estimated.   
– Concerning price impact functions as well, in the future it may be interesting 
to examine how this function develops intradaily.   
– It would also be worthwhile to examine how the empirical and the virtual 
price impact functions are related to each other. With the comparison of the 
two functions it could be determined whether there is a need to estimate the 
empirical function at all, or it is sufficient to know the virtual price impact 
function during investment decisions. However, it makes it difficult to 
compare that the virtual price impact function can be estimated even for every 
moment, whilst the empirical price impact function can only be determined 
based on a relatively longer period, e.g. for a month based on real trades. 
Moreover, the empirical price impact function is not eligible to make a time 
series analysis thereon, thus it can only play a less important role in market 
actors’ investment decisions than the virtual price impact function. 
– Lastly it is worth to mention that it would be very important to use the nature 
of liquidity as transaction cost – which is quantified by BLM on the stock 
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exchange – for a comparison of each market. Comparing my findings with the 
results of other markets – in the absence of appropriate data – is for the time 
being not possible. Namely, the estimation of trade transaction costs presumes 
the knowledge of databases hardly or not at all available. Actually, thus I can 
only hope that in the future more and more databases and studies which allow 
comparative analysis will be at researchers’ and market actors’ disposal. 
 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 175 
References 
 
Acerbi, C. [2010]: The value of liquidity – Can it be measured? RBC Dexia Investor 
Services 
Akerlof, G.A. [1970]: The market for „lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 83, No.3, pp. 488-500. 
Almgren, R. & Chriss, N. [2000]: Optimal execution of portfolio transactions. 
Journal of Risk, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 5-39. 
Almgren, R. [2003]: Optimal execution with nonlinear impact functions and trading-
enhanced risk. Applied Mathematical Finance, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-18. 
Almgren, R., Thum, C., Hauptmann, E. & Li, H. [2005]: Equity market impact. Risk, 
July, pp. 21-28. 
Amihud, Y. & H. Mandelson, H. [1986]: Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 223–249. 
Amihud, Y. & Mandelson, H. [1991]: Liquidity, Maturity, and the Yields on U.S. 
Treasury Securities. Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 1411–1425. 
Amihud, Y. [2002]: Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series 
effects. Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 5, pp. 31–56. 
Andrews, D.W.K. [1993]: Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with 
Unknown Change Point. Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 821-56. 
Angelidis, T. & Benos, A. [2006]: Liquidity adjusted value-at-risk based on the 
components of the bid-ask spread. Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 16, No. 
11, pp. 835-851. 
Antalóczy, K., Bod, P.Á., Csáki, Gy., Király, J., Kovács, Á., Mérő, K., Mohai, Gy., 
Sass, M., Száz, J. & Várhegyi, É. [2009]: Körkérdés a pénz- és tőkepiaci válság 
és a szabályozás összefüggéseiről. Külgazdaság, Vol. LIII, No. 1-2, pp. 4-42. 
Badics, T. [2011]: Arbitrázs, kockázattal szembeni attitűd és az eszközárazás 
alaptétele. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 325-335.  
Bak, P., Paczuski, M. & Shubik, M. [1997]: Price variations in a stock market with 
various agents. Physica A, Vol. 246, pp. 430-453.  
Balogh, Cs. & Kóczán, G. [2008]: Állampapírok másodpiaci kereskedési 
infrastruktúrája. MNB working paper series 74. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
176 
Balla, A. [2006]: Tőkeszerkezeti döntések – empirikus elemzés a magyar 
feldolgozóipari vállalatokról 1992-2001 között. Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. 
LIII, No. 4, pp. 681-700.  
Bangia, A., Diebold, F.X., Schuermann, T. & Stroughair, J.D. [1998]: Modeling 
Liquidity Risk With Implications for Traditional Market Risk Measurement and 
Management. Working paper, Financial Institutions Center at The Wharton 
School 
Bank for International Settlements [1999]: Market Liquidity: Research Findings and 
Selected Policy Implications. Committee on the Global Financial System, 
Publications, No. 11. 
Bank for International Settlements [2010]: Basel III: International framework for 
liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, 16th December 2010. 
december 16. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.htm  
Barclay, M. & Warner, J. [1993]: Stealth Trading and Volatility: Which Trades Move 
Prices? Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 281–305. 
Barra, I. [2008]: Analysis of market liquidity based on transaction durations. Thesis, 
Corvinus University of Budapest  
Basel Committee [2005]: Trading Book Survey: A Summary of Responses, Tech. 
Rep., Bank for International Settlement 
Basel Committee [2008]: Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision, Tech. Rep., Bank for International Settlement 
Bélyácz, I. [2009]: Befektetési döntések megalapozása. Aula Kiadó Kft., Budapest 
Bélyácz, I. [2011]: Stratégiai beruházások és reálopciók. Aula Kiadó Kft., Budapest 
Bélyácz, I. [2011]: Kockázat, bizonytalanság, valószínűség. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. 
X, No. 4, pp. 289-313. 
Berkowitz, J. [2000a]: Breaking the silence. Risk, Vol. 13, No. 10, pp. 105-108. 
Berkowitz, J. [2000b]: Incorporating liquidity risk into value at risk models. Working 
paper, University of California, Irvine 
Berlinger, E., Király, J., Száz, J., Walter, Gy. & Zsembery, L. [1998]: Volatilitás 
kereskedés. Bankról, Pénzről, Tőzsdéről. International Training Center for 
Bankers, Budapest. pp. 349-360. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 177 
Berlinger, E., Michaletzky, M. & Szenes, M. [2011]: A fedezetlen bankközi 
forintpiac hálózati dinamikájának vizsgálata a likviditási válság előtt és után. 
Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. LVIII, pp. 229-252.  
Berlinger, E., Horváth, F. & Vidovics-Dancs, Á. [2012]: Tőkeáttétel-ciklusok. 
Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. XI, No. 1, pp. 1-23.  
Bertsimas, D. & Lo, A.W. [1998]: Optimal control of execution costs. Journal of 
Financial Markets, Vol. 1, pp. 1–50. 
Biais, B., Hillion, P. & Spatt, C. [1995]: An Empirical Analysis of the Limit Order 
Book and the Order Flow in the Paris Bourse. Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 
5, pp. 1655-1689. 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A. & Marcus, A.J [2005]: Befektetések. Aula kiadó, Budapest  
Boehmer, E., Huszár Zs. & Jordan, B.D. [2010]: The good news in short interest. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp. 80-97. 
Bollerslev, T. [1986]: Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. 
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 307-327. 
Bookstaber, R. [1999]: A Framework for understanding market crisis. In: Risk 
management: Principles and Practices,  
http://media.wiley.com/product_data/excerpt/92/04709033/0470903392.pdf 
Borio, C. [2000]: Market Liquidity and Stress: Selected Issues and Policy 
Implications. BIS Quarterly Review. 
Bouchaud, J-P., Gefen, Y., Potters, M. & Wyart, M. [2004]: Fluctuations and 
response in financial markets: The subtle nature of „random” price changes. 
Quantitative Finance, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 176-190. 
Bouchaud, J-P. & Potters, M. [2002]: More statistical properties of order books and 
price impact. Physica A, 324, pp. 133-140. 
Bouchaud, J-P. [2010a]: Price impact, In: Encyclopedia of Quantitative Finance, 
Wiley Online Library. 
Bouchaud, J-P. [2010b]: The endogenous dynamics of markets: price impact and 
feedback loops. http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.2928v1.pdf 
Downloaded: 14th July 2011. 
Bouchaud, J-P., Farmer, J.D. & Lillo, F. [2008]: How Markets Slowly Digest 
Changes in Supply and Demand, In: T. Hens & K. Schenk-Hoppe, eds, 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
178 
'Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution', Elsevier: Academic 
Press. 
Bouchaud, J-P., Mezard, M. & Potters, M. [2002]: Statistical properties of stock order 
books: empirical results and models. Quantitative Finance, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 
251-256. 
Breusch, T.S. [1979]: Testing for Autocorrelation in Dynamic Linear Models. 
Australian Economic Papers, 17, pp. 334–355.  
Challet, D. & Stinchcombe, R. [2002]: Exclusion particle models of limit order 
financial markets, preprint cond-mat/0208025 
Challet, D. & Stinchcombe, R. [2001]: Analyzing and modeling 1+1d markets. 
Physisa A, Vol. 300, pp. 285-299. 
Chan, K., Ahn, H. & Bae, K. [2001]: Limit orders, depth, and volatility: Evidence 
from the stock exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 
767-788. 
Chordia, T. & Subrahmanyam, A. [2002]: Order imbalance and individual stock 
returns: theory and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 72, pp. 485-
518. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R. & Subrahmanyam, A. [2001]: Market Liquidity and Trading 
Activity, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 501-530. 
Chow, G.C. [1960]: Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear 
Regressions. Econometrica, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 591-605.  
Clauset, A.,  Shalizi, C.R. & Newman, M.E.J. [2009]: Power-law distributions in 
empirical data. SIAM Review, [arXiv:0706.1062] 
Cont, R. [2001]: Empirical properties of asset returns: stylized facts and statistical 
issues. Quantitative Finance, Vol.1, pp. 223-236. 
Cont, R., Kukanov, A. & Stoikov, S. [2011]: The price impact of order book events. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712822 Downloaded: 10th July 2011.  
Cosandey, D. [2001]: Adjusting value at risk for market liquidity. Risk, pp. 115-118. 
Csávás, Cs. & Erhart, Sz. [2005]: Likvideke-a magyar pénzügyi piacok? – A deviza- 
és állampapír-piaci likviditás elméletben és gyakorlatban. MNB working paper 
series 44. 
Daniels, M.G., Farmer, J.D., Iori, G. & Smith, E. [2002]: How storing supply and 
demand affects price diffusion, preprint cond-mat/0112422. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 179 
Darvas, Zs. [2004]: Bevezetés az idősorelemzés fogalmaiba. Lecture notes. Corvinus 
University of Budapest 
Dickey, D.A. & W.A. Fuller [1979]: Distribution of the Estimators for 
Autoregressive Time Series with Unit Root. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 74. pp. 427-431.  
Diebold, F.X., Hickman, A., Inoue, A. & Schuermann, T. [1998]: Scale Models. Risk, 
Vol. 11, pp. 104-107. 
Dowd, K. [2001]: Beyond Value at Risk - The new science of risk management. Wiley 
& Sons 
Dömötör, B. [2011]: A kockázat megjelenése a származtatott pénzügyi termékekben. 
Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 360–369. 
Dömötör, B. & Marossy Z. [2010]: A likviditási mutatószámok struktúrája. 
Hitelintézeti szemle, Vol. IX, No. 6, pp. 581-603. 
Dubil, R. [2003]: How to include liquidity in a market VaR statistic. Journal of 
Applied Finance, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 19-28.  
Dunbar, N. [1998]: Meriwether’s Meltdown. Risk, pp. 32-36. 
Engle, R.F. & Russell, J.R. [1998]: Autoregressive conditional duration: A new 
model for irregularly spaced transaction data. Econometrica, Vol. 66, No. 5, pp. 
1127-1162. 
Engle, R.F. & Ferstenberg, R. [2007]: Execution risk. Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 33, pp. 34-44.   
Ernst, C., Stange, S. & Kaserer, C. [2008]: Accounting for non-normality in liquidity 
risk. CEFS working paper 2008 No. 14, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1316769  
Ernst, C., Stange, S. & Kaserer, C. [2009]: Measuring market liquidity risk – Which 
model works best? CEFS working paper 2009 No. 01, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328480  
Erwan, L.S. [2001]: Incorporating liquidity risk in var models. Working papr, 
University of Rene 
Evans, M.D.D. & Lyons, R.K. [2002]: Order flow and exchange rate dynamics. 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 1, pp. 170-180. 
Fama, E.F. [1965]: The behavior of Stock Market Prices. Journal of Business, Vol. 
38, No. 1, pp. 34-105. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
180 
Fama, E.F. [1970]: Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 383-417.  
Farmer, J., Gillemot, L., Lillo, F., Mike, S. & Sen, A. [2004]: What really causes 
large price changes? Quantitative Finance, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 383-397. 
Farmer, J.D. & Lillo, F. [2004]: On the origin of power-law tails in financial markets. 
Quantitative Finance, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 7-11. 
Farmer, J.D., Gerig, A., Lillo, F. & Mike, S. [2006]: Market efficiency and the long-
memory of supply and demand: Is price impact variable and permanent or fixed 
and temporary? http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/physics/pdf/0602/0602015v1.pdf  
Farmer, J.D., Gillemot, L., Krisnamurthy, S. & Smith, E. [2002]: Statistical theory of 
the continuous double auction, preprint cond-mat/0210475 
Ferraris, A. [2008]: Equity Market Impact Models. Mathematics at the interface 
between business and research, Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft. 4 
December 2008, Berlin.  
http://www.dbquant.com/Presentations/Berlin200812.pdf Downloaded: 28th 
June 2011. 
Fazakas, G. & Juhász, P. [2009]: Alacsonyabb kockázat - nagyobb osztalék? A béta 
és az osztalékfizetési hányad kapcsolatának vizsgálata a Budapesti Értéktőzsdén 
(1997-2007). Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. LVI, No. 2, pp. 322 - 343. 
Fleming, M.J. [2003]: Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity. FRBNY Economic 
Policy Review. 
Francios-Heude, A. & Van Wynandaeale, P. [2001]: Integrating liquidity risk in a 
parametric intraday VaR framework. Working paper.  
Gabaix, X., Gopikrishnan, P., Plerou, V. & Stanley, H.E. [2003]: A theory of power-
law distributions in financial market fluctuations. Nature, Vol. 423, pp. 267-
270. 
Gabaix, X., Gopikrishnan, P., Plerou, V. & Stanley, H.E. [2006]: Institutional 
investors and stock market volatility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
121, pp. 461-504.  
Galati, G. [2000]: Trading Volumes, Volatility and Spreads in FX Markets: Evidence 
from Emerging Market Countries. BIS Working Papers No. 93, October 2000. 
Gellén, K. [2009]: Értékpapírjog. In: Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, SZTE ÁJTK, Szeged, 
2009. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 181 
Giot, P. & Gramming, J. [2005]: How large is liquidity risk in an automated auction 
market? Empirical Economics, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 867-887. 
Glosten, L., Jagannathan, R. & Runkle, D. [1997]: On the relationship between the 
expected value and the volatility of the normal excess returns on stocks. Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 1779-1801. 
Godfrey, L.G. [1978]: Testing Against General Autoregressive and Moving Average 
Error Models when the Regressors Include Lagged Dependent Variables. 
Econometrica, 46, pp. 1293–1302.  
Gomber, P. & Shcweikert, U. [2002]: The Market Impact – Liquidity Measure in 
Electronic Securities Trading. Die Bank, 7/2002. 
Gopikrishnan, P., Plerou, V., Gabaix, X. & Stanley, H. [2000]: Statistical properties 
of share volume traded in financial markets. Physical Review E, Vol. 62, No. 4, 
pp. 4493-4496. 
Grossman, S. J. & Miller, M. H. [1988]: Liquidity and Market Structure. NBER 
Working Paper No. 2641, July 1988. 
Gyarmati, Á., Michaletzky, M. & Váradi, K. [2010a]: A likviditás alakulása a 
Budapesti Értéktőzsdén 2007-2010 között. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. IX, No. 6, 
pp. 497-520.  
Gyarmati, Ákos, Michaletzky, Márton & Váradi, Kata [2010]: Liquidity on the 
Budapest Stock Exchange 2007-2010. Budapesti Értéktőzsde, working paper. 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784324  
Gyarmati, Á., Michaletzky, M. & Váradi, K. [2010b]: A Budapesti Likviditási 
Mérték és felhasználása – Likviditáskockázat VaR-mutatókban. Hitelintézeti 
Szemle, Vol. IX, No. 6, pp. 521-538. 
Gyarmati, Ákos, Michaletzky, Márton & Váradi, Kata [2010]: The Budapest 
Liquidity Measure and its application – Liquidity risk in VaR measure. 
Budapesti Értéktőzsde, working paper. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784348  
Haberle, R. & Persson, P. [2000]: Incorporating market liquidity constraints in var. 
Banque & March´es, Vol. 44, pp. 14–19. 
Harris, L. [1990]: Statistical properties of the Roll serial covariance bid/ask spread 
estimator. Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, pp. 568-579. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
182 
Hausbrouck, J. [1999]: Measuring the information content of stock prices. Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 179-207. 
Hausman, J.A., Lo, A.W. & MacKinlay, A.C. [1992]: An ordered probit analysis of 
transaction stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 
319-379. 
Havran, D., Szűcs, N. & Csóka, P. [2010]: Információs paradoxon a vállalkozások 
finanszírozásában – nem fizető vevő esetén. Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. LVII, 
pp. 318-336. 
Hisata, Y. & Yamai, Y. [2000]: Research toward the practical application of liquidity 
risk evaluation methods. Discussion Paper, Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies - Bank of Japan. 
Homolya, D. & Benedek, G. [2007]: Banki működési kockázat elemzése – 
katasztrófamodellezés. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. VI, No. 4, pp. 358-385. 
Hopman, C. [2007]: Do supply and demand drive stock prices? Quantitative Finance, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 37-53.  
Huang, R.D. & Masulis, R.W. [1999]: FX Spreads and Dealer Competition across the 
24-hour Trading Day. Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 61-93. 
Hunyadi, L. & Vita, L [2003]: Statisztika közgazdászoknak. Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal, Budapest. 
Iori, G., Daniels, M.G., Farmer, J.D., Gillemot, L., Krishnamurthy, S. & E. Smith 
[2003]: An analysis of price impact function in order-driven markets. Physica A, 
Vol. 324, pp. 146-151. 
Irvine, P., Benston, G.J. & Kandel, E. [2000]: Liquidity beyond the inside spread: 
measuring and using information in the limit order book. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=229959  
Jarrow, R. & Subrahmanyam, A. [1997]: Mopping up liquidity. Risk, Vol. 10, No. 12, 
pp. 170–173. 
Jarrow, R. & Subrahmanyam, A. [2001]: The liquidity discount. Mathematical 
Finance, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp.  447-474.  
Jarrow, R.A. & Potter, P. [2001]: Liquidity risk and option pricing theory. Working 
paper. 
Jorion, P. [2007]: Value at Risk: The Benchmark of Controlling Market Risk, 3.ed., 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 183 
Joulin, A., Lefevre, A., Grunberg, D. & Bouchaud, J-P. [2008]: Stock price jumps: 
news and volume play a minor role. http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.1769  
Keim, D. & Madhavan, A. [1996]: The upstairs market for large-block transactions: 
Analysis and measurement of price effects. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 9, 
No. 1, pp. 1-36. 
Kempf, A. & Korn, O. [1999]: Market Depth and Order Size. Journal of Financial 
Markets, Vol. 2, pp. 29-48. 
Kerékgyártó, Gy. & Mundruczó, Gy. [1995]: Statisztikai módzserek a gazdasági 
elemzésben. Aula kiadó, Budapest 
Király, J. [2008]: Likviditás válságban (Lehman előtt – Lehman után). Hitelinztézeti 
Szemle. Vol. VII, No. 6, pp. 598-611. 
Kovács, E. [2011] A kockázat, mint látens fogalom. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. X, No. 
4, pp. 349–359. 
Kovács, P. [2011]: Basel III és a várható hatásai a bankszektorra. Thesis, Corvinus 
University of Budapest  
Krekó, B. [2011]: Kockázat, bizonytalanság és modellkockázat kockázatkezelési 
szemmel. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 370-378. 
Krénusz, Á. [2007]: A vállalati tőkeszekezet meghatározó tényezőinek új modellje és 
annak vizsgálata Magyarország példáján. Dissertation, Corvinus University of 
Budapest 
Kupiec, P. [1995]: Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk measurement 
models. Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 3, pp. 73-84. 
Kutas, G. & Végh, R. [2005]: A Budapesti Likviditási Mérték bevezetéséről. 
Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. LII, pp. 686-711. 
Kyle, A. [1985]: Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, Vol. 53. No. 
6. pp. 1315-1335. 
Lawrence, C. & Robinson, G. [1997]: Liquidity Measures. Risk, pp. 52-55.  
Lee, C.M.C. & Ready, M.J. [1991]: Inferring trade direction from intraday data. 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 733-746. 
Lillo, F. & Farmer, J.D. [2004]: The long memory of the efficient market. Studies in 
Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 1. 
Lillo, F., Farmer, J.D. & Mantegna, R. [2003]: Master curve for price impact 
function. Nature, Vol. 421, pp. 129-130. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
184 
Lillo, F., Mike, S. & Farmer, J. [2005]: Theory for long memory in supply and 
demand. Physical Review E, Vol. 71, No. 6, 66122. 
Lim, M. & Coggins, R. [2005]: The immediate price impact of trades on the 
Australian Stock Exchange. Quantitative Finance, Vol. 5, pp. 365–377. 
Luckock, H. [2001]: A statistical model of a limit order market, Sidney University 
preprint  
Madhavan, A. [2002]: Market Microstructure: A Practitioner's Guide. Financial 
Analysts Journal, Vol. 58, No.5, pp. 28-42. 
Major, I. [2008]: A magyar állampapírpiac likviditásának vizsgálata – Mekkora a 
forint államkötvények likviditási prémiuma? Thesis, Corvinus University of 
Budapest  
Makara, T. [2004]: Maximum és minimum árfolyamok időbeli eloszlása. Hitelintézeti 
Szemle, Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 82-91. 
Mandelbrot, B. [1963]: The variation of certain speculative prices. Journal of 
Business, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 394-419.  
Margitai, I. [2009]: Piaci likviditás és mikrostruktúra. Thesis, Corvinus University of 
Budapest 
Markowitz, H.M. [1952]: Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance, Vol. 7, pp. 77-91. 
Maslov, S. & Mills, M. [2001]: Price fluctuation from the order book perspective – 
empirical facts and a simple model. Physice A, Vol. 299, pp. 234- 246. 
Maslov, S. [2000]: Simple model of a limit order-driven market. Physica A, Vol. 278, 
pp. 571-578. 
McGill, R., Tukey, J. W. & Larsen, W. A. [1978]: Variations of Box Plots" The 
American Statistician, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 12-16. 
Medvegyev, P. [2011]: Néhány megjegyzés a kockázat, bizonytalanság, valószínűség 
kérdéséhez. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 314–324. 
Medvegyev, P. & Száz, J. [2010]: Meglepetések jellege a pénzügyi piacokon. GT-
Print Kft, Budapest 
Michaletzky, M. [2010]: A pénzügyi piacok likviditása. Dissertation, Corvinus 
University of Budapest 
Mike, S. & Farmer, J.D. [2008]: An empirical behavioral model of liquidity and 
volatility. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 32, No.1, pp. 200-
234. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 185 
Móricz, D. [2005]: Vállalati szolgáltatási nyugdíjprogramok hatása a részvények 
értékére és kockázatára az USA-ban. Dissertation, Corvinus University of 
Budapest  
Muranaga, J. & Shimizu, T. [2009]: Expectations and market microstructure when 
liquidity is lost. In: BIS [1999]: Market Liquidity: Research Findings and 
Selected Policy Implications, Committee on the Global Financial System, 
Publications No. 11.  
Niemeyer, J. & Sandas, P. [1995]: An empirical analysis of the trading structure at the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange, Stockholm School of Economics, Working Paper 
No. 44. 
O’Hara, M. [1995]: Market Microstructure Theory. Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Öcsi, B. [2007]: Kockázatok mérése, kezelése, szabályozása. Lecture notes, 13th 
September 2007. Corvinus University of Budapest  
Parlour, C.A. & Seppi, D.J. [2008]: Limit order markets: A survey. In: Handbook of 
Financial Intermediation & Banking, A.W.A. Boot és A.V. Thakor 
Pastor, L. & Stambaugh, R. [2003]: Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Journal 
of Political Economy 111, pp. 642–685. 
Pilbeam, K. [2010]: Finance and financial markets. Palgrace-Macmillan, 3rd edition, 
London.  
Plerou, V., Gopikrishnan, P., Gabaix, X. & Stanley, H.E. [2002]: Quantifying Stock 
Price Response to Demand Fluctuations. Physical Review E, 66, pp.1-4. 
Qi, J. & Ng, W.L. [2009]: Liquidity adjusted intraday value at risk. Proceedings of 
the World Congress on Engineering Vol 2., July 1-3, London, U.K. 
Radnai, M. & Vonnák, Dzs. [2009]: Likviditási kockázat az Európai Tőkemegfelelési 
Direktíva tervezett módosításában. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. VIII, No.3, pp. 
248-256. 
Ranaldo, A. [2001]: Intraday market liquidity on the swiss stock exchange. Swiss 
Society for Financial Market Research, pp. 309-327.   
Réz, É. [2011]: Átalakuló piaci struktúra – Az új kereskedési technikák és helyszínek 
hatásai. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. X, No. 5, pp. 430-454.  
Riecke, W., Szalkai, I. & Száz, J. [1985]: Árfolyamelméletek és pénzügypolitika. 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
186 
Rosenow, B. [2008]: Fluctuations and market frictions in financial trading. 
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/cond-mat/pdf/0107/0107018v2.pdf Downloaded: 12th 
July 2011. 
Sarr, A. & Lybec, T. [2002]: Measuring Liquidity in Financial Markets. IMF 
Working Paper WP/02/232. 
Schwert, G. W. [1989]: Tests for unit roots: A Monte-Carlo investigation. Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 147-159. 
Seppi, D. [1990]: Equilibrium Block Trading and Asymmetric Information. Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 45, pp. 73–94. 
Slanina, F. [2001]: Mean-field approximation for a limit order driven market model, 
preprint http://xxx.lanl.gov/cond-mat/0104547  
Smith, E., Farmer, D., Gillemot, L. & Krisnamurthy, S. [2008]: Statistical theory of 
the continuous double auction. http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0210475.pdf 
Downloaded: 11th November 2011. 
Speigel, M.R., Schiller, J.J. & Srinivasan, R.A. [2000]: Schaum’s outline of 
probability and statistics. McGraw-Hill kiadó.  
Spence, A.M. [1973]: Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 90, pp. 629-650.  
Stange, S. & Kaserer, C. [2009a]: Why and how to integrate liquidity risk into VaR-
framework. CEFS working paper: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292289 
Stange, S. & Kaserer, C. [2009b]: Market liquidity risk – An overview. Working 
Paper Series, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies 
Stiglitz, J. [1977]: Monopoly, nonlinear pricing and imperfect information: the 
insurance market. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 44, pp. 407-430.  
Szatmári, A. [1996]: Aukciók, avagy a képbe kerül, ha a Louvre a képbe kerül. 
Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, pp. 303-314.  
Száz, J. [2009]: Pénzügyi termékek áralakulása. Jet Set Tipográfiai Műhely Kft., 
Budapest  
Száz, J. [2011]: Valószínűség, esély, relatív súlyok – Opciók és reálopciók. 
Hitelinztézeti Szemle, Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 336-348.  
Szűcs, B.Á. & Váradi, K. [2012]: Measuring and managing liquidity risk in practice. 
Pénzügyi Szemle, accepted tender material. 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 187 
Torre, N.G. & Ferrari, M.J. [1999]: The Market Impact ModelTM. BARRA Research 
Insights. 1999 BARRA, Inc. 
Tulassay, Zs. [2009]: A pénzügyi piacok stilizált tényei. Lecture notes of ’Empirical 
Finance’ class, 15th September 2009., Corvinus University of Budapest 
Váradi, Kata, Gyarmati, Ákos & Lublóy, Ágnes [2012]: Virtuális árhatás a Budapesti 
Értéktőzsdén. Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. LIX, pp. 508-539. 
Von Wyss, R. [2004]: Measuring and predicting liquidity in the stock market. 
Universität St. Gallen, Dissertation. 
Weber, P. & Rosenow, B. [2005]: Order book approach to price impact. Quantitative 
Finance, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 357-364. 
Wei, S-J. [1994]: Anticipation of Foreign Exchange Volatility and Bid-ask Spreads. 
NBER Working Paper No. 4737. 
Wilder, J.W. [1978]: New Concepts in Technical Trading Systems. Trend Research 
(Greensboro, N.C.) 
Willmann R.D., Schuetz, G.M. & Challet, D. [2003]: Exact Hurst exponent and 
crossover behavior in a limit order market model. Physica A, Vol. 316, pp. 430-
440.  
Zhang, Y-C. [1999]: Toward a theory of marginally effcient markets. Physica A, Vol. 
269, pp. 30-44. 
Zhou, W.-X. [2011]: Universal price impact functions of individual trades in an 
order-driven market. Quantitative Finance, in press. 
Zovko, I. & Farmer, J.D. [2002]: The power of patience: A behavioral regularity in 
limit order placement. Quantitative Finance, Vol. 2, No. 5, pp. 387-392.  
 
Reference form the internet: 
Homepage of the Budapest Stock Exchange: 
http://bet.hu/topmenu/befektetok/tozsde_lepesrol_lepesre/azonnali_piacismeretek/hog
yan_kereskedjunk_a_tozsden/tozsdei_megbizasok 
Homepage of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange: 
http://www.ljse.si/cgi-bin/jve.cgi?doc=2498&sid=aI37XEHLLc1cSD30  
Homepage of New York Stock Exchange: 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/fact_sheet_nyse_orders.pdf 
 
 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 
 
188 
Own publications 
 
Publications in Hungarian in the topic of the dissertation: 
Reviewed journal: 
Váradi, Kata [2012]: Az ajánlati könyv statisztikai tulajdonságai. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 
forthcoming. 
Váradi, Kata, Gyarmati, Ákos & Lublóy, Ágnes [2012]: Virtuális árhatás a Budapesti 
Értéktőzsdén. Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. LIX, pp. 508-539. 
Gyarmati, Ákos, Michaletzky, Márton & Váradi, Kata [2010]: A likviditás alakulása 
a Budapesti Értéktőzsdén 2007-2010 között. Hitelintézeti szemle, Vol. IX, No. 
6, pp. 497-520.  
Gyarmati, Ákos, Michaletzky, Márton & Váradi, Kata [2010]: A Budapesti 
Likviditási Mérték és felhasználása – Likviditáskockázat VaR-mutatókban. 
Hitelintézeti szemle, Vol. IX, No. 6, pp. 521-538. 
 
Publications in English in the topic of the dissertation: 
Reviewed journal: 
Szűcs, Balázs Árpád & Váradi, Kata [2012]: Measuring and managing liquidity risk 
in practice. Pénzügyi Szemle, accepted tender material. 
Working papers in English: 
Gyarmati, Ákos, Michaletzky, Márton & Váradi, Kata [2010]: Liquidity on the 
Budapest Stock Exchange 2007-2010. Budapest Stock Exchange, working 
paper. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784324  
Gyarmati, Ákos, Michaletzky, Márton & Váradi, Kata [2010]: The Budapest 
Liquidity Measure and its application – Liquidity risk in VaR measure. 
Budapest Stock Exchange, working paper. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784348  
Articles in conference proceedings: 
Váradi, Kata, Gyarmati, Ákos & Lublóy, Ágnes [2012]: The Budapest Liquidity 
Measure and the price impact function. Crisis Aftermath Conference, 8-9 
March, 2012. Szeged, Hungary, pp. 128-140. 
 
 
Liquidity Risk on Stock Markets 
 189 
Abstracts in conference proceedings: 
Váradi, Kata [2011]: Estimation and time series analysis of price impact functions. 
Financial Market Liquidity Conference 2011, 10-11. November, 2011. 
Budapest, Hungary, pp. 13. 
Váradi, Kata [2010]: Introduction and analysis of the Budapest Liquidity Measure. 
Financial Market Liquidity Conference 2010, 21-22. October, 2010. Budapest, 
Hungary, pp. 12. 
 
Publications in English in other topic: 
Reviewed journal: 
Váradi, Kata [2011]: Relationship between industry and capital structure from an 
asymmetric information perspective. International Journal of Management 
Cases, Vol. 13. No. 3. pp. 304-314. 
Articles in conference proceedings: 
Váradi, Kata [2011]: The determinants of capital structure of Hungarian firms based 
on the work of Hungarian researchers. Spring Wind DOSZ conference, 15-17. 
April, 2011. Piliscsaba, Hungary, pp. 439-444.  
Váradi, Kata [2010]: Analysis of the relation between industry and capital structure. 
Credit, World, Stage conference, 3. November, 2010. Sopron, Hungary  
Váradi, Kata [2010]: Relationship between industry and capital structure. Spring 
Wind DOSZ conference, 25-27. March, 2010. Pécs, Hungary, pp. 598-602. 
Abstracts in conference proceedings: 
Váradi, Kata [2011]: Relationship between industry and capital structure from an 
asymmetric information perspective. 8th Circle Conference, 27-29. April, 2011. 
Dubrovnik, Croatia, pp. 132. 
 
